Griffiths v. State
| Decision Date | 24 July 1947 |
| Docket Number | 30143. |
| Citation | 183 P.2d 821,28 Wn.2d 493 |
| Parties | GRIFFITHS v. STATE et al. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Department 1
Action by Austin E. Griffiths, individually and as executor of the estate of Ella Margaret Griffiths, deceased, a against the State and others, for a declaratory judgment determining constitutionality of statute granting to Supervisor of the Inheritance Tax Division authority to designate an appraiser in matters of probate and fixing by statute an arbitrary fee for compensation of the appraiser so designated. From a judgment of dismissal, following the sustaining of a general demurrer to the complaint and plaintiff's election to stand thereon, the plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Hugh Todd, Judge.
Austin E. Griffiths, C. M. McCune and McCune & Yothers, all of Seattle, for appellant.
Smith Troy, Atty. Gen., and Philip W. Richardson, of Olympia, for respondents.
Plaintiff who is the surviving spouse and executor of the will of Ella Margaret Griffiths, deceased, brought this action under the declaratory judgment act against the state of Washington, the state tax commission, the inheritance tax division of the state tax commission, the attorney general, and Charles Frankland, one of the appraisers of the estate of the decedent. Defendants' challenge by general demurrer, on the ground that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, was sustained. Plaintiff elected to stand upon his complaint, whereupon judgment of dismissal was entered. Plaintiff appealed.
The complaint alleges that appellant is the owner of certain lands situate in King county, which lands, prior to the death of appellant's wife, were the community property of appellant and his wife. As the executor of the will of decedent appellant filed an inventory of the estate as required by the statute. The appraisers of the estate, including Charles Frankland, who was nominated by the supervisor of the inheritance tax division and appointed by the court, appraised the estate in the amount of $102,762.06. The court allowed Charles Frankland $102.76 as his fee as appraiser nominated by the supervisor of the division. Appellant refused to pay the fee and brought this action, praying the entry of a judgment judging the fee to be invalid and a cloud on the title of his interest in the estate, and among other things, that the appointment be declared of no effect.
Appellant contends that the statute granting to the supervisor of the inheritance tax division authority to designate an appraiser in matters of probate and fixing by statute an arbitrary fee for compensation of the appraiser so designated is unconstitutional for the reason that the authority granted the supervisor encroaches upon the judicial power vested in the courts of this state under the constitution. It is argued that any legislation which arbitrarily fixes a fee for one of the appraisers, leaving the compensation of the other two to be fixed by the court in such amount as may be just and reasonable, is unconstitutional, as such statute operates to deprive appellant of his property without due process of law. It is further urged that the statute authorizing compensation of the appraiser designated by the supervisor be computed on a different basis than the compensation of the other two appraisers violates Art. I, § 12, of the state constitution which prohibits the enactment of a statute which grants to any citizen or class of citizens privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens.
The first statute relative to inventory and appraisal of estates was enacted in 1854 (see Laws of Washington 1854, p. 276) and remained substantially unchanged until 1873, when mileage outside the county of probate was provided in addition to the daily compensation of $3. Probate Practice Act, Laws of 1873 chapter 7, p. 279, § 131. Prior to the enactment of the Laws of 1901, chapter 55, p. 67, there was no inheritance tax and appraisement was primarily for ascertainment of values for purposes of distribution of the estate and for creditors. In § 1 of the 1901 inheritance tax code is a provision for payment of a reasonable sum for funeral expenses and court costs, including cost of appraisement made for the purpose of assessing the inheritance tax. Sections 13 and 15 of the 1901 inheritance tax code which were amended by the Laws of 1905 chapter 114, p. 222, again provided for appointment of three suitable disinterested persons to appraise the estate and that the appraisers forthwith give notice of the appraisement to the state treasurer who, under the laws of 1901, chapter 55, p. 67, was placed in the supervisory position similar to the supervisor of the inheritance tax division under the present law. The state tax commission was created by the Laws of 1905, chapter 115, p. 224, and was empowered and required to superintend and enforce the inheritance tax laws of the state. The Laws of 1907, chapter 217, p. 499, § 4, authorized the board of tax commissioners to apply to the court to have an estate appraised. The 1917 amendment, Laws of 1917, chapter 156, p. 642, § 95, provided:
The 1919 session of the legislature enacted two statutes relating to the appraisement of estates. The Laws of 1919, chapter 23, [183 P.2d 823] p. 5§, reenacted the 1917 statute and provided in addition that the court might appoint appraisers without application therefor and in some instances authorize dispensing with appraisement. By the Laws of 1919, chapter 24, p. 52, § 1, the state tax commissioner was authorized to object to the appraisement and to appeal therefrom. The Laws of 1929, Chapter 112, p. 216, § 1, changed the compensation of appraisers to a just and reasonable sum not to exceed $5.00 per day, for the time spent in making the appraisement. That act further provided that in all estates where an inheritance tax was payable, the court might fix the compensation of each appraiser in such amount as the court deemed just and reasonable.
The act was last amended by the Laws of 1939, chapter 202, p. 692, § 8, Rem.Rev.Stat. (Sup.), § 1465, which reads as follows ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
National Bank of Commerce of Seattle v. Green
...involved may not raise the question of constitutionality. State v. Lundquist, 60 Wash.2d 397, 374 P.2d 246 (1962); Griffiths v. State, 28 Wash.2d 493, 183 P.2d 821 (1947). The judgment is STAFFORD and UTTER, JJ., concur. 1 Section 1. Section 10, page 452, Laws of 1873 as amended by section ......
-
Zylstra v. Piva, 43485
...Mass., 287 N.E.2d 608 (1972). The legislature may provide by statute for the compensation of judicial employees. See Griffiths v. State, 28 Wash.2d 493, 183 P.2d 821 (1947); Leahey v. Farrell, 362 Pa. 52, 66 A.2d 577 (1949); 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 116. However, such a legislative en......
-
Poffenroth v. Culinary Workers Union Local No. 328
...by section 3 of the Fire Liability Law. * * *' Ventura County v. Southern California Edison Co., supra. Griffiths v. State, 28 Wash.2d 493, 183 P.2d 821, at page 825; Finnegan v. Royal Realty Co, Cal.App., 204 P.2d 661, at page 679; California State Automobile Ass'n v. Downey, 96 Cal.App.2d......
-
Galvin v. Tax Commission
...subject to the tax, and, unless he has been in some way discriminated against, he has no cause for complaint. Griffiths v. State, 1947, 28 Wash.2d 493, 501, 183 P.2d 821; Gengler v. King County, 1942, 12 Wash.2d 227, 235, 121 P.2d Roberts & Schaefer Co. v. Emmerson, 1926, 271 U.S. 50, 54, 5......