Griggs v. Brewer

• Decision Date: 28 October 2016
• Docket Number: No. 16–10221,16–10221
• Citation: 841 F.3d 308
• Parties: Tanner Elliot Griggs, Plaintiff–Appellant v. Officer Charley Daniel Brewer, Defendant–Appellee
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

841 F.3d 308

Tanner Elliot Griggs, Plaintiff–Appellant

v.Officer Charley Daniel Brewer, Defendant–Appellee

No. 16–10221

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

FILED October 28, 2016

Steven Gregory White, Esq., Waco, TX, Shelby Jean White, Harris, Finley & Bogle, P.C., Fort Worth, TX, for Plaintiff–Appellant.

Jeffrey Clay Hartsell, City Attorney's Office for the City of Lubbock, Lubbock, TX, for Defendant–Appellee.

Before JOLLY, HAYNES, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

E. GRADY JOLLY

, Circuit Judge:

This appeal arises from the dismissal, based on qualified immunity, of a § 1983 claim asserting excessive force under the Fourth Amendment.

I.

Officer Charley Brewer conducted a routine traffic stop of a vehicle driven by Tanner Griggs after Griggs ran a red light around 2:00 a.m. on September 4, 2013. A video and audio recording from Officer Brewer's dashboard camera captured most of the incident.

Officer Brewer smelled alcohol and suspected that Griggs might be intoxicated, so he asked Griggs to exit the vehicle and conducted a field sobriety test. After testing Griggs for over fifteen minutes, he arrested Griggs for driving while intoxicated.

The decision to arrest came in the midst of the “one legged stand” part of the sobriety test. Officer Brewer told Griggs, who was attempting to stand on one leg, that he could stop. Griggs did not stop and responded “I'm doing it.” Brewer retorted “you're not actually,” told him to “put your hands behind your back,” and grabbed Griggs's hands to handcuff him. As he did, Griggs lurched to the side and said “no, no.” Brewer immediately performed a “takedown” maneuver and threw Griggs face-down onto the nearby grass and landed on top of him.

As Griggs lay on the ground following the take down, Officer Brewer attempted to handcuff him. Brewer's backup officer, Officer Cruce, came to his assistance. Both officers got on top of Griggs and struggled with him, repeatedly ordering him to put his hands behind his back. Brewer punched Griggs with a closed fist to the back of the head in an effort to gain control of his arms; when Griggs pulled his arms back again, Brewer punched him several more times to regain control. The officers finally gained control of Griggs's arms and handcuffed him.

As noted, a police video was entered into evidence. Although the details of the struggle are blurred in the video, the parties' testimony tells the same basic story: the officers punched Griggs when attempting to gain control of his arms; he withdrew his arms again; and the officers punched him until they gained (and maintained) control of his arms a second time.

Once Griggs was handcuffed, the officers hoisted him to his feet and Officer Brewer escorted him to the back of his patrol vehicle. Officer Brewer attempted to get Griggs into the vehicle, then pushed Griggs's head down into the vehicle. After he was pushed into the vehicle, with his legs still hanging out the door, Griggs kicked Officer Brewer in the chest. Officer Brewer responded by quickly climbing on top of Griggs and delivering a closed-fisted punch to the head.

After he was punched the last time, Griggs receded into the car and Officer Brewer was able to close the door. Brewer completed the arrest without further incident. A blood sample taken from Griggs showed that his blood alcohol level was .273, more than three times the legal limit.

Griggs later brought these claims against Officer Brewer in his individual capacity, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

, alleging that Brewer used constitutionally excessive force in effecting the arrest. The district court granted Officer Brewer's motion for summary judgment, holding that he was entitled to qualified immunity on all claims against him. Griggs appeals.

II.

This court reviews de novo the district court's resolution of legal issues on a motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. Freeman v. Gore , 483 F.3d 404, 410 (5th Cir. 2007)

. Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)

.

In reviewing an appeal from summary judgment, we “view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor.” See Deville v. Marcantel , 567 F.3d 156, 163–64 (5th Cir. 2009)

. Further, although courts view evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, they give greater weight, even at the summary judgment stage, to the facts evident from video recordings taken at the scene. Carnaby v. City of Houston , 636 F.3d 183, 187 (5th Cir. 2011).

III.

A.

The Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force during a seizure is clearly established. See Poole v. City of Shreveport , 691 F.3d 624, 627 (5th Cir. 2012)

. The inquiry is “whether the officers' actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” Graham v. Connor , 490 U.S. 386, 398, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). The use of force must be evaluated “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Poole , 691 F.3d at 627 (quoting Graham , 490 U.S. at 397, 109 S.Ct. 1865 ). Factors to consider in determining whether the force was “objectively reasonable” include the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. Deville , 567 F.3d at 167 (quoting Graham , 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865 ).

Succinctly stated, a plaintiff must show (1) an injury, (2) which resulted directly and only from a use of force that was clearly excessive, and (3) the excessiveness of which was clearly unreasonable. Poole , 691 F.3d at 628

(citations and quotations omitted).

Excessive force claims are necessarily fact-intensive; whether the force used is excessive or unreasonable depends on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Deville , 567 F.3d at 167

(citations and quotations omitted).

B.

In claims against state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

, the official may raise the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. The plaintiff has the burden to negate the defense of qualified immunity where, as here, it is properly raised. See

Brumfield v. Hollins , 551 F.3d 322, 326 (5th Cir. 2008).

“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan , 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009)

(citations and quotations omitted). “Put simply, qualified immunity protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Pratt v. Harris Cty., Tex. , 822 F.3d 174, 181 (5th Cir. 2016) (citations and quotations omitted).

In determining qualified immunity, courts engage in a two-step analysis. First, they assess whether a statutory or constitutional right would have been violated on the facts alleged. Flores v. City of Palacios , 381 F.3d 391, 395 (5th Cir. 2004)

. Second, they determine whether the defendant's actions violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Id.

(citations and quotations omitted). “A clearly established right is one that is sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Mullenix v. Luna , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 305, 308, 193 L.Ed.2d 255 (2015) (citations and quotations omitted). There need not be a case directly on point, but “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Id. (citations and quotations omitted). The two steps of the qualified immunity inquiry may be performed in any order. Pearson , 555 U.S. at 236, 129 S.Ct. 808.

In excessive force cases, “the second prong of the analysis is better understood as two separate inquiries: whether the allegedly violated constitutional rights were clearly established at the time of the incident; and, if so, whether the conduct of the defendants was objectively unreasonable in light of that then clearly established law.” Tarver v. City of Edna , 410 F.3d 745, 750 (5th Cir. 2005)

(citations and quotations omitted). “If officers of reasonable competence could disagree as to whether the plaintiff's rights were violated, the officer's qualified immunity remains intact.” Id.

IV.

Griggs argues that Brewer violated his Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force in effecting the arrest, and that the district court erred in finding that Brewer was entitled to qualified immunity. Specifically, he raises three issues: (1) whether Brewer used excessive force when he executed the “takedown” maneuver; (2) whether Brewer used excessive force by punching him while attempting to handcuff him; and (3) whether Brewer used excessive force by punching him in the face while he was in the police car. We address each issue in turn.

A.

The first issue is whether the initial takedown amounted to excessive force. Recall that as Griggs was performing the one-legged stand during the sobriety test, Officer Brewer decided to arrest Griggs and told him to put his hands behind his back. As he did, Griggs lurched to one side and said “no, no.” Brewer immediately placed Griggs in a choke hold, swept his legs out from under him, and body-slammed him onto the nearby grass. Griggs claims that this “takedown” amounted to excessive force.

Griggs argues that the district judge erred by failing to construe the facts in the light most favorable to him. He testified that he did not “flex” or demonstrate any intent to escape; he merely lost his balance and lurched to the side, so the use of force was not justified. In the...