Wooten v. Roach, Civil Action No. 4:18-CV-380

• Decision Date: 23 December 2019
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 4:18-CV-380
• Parties: Suzanne H. WOOTEN v. John ROACH, Sr., Christopher Milner, Collin County, Texas, Gregory Abbott and Harry Eugene White
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas

431 F.Supp.3d 875

Suzanne H. WOOTEN

v. John ROACH, Sr., Christopher Milner, Collin County, Texas, Gregory Abbott and Harry Eugene White

Civil Action No. 4:18-CV-380

United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Sherman Division.

Signed December 23, 2019

James Painter Roberts, Scott H. Palmer, Scott H. Palmer, PC, Addison, TX, Sean Reed Cox, Law Offices of Sean R. Cox, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff.

Robert Jacob Davis, Matthews Shiels Knott Eden Davis & Beanland LLP, Dallas, TX, Patrick Kinney Sweeten, Christopher D. Hilton, Office of the Attorney General, Austin, TX, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

AMOS L. MAZZANT, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Pending before the Court are Defendants John Roach, Sr. and Christopher Milner's ("CCDAO Defendants") First Amended Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (Dkt. #59), Defendant Collin County, Texas' ("the County") First Amended Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (Dkt. #60), and Defendants Abbott and White's ("AG Defendants") Motion to Dismiss Putative Second Amended Complaint (Dkt. #61). Having considered the motions and the relevant pleadings, the Court finds that the CCDAO Defendants' and AG Defendants' motions (Dkt. #59; Dkt. #61) should be granted in part and denied in part and the County's motion (Dkt. #60) should be denied.

BACKGROUND

As alleged by Plaintiff Suzanne H. Wooten, on March 4, 2008, Plaintiff defeated incumbent Judge Charles Sandoval in the Republican primary election for the 380th District Court Judge in Collin County, Texas by a landslide. The next day, Judge Sandoval approached the Collin County District Attorney's Office (the "CCDAO") to complain about Plaintiff, asserting that she cheated during the election and he wanted the CCDAO to find a crime against her. After this meeting, the CCDAO¹ took it upon itself to investigate Plaintiff's campaign without the assistance of law enforcement. Eventually, the Office of the Attorney General² (the "OAG"), joined in the case against Plaintiff. The investigation lasted over two years before Plaintiff was initially indicted on October 14, 2010, with the final indictment filed on July 14, 2011.

The theory of the criminal investigation and prosecution against Plaintiff was that a married couple, David Frederick Cary and Stacy Stine Cary ("the Carys"), gave itemized monetary contributions to Plaintiff, through the Carys' consultant who also happened to be Plaintiff's media consultant, James Stephen Spencer ("Spencer"). The Carys and Spencer were Plaintiff's co-defendants in the criminal prosecution. Plaintiff and the Carys were all tried separately, and convicted by three different juries. Specifically, Plaintiff's jury found her guilty of six counts of bribery, one count of engaging in organized criminal activity, one count of money laundering, and one count of tampering with a governmental record. After these three trials, Spencer took a plea deal. The Carys appealed their convictions. The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed Stacy Cary's conviction but several months later a different panel determined David Cary should be acquitted on all counts. Both cases were then appealed to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. On December 14, 2016, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals determined that the Carys should be acquitted on all counts, as the allegations against the Carys were not actually a crime pursuant to the relevant statutes. Stacy Cary v. State , 507 S.W.3d 750 (2016) ; David Cary v. State , 507 S.W.3d 761 (2016).

Based on these holdings, on May 10, 2017, Plaintiff filed her First Amended Application for 11.072 Writ of Habeas Corpus Declaring Actual Innocence as a Matter of Law with the 366th Judicial District in Collin County, Texas. On May 24, 2017, the 366th Judicial District in Collin County granted the requested relief "finding the evidence presented legally insufficient because the allegations, even if true, were not crimes under Texas law." (Dkt. #3 at p. 1). The 366th Judicial District in Collin County further determined that because the evidence was legally insufficient to convict her of the nine felony charges, there had been a "violation of the Applicant's due process rights." (Dkt. #3 at p. 1).

Based on this set of facts, Plaintiff filed suit on May 23, 2018 (Dkt. #1). On May 29, 2018, Plaintiff amended her complaint (Dkt. #10) suing the CCDAO Defendants, the AG Defendants, and the County for violation of her due process rights, violation of the Fourth Amendment, conspiracy to deprive constitutional rights, and malicious prosecution, among other causes of action and theories of liability. On April 10, 2019, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint (Dkt. #42). On April 24, 2019, the CCDAO Defendants (Dkt. #59), the AG Defendants (Dkt. #61), and the County (Dkt. #60) filed their present motions to dismiss. Plaintiff responded to the CCDAO Defendants' (Dkt. #66), the AG Defendants' (Dkt. #65), and the County's (Dkt. #64) motions on May 8, 2019. The AG Defendants filed a reply in support of their motion on May 15, 2019 (Dkt. #73). The CCDAO Defendants (Dkt. #77) and the County filed replies on March 20, 2019 (Dkt. #78). On May 22, 2019, Plaintiff filed a sur-reply to the AG Defendants' motion (Dkt. #79). Finally, on May 31, 2019, Plaintiff filed sur-replies to the CCDAO Defendants' motion (Dkt. #80) and the County's motion (Dkt. #81).

LEGAL STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that each claim in a complaint include a "short and plain statement ... showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Each claim must include enough factual allegations "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion allows a party to move for dismissal of an action when the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the plaintiff's complaint and view those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

Bowlby v. City of Aberdeen , 681 F.3d 215, 219 (5th Cir. 2012). The Court may consider "the complaint, any documents attached to the complaint, and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are central to the claim and referenced by the complaint." Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC , 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010). The Court must then determine whether the complaint states a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the [C]ourt to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Gonzalez v. Kay , 577 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ). "But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the [C]ourt to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ " Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) ).

In Iqbal , the Supreme Court established a two-step approach for assessing the sufficiency of a complaint in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. First, the Court should identify and disregard conclusory allegations, for they are "not entitled to the assumption of truth." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 664, 129 S.Ct. 1937 . Second, the Court "consider[s] the factual allegations in [the complaint] to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief." Id. "This standard ‘simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary claims or elements.’ " Morgan v. Hubert , 335 F. App'x 466, 470 (5th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). This evaluation will "be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 .

Thus, "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).

ANALYSIS

In response to Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, the CCDAO Defendants, the AG Defendants, and the County each filed motions to dismiss. However, prior to addressing these motions, the Court needs to address its jurisdiction to accept the new factual allegations added to Plaintiff's complaint and to decide the motions to dismiss filed in this case.

I. Court's Jurisdiction Over the Matters not on Appeal

On March 27, 2019, the Court issued its Order on Defendants' Initial Motions to Dismiss (Dkt. #39) ("Court's Initial Order"). Defendants initially moved to dismiss Plaintiff's claims based on absolute prosecutorial immunity, qualified immunity, official immunity under state law, failure to state a claim under a Monell theory, statute of limitations, and failure to state a claim as to punitive damages. In summary, the Court decided that: (1) the CCDAO Defendants, at this stage in the litigation, are not entitled to prosecutorial immunity; (2) some of the AG Defendants' actions are covered by prosecutorial immunity and some are not; (3) the AG Defendants are not entitled to official immunity; (4) Plaintiff plausibly stated a valid claim using a Monell theory against the County; (5) Plaintiff plausibly pleaded a timely claim; (6) there is no plausible claim for punitive damages against the County; and (7) there is a plausible claim of punitive damages against the CCDAO Defendants. However, the Court did not decide the issue of qualified immunity. The Court stated that "[d]ue to the nature of qualified immunity, the Court finds allowing the Plaintiff to replead will assist the Court...