Griggs v. Greene

• Decision Date: 22 February 1973
• Docket Number: Nos. 27719,27741,s. 27719
• Citation: 197 S.E.2d 116,230 Ga. 257
• Parties: Charlotte GRIGGS et al. v. Fred GREENE et al. John A. BLACKMON v. Jim BRASINGTON et al.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 116

197 S.E.2d 116

230 Ga. 257

Charlotte GRIGGS et al. v. Fred GREENE et al.

John A. BLACKMON v. Jim BRASINGTON et al.

Nos. 27719, 27741.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Feb. 22, 1973.

Rehearing Denied March 15, 1973.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Under the decision of this court in Dobson v. Brown, 225 Ga. 73, 76, 166 S.E.2d 22, it was not a condition precedent to the plaintiffs' right to sue that any taxes admitted to be due be first tendered to the tax commissioners of the respective counties.

2. Under Article VII, Section 1, Paragraph III of the Constitution of 1945, all tangible property, both real and personal, constitutes a single class for the purposes of taxation, and the method of assessment thereof must be uniform throughout the taxing unit. The General Assembly has no authority to establish separate classes of tangible property for the purposes of taxation nor to authorize the revenue commissioner to establish such separate or subclasses of tangible property.

3. Properly construed Ga.L.1966, p. 45, Ga.Laws 1970, p. 91, Ga.L.1970, p. 642, and Ga.Laws 1972, p. 174, codified as §§ 92-7001 through 92-7002.1 of Code Ann. do not either expressly or impliedly require or authorize the sub-classification of tangible property for tax purposes and the orders of the State Revenue Commissioner which directed percentage adjustments in varying percentages as to certain parts of the respective tax digests with respect to tangible property but not with respect to all the tangible property on said digests amounted to sub-classification of such tangible property for tax purposes contrary to law and contrary to the Constitution of this state. Said orders were, therefore, illegal, and the trial court in each case properly enjoined their enforcement.

4. The Acts referred to in the foregoing headnote are not violative of the due process and equal protection provisions of the State and Federal Constitutions by reason of their failure to provide either singly or collectively for notice and an opportunity to be heard to individual taxpayers in counties where adjustments of individual assessments are effected by reason of an order of the revenue commissioner directing a percentage adjustment in the digest of the county as to the whole class of tangible property.

Charles T. Ballard, Fayetteville, for Griggs and others.

Moffett & Henderson, John Walton Henderson, Jr., Atlanta, for Greene and others.

Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., Harold N. Hill, Jr., Executive Asst. Atty. Gen., Richard L. Chambers, H. Perry Michael, Asst. Attys. Gen., Gary B. Andrews, Atlanta, for Blackmon.

Alexander, Vann & Lilly, Roy M. Lilly, Thomas K. Vann, Thomasville, James Lovett, Quitman, for Brasington and others.

Sanders, Mottola, Haugen, Wood & Goodson, Charles Van S. Mottola, Newnan, Heyman & Sizemore, Terry P. McKenna, William H. Major, George H. Myshrall, Atlanta, amicus curiae.

HAWES, Justice.

The appeal in each of these cases is from the order and judgment of the respective superior courts enjoining the defendants from putting into effect in their respective counties orders of the State Revenue Commissioner adjusting by varying percentages the valuations reported by the defendant tax commissioners and assessors on their respective digests as to certain real and personal properties referred to therein. While there are differences in the two cases, the substantial question presented by each is the same, and we have accordingly elected to dispose of them together, though they emanate from widely separated counties of the state.

The Griggs case was commenced when a large number of individual taxpayers, suing on behalf of themselves individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, filed a complaint naming as defendants the tax assessors and the tax commissioner of Fayette County seeking an injunction against the defendants putting into effect the revenue commissioner's order which required that the defendants adjust the tax digest of Fayette County by raising the assessment on real property located outside cities by 89 percent, by raising the assessment on real property located inside cities by 28 percent and by raising the assessment on personal property except bank shares and motor vehicles by 34 percent 'to achieve a digest of 40 percent of fair market value as required by Georgia law.' The case represented by the appeal of Blackmon was commenced when Brasington and four other individuals filed a complaint in the Superior Court of Brooks County against five named individuals as members of the Board of Tax Assessors of Brooks County, against five named individuals as members of the Board of Commissioners of Brooks County, against C. E. Dodd as Tax Commissioner of Brooks County, and against John A. Blackmon as Revenue Commissioner of the State of Georgia, seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the defendants putting into effect an order of the revenue commissioner similar to the order involved in the Griggs case which required that the tax assessors adjust the tax digest of Brooks County by increasing the assessments on all individual parcels of real estate located outside cities by 37 percent, and on personal property except bank shares and motor vehicles by 13 percent 'to achieve a digest of 40 percent of fair market value, as required by Georgia law.'

In each of the cases, the facts, so far as relevant to the issues, are substantially the same and are not in dispute. In each case the parties plaintiff and other taxpayers timely filed tax returns declaring their tangible property, both real and personal, subject to taxation at values which the taxpayers deemed to be the fair market value of the same, and in each instance, the tax assessors, after either accepting the valuation returned by the individual taxpayer or adjusting the same and notifying the taxpayer, and after any adjustments in such valuations resulting from arbitration assessed each parcel of real property and all tangible personal property at 40 percent of the fair market value which had been so fixed by that procedure, as required by law. Code § 92-5703, as amended by Ga.L.1968, pp. 358, 359. Thereafter, the tax receiver of each county prepared the county tax digest and forwarded the same to the State Revenue Commissioner for approval. Upon examination of the respective digests, the State Revenue Commissioner issued the orders respecting each county digest as above referred to and the same were returned to the respective tax commissioners who thereupon, together with the tax assessors of the respective counties, applied percentage adjustments to individual valuations and assessments of the taxpayers owning property of the category covered by the commissioner's order, and without prior notice of such percent age adjustments to any individual taxpayer mailed tax bills reflecting the increased assessments.

In the Griggs case, as was said by the trial court in the order appealed from, the 'gist of the action insofar as constitutional grounds are concerned is the lack of due process resulting from failure to give notice. This point is sufficiently raised and the decision therein cannot be voided by passing a decision herein on any collateral matter.' In neither that case nor in the Blackmon case did the complainants levy a direct attack on the constitutionality of the laws with which we hereinafter deal. The only relief sought in the Griggs case was an injunction prohibiting the defendants from arbitrarily raising assessments pursuant to the order of the revenue commissioner on the ground that the failure to afford the plaintiffs notice and an opportunity to be heard after the issuance of the revenue commissioner's order denied them the equal protection of the law and due process in violation of those constitutional guarantees. The trial court there found in accordance with that contention and merely enjoined the tax assessors from proceeding with any assessment contained in the 1972 Fayette County tax digest insofar as the same had been corrected, changed or equalized by the tax assessors pursuant to the revenue commissioner's order. In the Blackmon case, the attack was on the lawfulness of the procedure followed by the revenue commissioner on the ground that the failure to afford the plaintiffs notice and an opportunity to be heard denied them equal protection of the laws and due process. In that case, however, the trial court in its interlocutory decree expressly held Ga.L.1966, p. 45, as amended by Ga.L.1970, p. 91, and Ga.L.1970, p. 642, as amended by Ga.L.1972, p. 174 to be unconstitutional in that by reason of their failure to provide for notice and an opportunity to be heard after the revenue commissioner has ordered adjustments in the tax digest pursuant thereto they deny equal protection and due process of law.

In the view which we take of these cases, it is necessary to enunciate one other constitutional principle in order that the ruling which we make may be clearly understood. We, therefore, restate the real issues involved in these cases, as follows: First, does the Constitution permit the sub-classification of tangible property for the purpose of applying different assessment rates and procedures to one or more sub-classes of tangible property, and, if so, has the legislature in enacting the provisions of Code § 92-7001 as amended by the various Acts amendatory thereof in fact created sub-classifications of tangible property; second, may the legislature consistent with constitutional due process provide for the adjustment of the tax digests of the various counties by order of the revenue commissioner which results in the adjustment of the assessments of individual taxpayers, without affording the individuals whose assessments are affected by such percentage adjustments notice and an opportunity to be heard thereon.

1. The contention is made that the plaintiffs had no standing to sue in these cases in the absence of...