Griggs v. Griggs

• Decision Date: 11 March 1942
• Docket Number: 15388.
• Citation: 19 S.E.2d 477,199 S.C. 295
• Parties: GRIGGS v. GRIGGS.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

19 S.E.2d 477

199 S.C. 295

GRIGGS v. GRIGGS.

No. 15388.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

March 11, 1942

John D. Nock, of Cheraw, and C. B. Ruffin, of Hartsville, for appellant-respondent.

James E. Leppard, of Chesterfield, and D. Carl Cook, of Hartsville for respondent-appellant.

PER CURIAM.

We have assiduously studied the record in this case, and in the hope that under the governing principles of law, we could reach a satisfactory conclusion, but find that we are in the same position as was the Circuit Judge when he stated in his decree: "It has been impossible for me to determine the truth in this matter as both sides seem to be rather ready to swear to anything. ***" He thereupon undertook to give to plaintiff a life estate in the real property in dispute, and remainder over in fee to the defendant, something he could not do either under the pleadings or the testimony even if full credence be given to the testimony on behalf of plaintiff. Under her claim, she is entitled to have it decreed that either she is the owner of the land in dispute in fee, free of any claim by defendant, or that she has no interest whatsoever in same.

Both the plaintiff and the defendant having appealed from the decree of Judge Dennis, we will, as above, continue to refer to them in that way as it will be less confusing.

The plaintiff commenced her action on February 27, 1936, whereby she claimed that on August 30, 1927, she was seized and possessed, in fee, of a tract of land containing one hundred and forty-one and 50/100 (141.50) acres, more or less situate in Chesterfield County, South Carolina; and that being such owner and so possessed thereof, by her certain deed dated on said day, conveyed this land to defendant on the condition that he, his heirs and assigns, should furnish to her maintenance and support for the remainder of her life and that if the defendant, his heirs and assigns, should fail in the performance of such condition, that then and in such event, the title to the land so conveyed should revert to her. She further alleged that the condition attached to the deed had been breached, and that she had therefore entered in and upon the premises and had taken possession thereof "and has been, since such entry, seized and possessed of the said premises." Further, that notwithstanding the foregoing, the defendant continued to claim the ownership of the said premises by virtue of said deed, and has wrongfully and with force entered into and upon said premises, committing various acts of ownership, "and has threatened and continues to threaten to forcibly remove plaintiff from the said premises."

The answer of defendant was in effect a general denial, and a plea that he and his predecessors in title were seized in fee simple of the tract of land described in the complaint by virtue of deeds for same beginning with deed from David C. Griggs to C. Q. V. Griggs (C. Q. V. Griggs and Victoria Griggs, the plaintiff, are one and the same) of date January 11, 1896, and recorded on January 13, 1896; by deed from plaintiff to Dr. J. W. Williamson, dated September 18, 1905, recorded October 11, 1905; by deed from the heirs at law of Dr. Williamson to Bright Williamson of date March 12, 1926, and duly recorded; and by deed from Bright Williamson to defendant of date October 30, 1926, and recorded November 11, 1926. The defendant further alleges that since the plaintiff conveyed the land involved in this action to Dr. J. W. Williamson in fee simple, with general warranty, in the year 1905, she is estopped from asserting any claim in said land; and that upon defendant purchasing said land from Bright Williamson in October, 1926, he entered into the possession thereof and has continuously remained in the quiet and peaceable possession thereof as owner in fee until "recently when plaintiff unlawfully and maliciously interfered with plaintiff's possession ***."

By consent the cause was referred to the Master in Equity for Chesterfield County to take the testimony and report his findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The Master held two references, at which considerable testimony was taken, and there was admitted in evidence the following deeds, all conveying the property in question:

David C. Griggs to C. Q. V. Griggs (plaintiff), of date January 11, 1896.

C. Q. V. Griggs (plaintiff) to Dr. J. W. Williamson (in fee and general warranty) of date 18th of --, 1905, recorded October 11, 1905.

Sallie E. Byrd et al. (heirs at law of Dr. Williamson) to Bright Williamson, of date March 12, 1926.

Bright Williamson to S. J. Griggs (the defendant), of date October 30, 1926.

Victoria Griggs (plaintiff) to S. J. Griggs (defendant) of date August 30, 1927, containing the condition following: "Provided, nevertheless, and upon condition, that the said S. J. Griggs, his heirs and assigns, shall furnish me maintenance and support for the remainder of my life and to that end and to secure the performance of this covenant to the title to the above mentioned and described premises shall revest in me upon breach of this covenant and condition."

It is probably unnecessary to state that the plaintiff introduced in evidence the first and last deeds above enumerated, and the defendant the others.

It will be observed that at the time the plaintiff conveyed to the defendant this land containing the condition as set out above, the defendant had a perfect paper title, and the plaintiff had no interest to convey. For the years 1898 through 1905, the taxes thereon were paid in the name of plaintiff, but she has not paid the taxes, nor has the land been returned for taxes in her name since 1905. Thereafter the taxes were paid in the name of Dr. J. W. Williamson, and his estate, until in 1927, since which time the property has been returned in the name of the defendant and paid in his name through the year 1938.

The...