Griggs v. Mayor

• Decision Date: 23 March 1898
• Citation: 103 Ga. 602,30 S.E. 561
• Parties: GRIGGS. v. MAYOR, ETC, OF MACON.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

30 S.E. 561

103 Ga. 602

GRIGGS.

v.MAYOR, ETC, OF MACON.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

March 23, 1898.

City Ordinance—Registration of Dogs— Validity—Police Powers.

1. The mayor and council of a city, the charter of which authorizes them to "pass such ordinances as may be deemed necessary for the regulation of stock and other animals within the city, " and also contains the usual "general welfare clause, " have the power to pass and enforce a penal ordinance requiring all persons keeping dogs on their premises within the city to register the same, procure a badge for each dog so kept, and pay a fee of one dollar for each registration and badge.

2. "The power to regulate the keeping of dogs, and to enforce such regulations by forfeitures, fines, and penalties, is recognized as one within the police power."

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error from superior court, Bibb county; W. H. Felton, Jr., Judge.

Action by the mayor, etc., of Macon against Harry Griggs for violating city ordinance. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Affirmed.

Hope Polhill, for plaintiff in error.

Minter Wimberly and Robt. Hodges, Sol. Gen., for defendant in error.

LUMPKIN, P. J. The charter of the city of Macon authorizes the mayor and council to "pass such ordinances as may be deemed necessary for the regulation of stock and other animals within the city, " and also contains a "general welfare clause, " conferring upon the mayor and council the powers usually embraced in like portions of municipal charters.

The question presented by the present case is whether or not the mayor and council of Macon have the power to pass and enforce a penal ordinance requiring all persons keeping dogs on their premises within the city limits to register and procure badges for the same, and pay a fee of one dollar for each registration and badge. It seems difficult to fix with precision the legal status of the dog, but we have reached the conclusion that an ordinance of the kind above indicated was within the domain of the powers enjoyed by the municipal authorities of Macon. In 1 Dill. Mun. Corp. (4th Ed.) 212, note 2, it is said that "the power to regulate the keeping of dogs, and to enforce such regulations by forfeitures, fines, and penalties, is recognized as within the police power"; and, as authority for this proposition, the case of City of Faribault v. Wilson, 34 Minn. 254, 25 N. W. 449, is cited. In that case Wilson was prosecuted and convicted before a city justice for violating the provisions of an ordinance requiring the owner of every dog to register the same with the city...