Griggs v. Stoker Service Co.
| Decision Date | 15 December 1948 |
| Docket Number | 530 |
| Citation | 50 S.E.2d 914,229 N.C. 572 |
| Parties | GRIGGS et al. v. STOKER SERVICE CO., Inc., et al. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
To clarify the controversy, the undisputed events preceding the litigation will be stated at the outset.
The plaintiffs, T. G. Griggs, Otis C. Brigman, and Andrew D Jordan, reside at Ruby, South Carolina. As co-partners under the name of Griggs Trucking Company, they are engaged in the transportation of property in interstate commerce for compensation as common carriers by motor vehicle under the Federal Motor Carriers Act, 49 U.S.C.A. s 1 et seq. The defendant, York-Shipley, Inc., a corporation doing business at York, Pennsylvania, manufactures and wholesales heating equipment, and is hereafter designated as York-Shipley for convenience of description. The defendant, Stoker Service Company, Inc., is a corporation engaged in retailing and installing heating equipment in a territory centering at Charlotte, North Carolina, and is hereafter called Stoker Service for ease of narration.
Between January 7, 1947, and February 7, 1947, York-Shipley made twelve shipments of heating equipment from York Pennsylvania, to Charlotte, North Carolina, upon motor trucks operated by plaintiffs. The shipments were consigned to the order of York-Shipley, and were made on uniform order bills of lading. Each bill of lading contained the direction 'Notify Stoker Service Co., Inc., at 1444 S. Tryon Street, Charlotte, North Carolina,' and the provision 'The surrender of the original order bill of lading properly indorsed shall be required before the delivery of the property. ' The freight charges on the twelve shipments amounted to $890.13.
Section 7 of each bill of lading provided that the consignor should be 'liable for the freight and all other lawful charges,' unless the consignor directed that the shipment should 'be delivered to the consignee without recourse on the consignor' by signing a statement on the face of the bill in these words: 'The carrier shall not make delivery of this shipment without payment of freight and all other charges. ' The defendant, York-Shipley, did not sign such statements on any of the bills of lading.
As shipments were made, drafts for the sale prices were drawn upon Stoker Service by York-Shipley, and were forwarded with the bills of lading attached to banks in Charlotte for collection. These drafts totaled $21,925.98.
Stoker Service never paid the drafts or obtained the bills of lading. When the shipments arrived at Charlotte, the plaintiffs delivered them to Stoker Service without collecting the freight charges and without demanding the production and surrender of the bills of lading.
A few days later, to-wit, on February 14, 1947, York-Shipley and Stoker Service entered into a written contract concerning these matters without notice to the plaintiffs. Under this agreement, Stoker Service relinquished to York-Shipley at the place of business of the former in Charlotte all of the equipment included in the twelve shipments except four items retained by it, and paid York-Shipley for such four items the aggregate sale price of $3,842.79 designated therefor in the appropriate drafts; and York-Shipley released Stoker Service of 'all obligation * * * in connection with the bank drafts drawn by York-Shipley, Inc., on the Stoker Service Company' and agreed to be 'responsible for the payment of all unpaid freight * * * charges' on all of the property, except the four items kept by Stoker Service. The items retained by Stoker Service were covered by four of the bills of lading, and practically all of the equipment repossessed by York-Shipley was embraced by the other eight.
The plaintiffs began this action by suing Stoker Service for the freight charges on all twelve shipments. Stoker Service thereupon procured an order making York-Shipley a party defendant, and filed an answer praying that it be exonerated from liability and that York-Shipley be adjudged legally accountable to plaintiffs for the transportation charges. The action was nonsuited on the trial as to Stoker Service, and no appeal has been prosecuted from this ruling. In consequence, this Court is concerned only with the conflictive claims of the plaintiffs and York-Shipley.
After York-Shipley became a party, the plaintiffs filed a somewhat informal pleading in which they allege sufficient facts to show a right on their part to recover the freight charges of York-Shipley in its capacity as consignor and by virtue of its contract of February 14, 1947, with Stoker Service. This pleading does not demand judgment against York- Shipley for the freight charges, but it does pray 'for such relief as the plaintiffs are entitled to in the premises. ' York-Shipley answered, admitting it was bound by its contract with Stoker Service. But it denied liability for the transportation charges and asserted a counterclaim against plaintiffs for breaches of the contracts of carriage because of their delivery of the several shipments to Stoker Service without production and surrender of the bills of lading. Plaintiffs replied, alleging that the supposed misdelivery had been previously authorized by York-Shipley and had been subsequently ratified by York-Shipley by its contract of February 14, 1947, with Stoker Service.
Pursuant to the written consent of the parties filed with the Clerk, the action was tried by Judge Coggin without a jury under G.S. s 1-184. The court made findings of fact on evidence properly presented conforming to the undisputed matters hereinbefore set out.
In addition, the court made these findings of fact adverse to the plaintiffs, to-wit: (1) That York-Shipley did not authorize plaintiffs to deliver any of the shipments to Stoker Service without production and surrender of the bills of lading; (2) that York-Shipley did not ratify the wrongful delivery of the property repossessed by it or waive its rights against the plaintiffs therefor by its contract of February 14, 1947, with Stoker Service; and (3) that York-Shipley entered into such contract and actually expended $805.47 reclaiming the property repossessed by it thereunder in a reasonable effort to avoid or minimize the damaging effects of the wrongful delivery of the shipments to Stoker Service. These findings were based in part upon evidence indicating that Stoker Service professed a financial inability to pay for the equipment in its entirety. The plaintiffs did not except to these findings, which were supported by testimony on the trial.
York-Shipley contended that the pecuniary losses resulting to it from the misdelivery of its property exceeded the expenses of $805.47 set out above, and that it was entitled to recover an additional $943.85 on account of salaries and expense accounts which it allegedly paid to some of its agents while they were negotiating the contract of February 14, 1947, and repossessing the heating equipment thereunder. But the testimony presented by York-Shipley to establish this contention did not prove convincing to the court, which found on the entire evidence that the claimed loss of $943.85 'did not result from * * * acts of the plaintiffs. ' York-Shipley excepted to this finding.
After making its findings of fact and drawing conclusions of law therefrom, the court 'decreed that the plaintiffs have and recover of the defendant York-Shipley, Inc., the sum of $890.13, and that the defendant York-Shipley, Inc., have and recover of the plaintiffs the sum of $805.47, and that the defendant York-Shipley, Inc., be taxed with the costs of this action.'
The plaintiffs and York-Shipley took separate appeals from this judgment to this Court.
M. K. Harrill, of Charlotte, and James E. Leppard, of Chesterfield, S. C., for the plaintiffs, appellants and appellees.
Covington & Lobdell, of Charlotte, for defendant York-Shipley, Inc., appellant and appellee.
The defendant, York-Shipley, asserts on its appeal by appropriate assignments of error that the pleadings of the plaintiffs do not state a cause of action against it for recovery of the freight charges, and that by reason thereof the court erred in concluding and adjudging that it is liable to plaintiffs for the same.
The pleadings of the plaintiffs are somewhat informal and do not contain any specific demand for judgment against the defendant, York-Shipley, for the amount of the freight charges. In consequence, they fall short of the standard of good pleading under G.S. s 1-122, which clearly contemplates that a plaintiff should set forth in his complaint a demand for the relief to which he supposes himself entitled. Notwithstanding this statute, however, the decisions have consistently followed the rule that under the code of civil procedure the relief to be granted in an action does not depend upon that asked for in the complaint, but upon whether the matters alleged and proved entitle the complaining party to the relief granted, and this is so in the absence of any prayer for relief. Bryan v. Canady, 169 N.C. 579, 86 S.E. 584; McNeill v. Hodges, 105 N.C. 52, 11 S.E. 265; Knight v. Houghtalling, 85 N.C. 17. As Chief Justice Merrimon said in Presson v. Boone, 108 N.C. 78, 79, 12 S.E. 897, 900: ...
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