Grimes v. Amtec Corp.

• Decision Date: 30 July 2012
• Docket Number: Civil Action Number 5:12-cv-01144-JEO
• Parties: CAROLYN GRIMES, Individually and as Administratrix and Personal Representative of the Estate of Jerry A. Grimes, deceased, and as a dependent survivor of Jerry A. Grimes, Plaintiff, v. AMTEC CORPORATION, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama

CAROLYN GRIMES, Individually and as Administratrix and Personal Representativeof the Estate of Jerry A. Grimes, deceased, and as a dependent survivor of Jerry A. Grimes, Plaintiff,

v.AMTEC CORPORATION, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action Number 5:12-cv-01144-JEO

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

Dated: July 30, 2012

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This action is before the court on plaintiff Carolyn Grimes's Motion to Remand the case to the Circuit Court of Madison County. (Doc. 21). The matter has been briefed by the parties and is appropriate for resolution. (Docs. 40-43, 53-55). Upon consideration, the court finds that the motion is due to be granted and, therefore, the action is due to be remanded to the Circuit Court of Madison County, Alabama.

I. BACKGROUND

This action arises from a May 5, 2010, accident in Madison County, Alabama, in which a decanter centrifuge exploded and caused fatal injuries to plaintiff's husband, Jerry A. Grimes. (Doc. 1-1). At the time of the accident, Grimes was working on a project at Redstone Arsenal for defendant Amtec Corporation. (Id. at 9). Plaintiff subsequently filed this action in the Circuit Court of Madison County, alleging workers' compensation claims against Amtec Corporation and Employers Claims Management Inc., and wrongful-death and breach-of-warranty claims against U.S. Centrifuge Corporation, U.S. Centrifuge Systems, Inc., U.S. Innovation Group, Inc.,U.S. Centrifuge d/b/a U.S. Innovation Group, Inc., Centriquip, Ltd., Ashbrook Simon-Hartley, Ltd., Ashbrook Simon-Hartley, Ltd., d/b/a Centriquip, Ltd., Dr. William Albritton, Scott Albritton, Gene Jordan, Tom Chandler, Steve Ward, and numerous fictitious defendants. (Doc. 1-1 at 2). On March 16, 2012, plaintiff moved the circuit court for leave to amend the Complaint to add Ashbrook Simon-Hartley, LP, Ashbrook Simon-Hartley Operations LP, and Ashbrook Simon-Hartley Operations GP, LLC, as additional defendants. (Doc. 1-5 at 2). The circuit court granted that motion, and plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint on March 21, 2012. (Doc. 1-6 at 2).

The three subsequently added defendants, Ashbrook Simon-Hartley, LP, Ashbrook Simon-Hartley Operations, LP, and Ashbrook Simon-Hartley Operations GP, LLC, removed the case to this court on April 17, 2012, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441, 1446, and 16 U.S.C. § 457. (Doc. 1). The removing defendants particularly asserted that this court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case under federal-enclave jurisdiction, and, therefore, the case is removable under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).¹ (Id. at 2). Additionally, these defendants asserted that this court has original and exclusive jurisdiction of this case pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 457 because Jerry Grimes's death occurred within a place subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.² (Id. at 3). The same day, April 17, 2012, defendant U.S. Innovation Group, Inc., filed anotice to join the removing defendants in removing the action to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446 and 16 U.S.C. § 457.³ (Doc. 4). On May 3, 2012, defendants Amtec Corporation, Employers Claims Management, Inc., Dr. William Albritton, Scott Albritton, Gene Jordan, Tom Chandler, and Steve Ward filed a notice that they did not consent and have not consented to the removal of this action. (Doc. 13).

On May 15, 2012, plaintiff moved to remand the action back to the Circuit Court of Madison County. (Doc. 21). The removing defendants and defendant U.S. Innovation Group, Inc., responded in opposition to the motion. (Docs. 40 & 41). Plaintiff then replied. (Docs. 42 & 43). Plaintiff filed a notice of supplemental authority (doc. 53) in support of the remand, and certain defendants filed responses in opposition (doc. 54 & 55).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A civil action filed in a state court may be removed to federal court only if the district court would have had jurisdiction over the case had the case been brought there originally. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). District courts, of course, have original jurisdiction over diversity matters and matters arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. Because there is no contention in this case of diversity of citizenship between the parties, federal jurisdiction must rest, if at all, on federal-question jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §1331.

Because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, the parties seeking removal carry the burden of showing the propriety of this court's removal jurisdiction. See Diaz v. Sheppard, 85 F.3d 1502, 1505 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1162 (1997). Additionally, "[a] court must strictly construe the requirements of the removal statute, as removal constitutes an infringement on state sovereignty." Newman v. Spectrum Stores, Inc., 109 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 1345 (M.D. Ala. 2000). The Eleventh Circuit has explained that a "[d]efendant's right to remove and plaintiff's right to choose his forum are not on equal footing." Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir. 1994). Therefore, any ambiguities are to be construed against removal because the removal statutes should be strictly construed in favor of remand. See id. "When a plaintiff questions the propriety of a defendant's removal petition, the defendant bears the burden of showing that the removal was proper." Newman, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 1345.

III. ANALYSIS

The removing defendants' central argument is that federal-enclave jurisdiction provides the court subject-matter jurisdiction because the incident arose on Redstone Arsenal and that this jurisdiction is exclusive of the state courts pursuant to Art. I, § 8, cl. 17, U.S. CONST., and 16 U.S.C. § 457. To understand the application of federal-enclave jurisdiction, a background of the existence of federal enclaves and the formation of Redstone Arsenal is helpful. In 1943, the State of Alabama ceded land in Madison County to the United States for creation of Redstone Arsenal. See Alabama-Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. City of Huntsville, 153 So. 2d 619, 625 (Ala. 1963) ("Redstone Arsenal was ceded to the Federal Government by the State of Alabama."). The cessation occurred consistent with Article I, § 8, cl. 17, U.S. CONST., whichprovides Congress the power to exclusively legislate "all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings." (emphasis added).

The places listed in clause 17 are considered "'federal enclaves' within which the United States has exclusive jurisdiction." Akin v. Ashland Chem. Co., 156 F.3d 1030, 1034 (10th Cir. 1998). The Supreme Court has explained that "if the United States acquires with the 'consent' of the state legislature land within the borders of that State by purchase or condemnation for any of the purposes mentioned in Art. I, § 8, cl. 17 ... the jurisdiction of the Federal Government becomes 'exclusive.'" Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 264 (1963). However, the law is well established that "the jurisdiction acquired from a state by the United States whether by consent to the purchase or by cession may be qualified in accordance with agreements reached by the respective governments." James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94, 99 (1940). The Patent of Cessation for Redstone Arsenal made several qualifications and states in relevant part:

I, Chauncey Sparks, as Governor of the State of Alabama, in the name and on behalf of the State of Alabama, and in accordance with the laws of said State, do hereby cede unto the United States of America exclusive jurisdiction over land comprising the site of the Huntsville Arsenal, and also the site of the Redstone Arsenal, all situate[d] in Madison County, State of Alabama, and more particularly described as follows:

. . .

PROVIDED, That the jurisdiction so ceded shall not prevent the execution upon such lands of any process, civil or criminal, issued under the authority of this State, except as such process might affect the property of the United States thereon.

PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the State of Alabama expressly reserves the right to tax all persons, firms, corporations, or associations now or hereafter residing or located upon said land, to tax or exercise by any person, firm,corporation, or association of any and all rights, privileges, and franchises upon said land, and to tax property of all persons, firms, corporations, or associations situated upon said land. The jurisdiction ceded is for the purpose of cession, and none other, and shall continue during the time the United States shall be or remain the owner thereof and shall use such land for the purposes of cession, and the State of Alabama expressly reserves the right to exercise over or upon any such land any and all rights, privileges, powers, or jurisdiction which may now or hereafter be released or receded by the United States to the State.

(Doc. 1-7 at 2-8).

With the creation of federal enclaves, a need arose "to provide a source of law to claims for personal injuries sustained on land that was ceded by one sovereign (e.g., a state) to the exclusive jurisdiction of another sovereign (e.g., the United States)." Sinicki v. General Elec. Co., No. 1:05-cv-508, 2005 WL 1592961, *3 (N.D.N.Y. 2005). In simple terms, to prevent a legal void, "the preexisting State law becomes federal law." Pratt v. Kelly, 585 F.2d 692, 695 (4th Cir. 1978) (citing Sadrakula, 309 U.S. at 99-101). Therefore, when the State of Alabama ceded the land to the United States, Alabama law, by virtue of Alabama sovereignty, ceased to exist, but the substance of the law remained in effect as federal law, by virtue of the sovereignty of the United States. See Mater v. Holley, 200 F.2d 123, 124 (5th Cir. 1953)⁴ (citing Chi., Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co. v. McGlinn, 114 U.S. 542, 546-47 (1885)); Stokes v. Adair, 265 F.2d 662, 664...