Grimes v. Bryne

• Citation: 2 Minn. 89
• Parties: GEORGE J. GRIMES vs. JOHN D. BRYNE.
• Decision Date: 01 January 1858
• Court: Supreme Court of Minnesota (US)

2 Minn. 89

GEORGE J. GRIMESvs.

JOHN D. BRYNE.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Appeal from judgment of district court, Ramsey county.

This was an action in replevin. It appeared from the complaint and a stipulation, that the plaintiff was a merchant in business; that the property involved in the action was his entire stock in trade, and worth not more than $200; that the same had been levied upon by the defendant, an officer, upon a writ of attachment, issued in an action to recover a debt accrued before August 12, 1858. To the complaint the defendant interposed a demurrer, upon the following gounds:

1. That it did not appear by said complaint that the property therein mentioned was exempt from execution or attachment, because — (a) The debt on which the attachment issued in this action accrued before the passage of the law exempting four hundred

dollars' worth of stock in trade, and said law has only a prospective effect. (b) Any construction giving said law a retrospective effect, would be unconstitutional, and the law, consequently, void as to past contracts. (c) If said law has no effect on this case, plaintiff shows no title by his complaint, because, in such case, the attachment was rightly and legally executed.

2. It does not appear by said complaint, that said plaintiff was a mechanic or other person who has a right to stock in trade to the amount of four hundred dollars, a merchant not having that right.

3. It does not appear that the goods in the complaint mentioned were stock in any trade, or that the plaintiff was exercising or doing any trade or business.

The district court sustained the demurrer, and a judgment for the return of the property was made and entered, from which judgment the plaintiff appealed to this court.

Points and authorities for the appellant:

The court below erred in sustaining defendant's demurrer to plaintiff's complaint herein, because —

1. By the constitution of the state, every man is entitled to a reasonable amount of property which shall be exempt from seizure or sale for any debt or liability. Const., art. 1, § 12.

2. The law of August 12, 1858, "An act for a homestead exemption," determines (under the constitution) the amount of property exempt from seizure on sale, and is a general remedial law, intended to, and which does, include merchants butchers, grocery shop-keepers, as well as farmers, mechanics, miners, and professional men. Minn. Session Laws, 1858, 89, 90, and 91; 2 Vattel, ch. 17, on Construction and Interpretation; Smith's Com. on Const. Construction, ch. 12; The American Fur Company v. The United States, 2 Pet. 358; The People v. Hennessey, 15 Wend. 147; The United States v. Winn, cited in Smith's Com. 874; Bishop's Crim. Law, § 149, and note 7, and cases there cited; Eubanks v. The State, 5 Mo. 450; Foley v. The People, 1 Ill. 57; Minn. & P. R. R. Co. v. Gov. Sibley, ante; also, Bouvier's and Webster's Dict. for the definition of the words, tools, instruments, trade, stock, other, and business.

3. Said statute, aside from the constitution, is remedial only, and does not impair the obligation of contracts; and was intended to, and does, affect past contracts as well as future. Smith's Com. on Const. Construction, § 254; Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 200; Butler v. Palmer, 1 Hill, 325; Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Pet. 380; 3 Story on Construction, 250; Bronson v. Newberry, 2 Doug. Mich. 38; Rockwell v. Hubbell's Adm'rs, 2 Doug. Mich. 197; 2 Parsons on Cont. 532-3-4, and cases cited in notes; Vedder v. Alkenbrack, 6 Barb. 327; Evans v. Montgomery, 4 Watts and S. Penn. 218; Morse v. Goold, 11 N. Y. 281; see also the debates in the constitutional convention on the bill of rights, exemption, and retroactive laws.

Points and authorities for respondent:

1. The plaintiff does not show himself a person entitled to the benefit of the act. (a) The act excepts the tools and instruments of any mechanic, miner, or other person, used and kept for the purpose of carrying on his trade or business, and, in addition thereto, stock in trade not exceeding four hundred dollars in value. The stock in trade is given only in addition to the tools and instruments, and unless the plaintiff shows himself to be a "mechanic, miner, or other person," using "tools and instruments," which are exempt by the previous clause, he cannot claim exemption for any stock in trade. The stock in trade is only exempt in addition to tools and instruments — weights, counters, and shelves are not such tools and instruments. Web. Dic.; opinion of Palmer, J., in court below. (b) Stock in trade means only the said material to be worked up into the finished article, e. g. leather for a shoemaker, rough lumber for a cabinet maker, iron for a blacksmith, &c. A more extended signification would be absurd, for it would exempt land of a real estate dealer, cattle of a horse trader, specie in gold or silver of a banker, and, in short, every kind of capital to the amount of four hundred dollars.

2. The debt on which the attachment issued being prior to the passage of this law, and the law having no express retroactive provisions, it will not be construed to have a retroactive effect, but will be held to apply only to cases in future. This principle is uniform. 6 Bacon Abr. title Statute (C.) 370; 1 Arch. Black. Com. 44-45; 2 Atkyns, 36; 7 Johns. 477; 8 Wend. 661; 1 Hill, 324, 334; 7 Barb. 445; 11 Paige, 400; 3 Dallas, 386; 2 Cranch, 272; 1 Denio, 128; 1 N. Y. 129. On non-payment of the debt the creditor's right to levy on the property becomes vested, and no statute should be so construed as to take away a vested right, "even if the thing be within the letter of the statute, should be so read, if possible as not to touch it." Bronson, J., 5 Hill, 333, 334, 335. In this case, the statute words, "shall be," have rather a future signification.

3. The act, as regards past contracts, is unconstitutional and void. (a) The law existing at the time of the foundation of the contract, and which is the law of contracts, as distinguished from the legal remedies to enforce the contract, is a part of the contract, and cannot be altered by legislation. McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. U. S. 608. (b) It impairs the obligation of the contract, as the act of August 12 was passed after the contract was made. Quackenbush v. Danks, 1 Denio, 128; Danks v. Quackenbush, 3 Denio, 594; 1 N. Y. 129; McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 608; Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. U. S. 311; 6 Web. 200, 349.

Babcock & Cotton, for appellant.

Gorman & Peckham, for respondent.

FLANDRAU, J.

Three important questions are presented by this case. 1. Whether the exemption law of August 12, 1858, was intended to operate upon debts contracted prior to its passage. 2. That if it was so intended, it, to that extent, contravenes the provisions of the constitution of the United States, and of our own state, that laws shall not be passed impairing the obligation of contracts. Const. U. S. art. 1, § 10; Const. Minn. art. 1, § 11. And 3. Whether the plaintiff falls within the class of persons entitled to its benefits.

The plaintiff, in the court below, contracted a debt prior to the passage of the act of August 12, 1858, upon which an attachment was issued by a justice of the peace, after the passage of that act, and the property of the plaintiff (defendant in the attachment) was seized, consisting of a stock of groceries, the vessels containing them, and the counters and shelves upon which they were kept and sold. The plaintiff was a merchant doing business in Saint Paul at the time of the seizure, and these goods comprised "his entire stock and implements of trade in that business," and were in value less than four hundred dollars. Had the exemption law of August 12, 1858, a retrospective operation? The section which gives the exemption is as follows: "Sec. 8. No property hereinafter mentioned or represented shall be liable to attachment, execution, or sale, or any final process issued from any court in this state." It would seem that the language was full and broad enough to cover everything which existed at the time of its passage, and that it was directed against all process which should be issued subsequently. It was claimed, on the argument, that the words, "shall be," gave the statute a prospective force only; but it will be observed that those words are directed to the seizure of property subsequently to the passage of the act, and to such process as should be afterwards executed, and not to the debt or demand upon which the process was issued. The statute simply says, that the property mentioned shall not be liable to the process named, and, we think, was intended to include process issued upon antecedent as well as subsequent demands. Morse v. Goold, 5 N. Y. 281.

On the question of whether the legislature can give validity to an act of this nature, much conflict of opinion and authority exists, and the difficulty arises in distinguishing between such acts as impair the obligation of the contract, and such as simply apply to the remedy. No case that I have had access to denies the right to the several states to control the remedy, except 1 Denio, 123, noticed hereafter, but they differ materially in their reasoning and conclusions as to what is an infringement of the right, or merely a regulation of the remedy. The leading cases in the supreme court of the United States, on this subject, are Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311; McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 608.

These cases arose under statutes of a state, called valuation laws. In Bronson v. Kinzie, the question decided was, that a state law passed subsequently to the execution of a mortgage, which declared that the equitable estate of the mortgagor should not be extinguished for twelve months after a sale under a decree in chancery, and prevented any sale unless two-thirds of the amount at which the property had been valued by appraisers should be bid therefor, was within the clause of the...