Grimes v. Cnty. of Cook

• Decision Date: 23 April 2020
• Docket Number: 19 C 6091
• Citation: 455 F.Supp.3d 630
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
• Parties: Logan M. GRIMES, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF COOK, an Illinois county, d/b/a Cook County Health & Hospitals System and/or Cermak Health Services, and Melvin Judkins, in his individual capacity, Defendants.

455 F.Supp.3d 630

Logan M. GRIMES, Plaintiff,

v.COUNTY OF COOK, an Illinois county, d/b/a Cook County Health & Hospitals System and/or Cermak Health Services, and Melvin Judkins, in his individual capacity, Defendants.

19 C 6091

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

Signed April 23, 2020

Joanie Rae Wimmer, Law Offices of Joanie Rae Wimmer, Oak Park, IL, for Plaintiff.

Colleen Marie Harvey, Cook County State's Attorneys Office, Chicago, IL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Gary Feinerman, United States District Judge

Logan Grimes brought this suit in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, against his employer, Cook County, and his supervisor, Melvin Judkins, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Illinois law. Doc. 1 at pp. 143-182. Defendants removed the suit, id. at 1-2, Grimes amended his complaint, Doc. 13, and Defendants move under Civil Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss the suit, Doc. 18. The motion is denied.

Background

In resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court assumes the truth of the operative complaint's well-pleaded factual allegations, though not its legal conclusions. See Zahn v. N. Am. Power & Gas, LLC , 815 F.3d 1082, 1087 (7th Cir. 2016). The court must also consider "documents attached to the complaint, documents that are critical to the complaint and referred to in it, and information that is subject to proper judicial notice," along with additional facts set forth in Grimes's brief opposing dismissal, so long as those additional facts "are consistent with the pleadings." Phillips v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. , 714 F.3d 1017, 1020 (7th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). The facts are set forth as favorably to Grimes as those materials allow. See Pierce v. Zoetis, Inc. , 818 F.3d 274, 277 (7th Cir. 2016). The passages in quotation marks are direct quotations from the operative complaint. In setting forth the facts at the pleading stage, the court does not vouch for their accuracy. See Goldberg v. United States , 881 F.3d 529, 531 (7th Cir. 2018).

Grimes is a transgender person. Doc. 13 at p. 2, ¶ 4. Transgender means "of, relating to, or being a person whose gender identity differs from the sex the person had or was identified as having at birth." Ibid. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). At birth, Grimes's "designated sex ... was female." Ibid . Around 2000, when he was 37 years old, Grimes was diagnosed with a condition then known as gender identity disorder and today known—under the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition ("DSM-5")—as gender dysphoria

. Ibid . Around 2003, Grimes became recognized medically and legally as male. Id. at p. 3, ¶ 6. To treat his gender dysphoria, Grimes underwent a series of medical interventions, including testosterone treatment, chest reconstructive surgery, and genital surgeries. Id. at p. 2, ¶ 4. Grimes's surgical treatment was completed by 2006, and he continues to undergo testosterone treatment. Ibid.

As a result of these medical procedures, Grimes has male pattern baldness

, a low voice, a full beard, and a male build. Id. at p. 3, ¶ 5. Grimes has presented as "unambiguously male" since at least 2008. Ibid . From 2008 to the present, disclosing that Grimes is transgender would be tantamount to disclosing that he had gender dysphoria and that he had undergone significant medical intervention given that: "(1) no one could look or sound like [Grimes] whose designated sex at birth was female without significant medical interventions, (2) the combination of surgeries which [he] [underwent] were available only to persons diagnosed with ... gender dysphoria, and (3) a person does not transition from one sex to the other unless they suffer from gender dysphoria." Ibid.

Grimes has sought to keep his transgender status private, disclosing it only to close friends and not to neighbors, acquaintances, or co-workers. Id. at p. 3, ¶ 7. When applying for jobs, Grimes did not disclose his transgender status, which he considers confidential medical information. Ibid. Grimes was " ‘living in stealth’ "—a term "used to refer to people who are not out to the public about their transgender status." Id. at p. 4, ¶ 8.

In February 2013, Grimes began work as a Correctional Medical Technician II at Cook County Jail. Id. at p. 2, ¶ 2. Cook County was Grimes's employer and Judkins was his immediate supervisor. Id. at p. 2, ¶¶ 2-3. On at least five occasions, Grimes witnessed verbal harassment and degradation of transgender detainees by correctional officers and medical staff. Id. at p. 4, ¶ 9. Grimes also is aware of incidents of physical violence toward transgender detainees by correctional officers at the Jail. Ibid ; Doc. 13-1.

In 2013, after acts of violence were perpetrated against transgender detainees, the Jail placed some transgender detainees in protective custody. Doc. 13 at p. 4, ¶ 10; Doc. 13-1. For the entirety of Grimes's tenure at the Jail, there was a culture of transphobia among Jail employees. Doc. 13 at p. 4, ¶ 11. For example, in August 2018, while speaking with Grimes, a co-worker referred to an individual who presented as female by saying: " ‘You see that. That's a man. People ought to tell who they really are. That's how people get killed.’ " Id. at p. 5, ¶ 12.

On September 28, 2018, Judkins told some of Grimes's co-workers that Grimes is transgender and that this was the reason he was no longer assigned to Division Six, which housed transgender detainees. Id. at p. 5, ¶ 13. On September 30, 2018, two co-workers who were present when Judkins outed Grimes told Grimes that Judkins had disclosed his transgender status. Id. at p. 6, ¶ 15. One co-worker told Grimes she was afraid for his physical safety. Ibid. The disclosure of Grimes's status to his co-workers created a significant likelihood of physical violence against him. Id. at p. 6, ¶ 16.

Grimes fears for his safety and his family's safety should he continue to work at the Jail. Id. at p. 6, ¶ 17. He has been on an unexcused and unpaid leave of absence since September 28, 2018, losing income and retirement benefits he otherwise would have earned. Ibid. As a result of Judkins's disclosure of his status, Grimes has lost friends and acquaintances; experienced severe mental and emotional pain and suffering; endured sleepless nights and hypertension

; been prescribed hypertensive medication to reduce his blood pressure; and incurred medical expenses. Ibid.

Discussion

I. Section 1983 Claim

Grimes's § 1983 claim alleges that Judkins violated his right to medical privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Id. at pp. 1-8. A substantive due process claim "is limited to violations of fundamental rights." Palka v. Shelton , 623 F.3d 447, 453 (7th Cir. 2010). The Seventh Circuit has held that one fundamental right is the "right to the privacy of medical, sexual, financial, and perhaps other categories of highly personal information—information that most people are reluctant to disclose to strangers." Wolfe v. Schaefer , 619 F.3d 782, 785 (7th Cir. 2010). This "right is defeasible only upon proof of a strong public interest in access to or dissemination of the information." Ibid. ; see also Denius v. Dunlap , 209 F.3d 944, 956 (7th Cir. 2000) ("[T]his Circuit has outlined a clearly established ‘substantial’ right in the confidentiality of medical information that can only be overcome by a sufficiently strong state interest."). Defendants do not argue that the public interest justified Judkins's disclosure of Grimes's transgender status. Thus, whether Grimes states a medical privacy claim turns on whether he alleges that (1) Judkins disclosed to others (2) his private medical information (3) without his permission.

Grimes plainly satisfies (1) and (3), having alleged that Judkins made a disclosure to others without his permission. Doc. 13 at p. 5, ¶ 13. As for (2), the subject matter of Judkins's disclosure—Grimes's transgender status—qualifies as private medical information. Grimes plausibly alleges that anybody informed of his transgender status would necessarily know of his gender dysphoria

and prior medical interventions. Id. at pp. 2-3, ¶¶ 4-5. Gender dysphoria is a medical condition under governing precedent, see

Fields v. Smith , 653 F.3d 550, 555 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that the condition then known as gender identity disorder was a "serious medical need"); Maggert v. Hanks , 131 F.3d 670, 671 (7th Cir. 1997) (describing a transgender woman's gender dysphoria as a medical condition, the treatment of which required estrogen therapy and surgery), and according to the psychiatric community, see American Psychiatric Association ("APA"), Gender Dysphoria 1 (APA 2013), available at https://www.psychiatry.org/File% 20Library/Psychiatrists/Practice/DSM/APA_DSM-5-Gender-Dysphoria.pdf ("In the [DSM-5], people whose gender at birth is contrary to the one they identify with will be diagnosed with gender dysphoria."); see also

McGee v. Bartow , 593 F.3d 556, 576-77 (7th Cir. 2010) (describing the DSM as a "respected source"). And it is plausible that Grimes's transgender status is private information "that most people are reluctant to disclose to strangers," Wolfe , 619 F.3d at 785, as he alleges that many transgender persons go to great lengths to keep their statuses private, Doc. 13 at p. 4, ¶ 8, that he personally went to great lengths to keep his status private, id. at pp. 3-4, ¶¶ 7-8, and that he would likely face violence at work as a result of his status being disclosed, id. at p. 6, ¶¶ 16-17.

Defendants incorrectly contend that Grimes's § 1983 claim fails because he does not allege "how Judkins accessed [his medical] information." Doc. 18 at 5. Given the complaint's allegation that Judkins made a significant employment-related decision—declining to post Grimes to Division Six, where transgender detainees are held—based on Grimes's transgender status, Doc. 13 at p. 5, ¶ 13, it is...