Grimes v. Enter. Leasing Co. of Phila., LLC.
| Decision Date | 11 June 2013 |
| Citation | 2013 PA Super 57,66 A.3d 330 |
| Parties | Christina GRIMES, Appellant v. ENTERPRISE LEASING COMPANY OF PHILADELPHIA, LLC., Appellee. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
James M. Alexander, Philadelphia, for appellant.
Theodore H. Jobbes, Philadelphia, for appellee.
Appellant, Christina Grimes (Grimes), appeals from the March 29, 2012 order granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by Appellee, Enterprise Leasing Company of Philadelphia, LLC (Enterprise). After careful review, we reverse the portion of trial court's order granting Enterprise judgment on the pleadings as to Grimes' claim under the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL).1 In all other aspects, we affirm.
The trial court summarized the relevant facts and procedural history of this case as follows.
On December 29, 2010, [Grimes] executed a vehicle rental contract () with Enterprise. [Grimes] declined an optional damage waiver provision that would have rendered the disputed fees inapplicable here. Instead, [Grimes] elected to forgo the optional waiver and agreed that if the vehicle were damaged during the rental period, she would pay Enterprise for the repairs, as well as administrative, loss of use, and diminution in value fees. Section Six of the Rental Agreement (“Section Six”) explained in detail, the manner in which the fees would be calculated. It is clear from the language in the Rental [A]greement that causing damage to the rental is not a breach of contract. Further, the section of the [A]greement that explains the damage calculation is not a liquidated damages clause intended to compensate Enterprise for damages incurred as a result of a breach.
The Rental Agreement also contained a Power of Attorney clause. This clause grants Enterprise the power to request payment from the customer's insurance company for damage to a vehicle caused by a customer who refused the damages waiver and later failed to pay for the damage.
On December 31, 2010, [Grimes] returned the rental vehicle to Enterprise. [Grimes] alleges ... Enterprise['s] employee informed her that she had returned it with a ten to twelve inch scratch on the outer body of the vehicle. The complaint denies neither the existence of the scratch nor that the scratch occurred during ... the rental period. On January 4, 2011, [Grimes] received a letter ... from the Damage Recovery Unit, an Enterprise affiliate, notifying her of reported damage to the vehicle. On January 26, 2011, [Grimes] was sent a second letter which provided her with the itemized total of the damage amount. An estimate for the vehicle repairs was provided by Moppert Brothers at Blue Bell, Inc., a third party auto-repair shop. The damages total came to $840.42.1
According to [Grimes], more than four months passed without any further contact from Enterprise during which time [Grimes] did not pay any of the requested fees. Subsequently, [Grimes] filed a six count complaint against Enterprise, who soon thereafter filed a counterclaim for the $840.42 in unpaid fees arising out of damage to the rental. On November 15, 2011[,] Enterprise filed a praecipe to discontinue its counterclaims. Enterprise has further stipulated that no claims against [Grimes] will be pursued. Enterprise [also] filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
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1 Damage to the vehicle totaled $590.00, Administrative fees totaled $100.00, Loss of Use fees totaled $91.42, calculated at the rate of 3.451 days at $26.50/day at 100% capacity, Diminution in Value fees totaled $59.00.
Trial Court Opinion, 7/3/12, at 1–2.
On March 29, 2012, the trial court granted Enterprise's motion for judgment on the pleadings on all counts raised in Grimes' complaint. On April 23, 2012, Grimes filed a timely notice of appeal.2
On appeal, Grimes raises eight issues for our review.
1. In light of Enterprise's discontinuance of its counterclaim, may this Court exercise appellate jurisdiction over [Grimes'] appeal from the March 28, 2012 Order granting Enterprise's motion for judgment on the pleadings that adjudicated all other remaining issues between the parties?
2. Did [Grimes] allege “any ascertainable loss of money or property” in support of her cause of action under Pennsylvania's Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (“UTPCPL”) and pecuniary loss in support of her cause of action for breach of contract and her causes of action for declaratory and injunctive relief, based upon her claim that because Enterprise extracted a power of attorney from her and sought to collect fraudulent and excessive damages and fees, she was forced to resist Enterprise's unlawful claims and collection practices?
3. Did [Grimes] state a cognizable cause of action for breach of contract and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, based upon allegations that Enterprise attempted to enforce an unconscionable liquidated damages clause by seeking to collect from [Grimes] excessive damages and fees at disproportionately higher amounts than the actual loss (if any) sustained by Enterprise?
4. Did [Grimes] plead a viable breach of contract claim by alleging that Enterprise sought to enforce a contract of adhesion without disclosing to [Grimes] that the claimed damages and fees had no relationship to the damage (if any) actually incurred by Enterprise?
5. Did [Grimes] sufficiently allege fraudulent or deceptive conduct under the UTPCPL's “catchall” provision by contending that Enterprise made knowingly false statements to deceive [Grimes] into accepting Enterprise'salleged damages and fees as lawful?
6. Was [Grimes'] UTPCPL claim sufficiently supported by allegations that Enterprise's misleading and unconscionable contract terms do not fully nor accurately explain that Enterprise charges for damages and fees unrelated to Enterprise's actual damage?
7. Did [Grimes] sufficiently plead justifiable reliance upon Enterprise's unlawful contract language, and upon Enterprise's subsequent fraudulent and deceptive conduct as to the legality of Enterprise's alleged damages and fees, thereby supporting her right to pursue a UTPCPL claim?
8. Did [Grimes] allege a valid claim for permanent injunctive relief based upon allegations that she cannot be compensated adequately by a damage award due to the threat that Enterprise could enforce its unconscionable contract terms, thereby damaging her good standing with her insurer and/or credit card issuer and adversely impacting her insurance rates and/or credit score?
We begin by addressing Grimes' first claim, which pertains to our appellate jurisdiction in this case. On May 22, 2012, this Court filed an order directing Grimes to show cause why the appeal was not interlocutory because “[Enterprise]'s counterclaim may be pending in the lower court.” Superior Court Order, 5/22/12, at 1. Grimes filed a response on June 1, 2012, arguing that her appeal was properly before this Court because “[Enterprise] affirmatively discontinued its counterclaim in the [trial] court.” Grimes' Response to the Order to Show Cause, 6/1/12, at 1.
Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 341 governs the appealability of final orders generally.
Rule 341. Final Orders; Generally
(a) General rule. Except as prescribed in subdivisions (d), and (e) of this rule, an appeal may be taken as of right from any final order of an administrative agency or lower court.
(b) Definition of final order. A final order is any order that:
(1) disposes of all claims and of all parties[.]
...
Pa.R.A.P. 341. This Court has held that “[a] praecipe to discontinue constitutes a final judgment.” Levitt v. Patrick, 976 A.2d 581, 587 (Pa.Super.2009) (citation omitted). As noted above, Enterprise filed a praecipe to discontinue its counterclaim in the trial court on November 15, 2011. As a result, we agree with Grimes that we have appellate jurisdiction to decide the remaining issues in this case. See id. We now proceed to address the merits of Grimes' remaining issues on appeal.
Grimes avers that the trial court erred in granting Enterprise's motion for judgment on the pleadings. We begin by noting our well-settled standard of review.
Our scope of review on an appeal from the grant of judgment on the pleadings is plenary. Entry of judgment on the pleadings is permitted under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1034, which provides that after the pleadings are closed, but within such time as not to unreasonably delay trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. A motion for judgment on the pleadings is similar to a demurrer. It may be entered when there are no disputed issues of fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In determining if there is a dispute as to facts, the [trial] court must confine its consideration to the pleadings and relevant documents. On appeal, we accept as true all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint.
On appeal, our task is to determine whether the trial court's ruling was based on a clear error of law or whether there were facts disclosed by the pleadings, which should properly be tried before a jury, or by a judge sitting without a jury.
Neither party can be deemed to have admitted either conclusions of law or unjustified inferences. Moreover, in conducting its inquiry, the [trial] court should confine itself to the pleadings themselves and any documents or exhibits properly attached to them. It may not consider inadmissible evidence in determining a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Only when the moving party's case is clear and free from doubt such that a trial would prove fruitless will an appellate court affirm a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Guerra v. Redevelopment Auth. of Phila., 27 A.3d 1284, 1288–1289 (Pa.Super.2011) (citation omitted).
We first address Grimes' second, fifth, sixth...
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