Grimes v. Grimes
| Decision Date | 19 October 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 06CA73.,No. 06CA56.,06CA56.,06CA73. |
| Citation | 879 N.E.2d 247,173 Ohio App.3d 537,2007 Ohio 5653 |
| Parties | GRIMES et al., Appellants, v. GRIMES, Jr., Appellee. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Theisen Brock, James S. Huggins, and Ethan T. Vessels, Marietta; and Richard A. Yoss, Woodsfield, for appellant Lewis F. Grimes.
Steven L. Story, Pomeroy, for appellee.
{¶ 1} Lewis F. Grimes (hereinafter, "Lewis"), individually and as the executor of the estate of John H. Grimes Sr. (hereinafter, "Senior"), appeals separate judgments in favor of John H. Grimes Jr. (hereinafter, "Junior") from different divisions of the Washington County Common Pleas Court, i.e., one judgment from the probate division and another judgment from the general division. On appeal, Lewis contends that the probate court erred when it failed to exercise its exclusive jurisdiction over his three claims that he asserted as executor of Senior's estate, which involved Senior's inter vivos transfers of real estate to Junior. Because the three claims were related to the administration of Senior's estate, we agree. Lewis further contends that the probate court erred when it found that the doctrine of res judicata barred his three claims. Because the summary judgment involving these same three claims in the general division was void ab initio, we agree. Lewis next contends that the trial court in the general division erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Junior for his individual "tortious interference with an expectancy of inheritance" claim. Because Lewis's individual claim was not ripe for consideration, we agree. Accordingly, we vacate the two judgments and remand these causes to the trial courts for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
{¶ 2} Senior had two sons, Lewis and Junior. A couple of months before he died, Senior executed several deeds transferring certain real estate properties to Junior. No money exchanged hands.
{¶ 3} Lewis was named the executor of his father's estate in the probate division of the common pleas court. Senior's will left his entire estate to his two sons.
{¶ 4} Lewis, individually and as executor of his father's estate, filed a complaint against Junior involving four claims in the general division of the common pleas court.
{¶ 5} In three of the four claims, Lewis, as executor, alleged that at the time of the real estate transfers, Junior had a confidential relationship with Senior. He further alleged that Senior (1) had a deteriorated mental condition; (2) was dependent on Junior for advice; (3) was in poor health; (4) was physically incapacitated; (5) was susceptible to undue influence; and (6) was of advanced age. He claimed that Junior took advantage of Senior's conditions and preyed upon his incompetence in obtaining the transfer of the real estate. He alleged that the deeds were recorded after Senior's death, and thus, the property described in the deeds vested in Senior's beneficiaries at the time of his death. In addition, he alleged that the deeds were void for failure of delivery and acceptance. He demanded that the court declare the deeds void and requested the court to declare that Junior held the properties in trust for Senior's estate.
{¶ 6} In the remaining claim, Lewis, individually, alleged that Junior had intentionally interfered with his expected inheritance.
{¶ 7} Junior moved for summary judgment on all four claims. In addition, he moved to dismiss the three claims Lewis filed in his capacity as executor, i.e., claims one, three, and four. He asserted that the general division lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over these declaratory judgment claims and that the probate court held exclusive jurisdiction.
{¶ 8} Lewis, as executor, did not contest Junior's motion to dismiss. Instead, he agreed that the probate court had exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over these three claims. He consented to a dismissal of his three declaratory judgment claims pursuant to Civ.R. 41(B)(4)(a).1 He stated that he would file a complaint in the probate court that restated those three claims. In addition, he asserted that his individual claim for intentional interference with an expected inheritance remained pending in the general division.
{¶ 9} The general division never ruled on the issue of whether it had subject-matter jurisdiction over the three declaratory judgment claims. However, Lewis, as executor, filed a complaint in the probate court asserting the same three claims. Junior then withdrew his motion to dismiss the three claims in the general division for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and filed a motion to dismiss in the probate court on the grounds that the probate court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the three claims.
{¶ 10} The general division then granted Junior's motion for summary judgment on all four claims. Again, it did not address the issue of whether it had subject-matter jurisdiction.
{¶ 11} Junior proceeded to file another motion to dismiss in the probate court, this time on the grounds that the complaint was barred by collateral estoppel. Junior argued that the general division's grant of summary judgment in his favor on the same claims barred a re-litigation of those claims in the probate action. The probate court found that it had concurrent jurisdiction with the general division and that the general division exercised its jurisdiction first. It granted Junior's motion to dismiss, stating, "Plaintiff is estopped by the doctrine of Res Judicata from bringing this action."
{¶ 12} Lewis, as executor, appeals the probate court's judgment and asserts the following two assignments of error: I. "The probate court erred in failing to exercise its exclusive jurisdiction." And II. "The probate court erred in holding that the general division's decision granting summary judgment against the plaintiff barred the plaintiff's claims in the probate division under the doctrine of res judicata."
{¶ 13} In addition, Lewis, individually and as executor, appeals the general division's summary judgment and asserts the following four assignments of error: I. "The trial court erred in failing to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and under the doctrine of ripeness." II. "Assuming arguendo that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction, it erred in failing to grant plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment as a matter of law." III. "Assuming arguendo that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction, the trial court erred in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment." And IV. "Assuming arguendo that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction, the trial court erred in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's fourth claim of their first amended complaint."
Appeal from Probate Court — Case No. 06CA73
{¶ 14} Lewis, as executor of Senior's estate, contends in his first assignment of error that the probate court erred when it failed to exercise its exclusive jurisdiction over his three claims. We agree.
{¶ 15} A court possesses authority to determine its own jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter absent a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction. State ex rel. Enyart v. O'Neill (1995), 71 Ohio St.3d 655, 656, 646 N.E.2d 1110. "The existence of the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law." Yazdani-Isfehani v. Yazdani-Isfehani, 170 Ohio App.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-7105, 865 N.E.2d 924, ¶ 20. We review questions of law de novo. Id.
{¶ 16} Ohio probate courts are courts "of limited jurisdiction," and proceedings therein "are restricted to those actions permitted by statute and by the Constitution." State ex rel. Lipinski v. Cuyahoga Cty. Common Pleas Court, Probate Div. (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 19, 22, 655 N.E.2d 1303; see, also, Corron v Corron (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 75, 531 N.E.2d 708, at paragraph one of the syllabus. R.C. 2101.24(A)(1)(c) provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, the probate court has exclusive jurisdiction * * * [t]o direct and control the conduct and settle the accounts of executors and administrators and order the distribution of estates * * *." Therefore, any matter "related to the administration of an estate and the distribution of its assets [is] within the exclusive jurisdiction of the probate court." Mock v. Bowen (July 17, 1992), Lucas App. No. L-91-210, 1992 WL 163959, citing R.C. 2101.24(A)(1)(c).
{¶ 17} R.C. 2101.24(A)(1)(l) gives the probate court exclusive jurisdiction "[t]o render declaratory judgments, including, but not limited to, those rendered pursuant to section 2107.084 of the Revised Code." R.C. 2721.05(C) provides that "[a]ny person interested as or through an executor, administrator, trustee, guardian, or other fiduciary, creditor, devisee, legatee, heir, next of kin, or cestui que trust, in the administration * * * of the estate of a decedent * * * may have a declaration of rights or legal relations in respect thereto * * * [t]o determine any question arising in the administration of the estate * * * including questions of construction of wills and other writings." R.C. 2101.24 and 2721.05 "taken together * * * give the probate court exclusive jurisdiction over declaratory actions brought `to determine any question arising out of the administration of the estate.'" Lamar v. Washington, Allen App. No. 1-05-54, 2006-Ohio-1414, 2006 WL 758632, ¶ 15. Probate courts are therefore vested "with jurisdiction over declaratory judgment actions upon questions relating to the administration of an estate." Lipinski, 74 Ohio St.3d at 22, 655 N.E.2d 1303;2 see, also, Sayer v. Epler (1997), 121 Ohio App.3d 329, 333, 699 N.E.2d 1000.
{¶ 18} Hence, "a declaratory judgment action may be brought in the probate court to determine the validity of inter vivos transfers where the property transferred would revert to the estate if the transfers are invalidated." Id., citing ...
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