Grimsley v. Sec'y
| Decision Date | 03 May 2011 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 8:10-cv-2241-T-33AEP |
| Parties | JEREMIAH GRIMSLEY, JR., Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
This cause is before the Court on Jeremiah Grimsley, Jr.'s timely-filed 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for writ of habeas corpus. Grimsley challenges his conviction and sentence entered by the Circuit Court for the Tenth Judicial Circuit, Polk County, Florida. A review of the record demonstrates that, for the reasons below, the petition must be denied.
On February 9, 2007, the State filed an Information charging Grimsley with one count of Possession of a Firearm by a Convicted Felon (Count I), and two counts of Aggravated Battery (great bodily harm and firearm enhancement) (Counts II and III). (Exhibit 1). On January 17, 2008, pursuant to a negotiated plea bargain, Grimsley appeared before the Honorable Steven L. Selph, Circuit Judge, and entered a nolo contendere plea to all three charges. (Exhibit 2). Grimsley signed a written plea form. (Exhibit 3). OnJanuary 25, 2008, according to the terms of the agreement, the state trial court sentenced Grimsley to fifteen years incarceration on Count I, and to twenty-five years incarceration, followed by two years probation on Counts II and III, with all sentences running concurrently. (Exhibit 4). Grimsley did not appeal his convictions or sentences.
On June 29, 2008, Grimsley filed a pro se Rule 3.850 motion for postconviction relief and memorandum of law, raising three grounds:
(Exhibit 5).
On August 29, 2008, the state trial court summarily denied grounds 1 and 3, and directed the State to respond to ground 2. (Exhibit 6). On September 23, 2008, Grimsley filed an "Amended Information Motion for Postconviction Relief" in which he sought to amend ground 3 of the motion.1 (Exhibit 7).
The State filed its response to ground 2 of the motion on October 27, 2008. (Exhibit8). The State agreed that the aggravated battery charges should not have been reclassified as first degree felonies, and that the written judgment and sentence should be corrected to designate the offenses as second degree felonies. However, the State argued that the 25-year prison sentences were legal under Florida law and should not be disturbed.
On October 30, 2008, the state trial court granted resentencing on the two aggravated battery counts. (Exhibit 9). The state trial court appointed conflict counsel, Gail Cheatwood, Esquire, to represent Grimsley at the resentencing proceeding. The hearing was held before the Honorable James Yancy, Circuit Judge, on January 23, 2002. (Exhibit 10). Grimsley's appointed counsel waived Grimsley's presence at the hearing. (Exhibit 10 at p. 6). The state trial court judge ordered that the judgment and sentences on the aggravated battery counts be reclassified as second degree, rather than first degree, felonies, but that the length of the sentences remain the same. (Exhibit 10 at pp. 5, 6).
Grimsley appealed the state trial court's adverse ruling as to grounds 1 and 3 of the postconviction motion as well as the order granting resentencing. (Exhibit 11). On August 20, 2010, in Case No. 2D09-1533, the state district court of appeal per curiam affirmed the denial of relief. (Exhibit 14). Grimsley v. State, 45 So. 3d 49 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010)[table]. The mandate issued September 14, 2010. (Exhibit 15).
Grimsley raises three grounds for relief in the present petition:
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) and (e) as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), this court's review of the state court's factual findings must be highly deferential. Such findings are presumed to be correct unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. Similarly, the state courts' resolutions of issues of law-including constitutional issues-must be accepted unless they are found to be "contrary to" clearly established precedent of the Supreme Court of the United States or involved an "unreasonable application" of such precedent. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). Indeed, it is not enough that the federal courts believe that the state court was wrong; it must be demonstrated that the state court decision was "objectively unreasonable." Id. Breedlove v. Moore, 279 F. 3d 952 (11th Cir. 2002).
To have a facially valid claim in alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, a Petitioner must meet the two-part test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Strickland's two-part test requires a Petitioner to demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficience and "there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel'sunprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. However, if a claim fails to satisfy the prejudice component, the court need not make a ruling on the performance component.
Grimsley contends the trial court did not have jurisdiction to enter a judgment on aggravated battery with a firearm and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon because the court failed to make a factual finding to prove possession as charged on these offenses, violating Grimsley's Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Although presented in federal constitutional terms in the present federal petition, Grimsley's claim concerns a state law matter that is not cognizable in this proceeding. The requirement that a factual basis be placed on the record in accepting a guilty plea is a matter of state law prescribed by Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.172(a).
"Due process requires a court accepting a guilty plea to carefully inquire into the defendant's understanding of the plea, so that the record contains an affirmative showing that the plea was intelligent and voluntary." Koenig v. State, 597 So.2d at 258 (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969)); see also Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.170(k) (); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.172(a) ().
Jones v. State, 885 So.2d 449, 452 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). The purpose of determining whether a factual basis for a plea exists is to ensure "'that the facts of the case fit the offense with which the defendant is charged.'" Allen v. State, 876 So.2d 737, 740 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).
Florida's rule of criminal procedure and case law interpreting the rule is an independent and adequate state law ground upon which to deny Grimsley's claim regarding the factual basis of his nolo contendere plea, and is adequate to support the state trial court's decision. See Spivey v. Head, 207 F.3d 1263, 1270 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 728 (1991)). Ground One does not raise a federal constitutional issue.
Alternatively, under the AEDPA, which governs Grimsley's petition, Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997), the state court's decision is objectively reasonable and is entitled to deference pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) and (e). The state trial court's denial of Grimsley's claim is neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent. The state trial court's order states:
In response to claim 1, the Court finds the claim must be denied. The Information in this case specifically alleges, in all three counts, that Defendant actually possessed a firearm during the commission of the charge[d] crimes. In addition, as the attached copy of Defendant's plea and sentencing hearing transcripts establish, Defendant pled to the offenses as charged and through counsel, conceded that there was a factual basis for the pleas entered. Lastly, in his plea agreement Defendant expressly pled to all three counts "as charged." Based on the facts, there was simply no need to conduct any additional "court proceeding" to prove a fact that Defendant pled to. Based on all of the foregoing, claim 1 is DENIED.
(Exhibit 6: Order on Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief and Order to Show Cause at pp. 1-2) (Emphasis in original).
The state trial court's ruling is supported in the record. As noted by the state trial court, the Information in this case specifically alleges, in all three counts, that Grimsley actually possessed a firearm during the commission of the charged crimes. Also, the...
To continue reading
Request your trial