Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com.

• Decision Date: 28 November 1994
• Docket Number: No. S029701,S029701
• Citation: 884 P.2d 116,35 Cal.Rptr.2d 659,8 Cal.4th 851
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 884 P.2d 116, 63 USLW 2355 Daniel GRISET et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. FAIR POLITICAL PRACTICES COMMISSION, Defendant and Respondent.

Page 659

35 Cal.Rptr.2d 659

8 Cal.4th 851, 884 P.2d 116, 63 USLW 2355

Daniel GRISET et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. FAIR POLITICAL PRACTICES COMMISSION, Defendant and Respondent.

No. S029701.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

Nov. 28, 1994.

Reed & Davidson and Darryl R. Wold, Costa Mesa, for plaintiffs and appellants.

Bell, McAndrews & Hiltachk, Charles H. Bell, Jr., Sacramento, Altshuler, Berzon, Nussbaum, Berzon & Rubin, Lowell Finley, San Francisco, Olson, Hagel, Fong, Leidigh, Waters & Fishburn and Robert E. Leidigh, Sacramento, as amici curiae on behalf of plaintiffs and appellants.

Jeff Marschner, Scott Hallabrin, Jeevan S. Ahuja, Sacramento, Deanne Stone, Jonathan S. Rothman, Berkeley, and Steve Churchwell, Sacramento, for defendant and respondent.

Lisa Foster, San Diego, Munger, Tolles & Olson and Bradley S. Phillips, Los Angeles, as amici curiae on behalf of defendant and respondent.

KENNARD, Justice.

This is a case about anonymity and the political process. Government Code section 84305 ¹ requires that candidates for public office, and individuals or groups supporting or opposing a candidate or ballot measure, must identify themselves on any mass mailings they send to prospective voters. In this case, a candidate for city council and two committees he controlled sent prospective voters five mass mailings that did not contain the identifying information required by statute. When the government agency responsible for enforcing the statute brought administrative charges against the candidate and the two committees he controlled, the candidate brought this lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the statute. He argues that persons who send prospective voters mass mailings designed to influence the outcome of an election are entitled, under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, to remain anonymous, and that section 84305's requirement that such persons identify themselves is therefore unconstitutional.

We conclude that section 84305 does not violate the First Amendment rights of candidates or candidate-controlled committees.

I

Daniel Griset was a candidate for reelection to the Santa Ana City Council in 1988. During the month before the election, the Griset Campaign Committee, which Griset controlled, sent prospective voters a mass mailing carrying the letterhead of the "Washington Square Neighborhood Association." The mailing failed to identify Griset or the Griset Campaign Committee as the sender. During the same month, the Santa Ana Progress Committee, also controlled by Griset, sent prospective voters four mass mailings attacking Griset's opponent, Rick Norton. The mailings--entitled "Meet the Real Rick Norton," "Swap Meet," "The 7 Lies Swap Meet Owner Rick Norton Wants You to Believe," and "Beware of Tricksters"--each identified the Santa Ana Progress Committee as the sender, but none of the mailings identified Griset as the controlling candidate.

In March 1990, the Fair Political Practices Commission (FPPC) named Griset (who won the election), the Griset Campaign Committee, and the Santa Ana Progress Committee as respondents in an enforcement action, alleging that they had violated section 84305 by sending the five mass mailings described above. Griset then filed a lawsuit to enjoin the FPPC proceedings. The trial court denied Griset's motion for a preliminary injunction, and the enforcement action proceeded. Based on stipulated facts, the FPPC found that Griset had committed five violations of section 84305. The FPPC imposed a $2,000 fine against Griset and the Griset Campaign Committee, and an $8,000 fine against Griset and the Santa Ana Progress Committee.

The validity of Government Code section 84305 was not an issue in the administrative proceedings. Following the conclusion of those proceedings and the imposition of a fine on plaintiffs, plaintiffs added a petition for writ of administrative mandamus (Code Civ.Proc. § 1094.5) as a cause of action in the pending suit for declaratory and injunctive relief. They contended there that the statute was invalid as applied and on its face. In response to plaintiffs' subsequent motions for issuance of a peremptory writ on that cause of action and for summary adjudication and judgment in the action for declaratory and injunctive relief, the trial court denied the petition for writ of mandate. In so doing it ruled that, while there was a possibility that section 84305 might be invalid in other circumstances, the administrative action involved only candidates and their controlled committees.

The court then entered separate orders. The first denied the petition for writ of administrative mandamus. The second denied plaintiffs' motions for summary adjudication and judgment on the causes of action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs appealed only from the order denying their petition for writ of mandate.

The Court of Appeal recognized the limited basis of the trial court's ruling, agreed that section 84305 was not invalid as applied to plaintiffs, and affirmed the trial court order denying the petition for writ of administrative mandamus. Notwithstanding that conclusion, the court also considered the facial validity of the statute as it might apply not only to candidates and their controlled committees, but to all persons and entities potentially subject to its disclosure requirement. Because we agree that section 84305 is valid as applied to plaintiffs, we need not reach the broader question addressed by the Court of Appeal. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal, but express no view regarding the validity of section 84305 as applied to persons and entities other than candidates and their controlled committees.

In part II.A., we set forth the text of section 84305 and related statutes. In part II.B., we review the leading cases from the United States Supreme Court that govern the question whether a statute that bars anonymous mailings in political campaigns violates the First Amendment rights of candidates or candidate-controlled committees. In part III., we apply the principles derived from precedent to analyze the constitutionality of section 84305.

II

A

Section 84305, the challenged statute, provides:

"(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), no candidate or committee shall send a mass mailing unless the name, street address, and city of the candidate or committee are shown on the outside of each piece of mail in the mass mailing and on at least one of the inserts included within each piece of mail of the mailing in no less than 6-point type which shall be in a color or print which contrasts with the background so as to be easily legible. A post office box may be stated in lieu of a street address if the organization's address is a matter of public record with the Secretary of State.

"(b) If the sender of the mass mailing is a single candidate or committee, the name, street address, and city of the candidate or committee need only be shown on the outside of each piece of mail.

"(c) If the sender of a mass mailing is a controlled committee, the name of the person controlling the committee shall be included in addition to the information required by subdivision (a)."

Section 82041.5 defines "mass mailing" in these words: " 'Mass mailing' means over two hundred substantially similar pieces of mail, but does not include a form letter or other mail which is sent in response to an unsolicited request, letter or other inquiry." ²

B

Although the United States Supreme Court has never addressed the precise question that confronts us--whether a statute that prohibits anonymous mass mailings by candidates or candidate-controlled committees in political campaigns violates the First Amendment--the high court in several opinions has discussed the degree to which government entities may compel the identification of persons engaged in activities protected by the First Amendment.

In three cases, all decided between 1958 and 1960, the high court rejected as unconstitutional attempts by state and local governments to require disclosure of names of persons exercising their First Amendment rights. N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama (1958) 357 U.S. 449, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 is the first of these cases. There, the State of Alabama sought to compel the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), a civil rights organization, to produce a list of all its members in the state, contending that the list was relevant to pending litigation to determine whether the organization was conducting intrastate business in violation of the state's foreign corporation registration statute. The NAACP showed that on previous occasions revealing the identity of its members had subjected those members to economic reprisals and physical threats. The high court held that the state could not compel the NAACP to disclose its membership list. The court explained that the state's justification for ordering disclosure was inadequate to justify "the deterrent effect on the free enjoyment of the right to associate" that disclosure was likely to cause. (Id. at p. 466, 78 S.Ct. at p. 1174.)

In the second case, Bates v. City of Little Rock (1960) 361 U.S. 516, 80 S.Ct. 412, 4 L.Ed.2d 480, the governmental entities advanced a different justification for compelling disclosure, but the result was the same as in N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, supra, 357 U.S. 449, 78 S.Ct. 1163. In Bates, ordinances of two Arkansas cities required nonprofit organizations to provide the cities with lists of the names of local members. The local branches of the NAACP refused to provide such lists; they showed that public identification of their members had in the past led to harassment and threats of injury, and that economic reprisals were likely to follow disclosure. The high court rejected the cities' claim that disclosure was necessary to determine whether the NAACP was entitled to tax-exempt status, reasoning that...