Griswold v. Ill. Cent. R. Co.
Decision Date | 03 February 1894 |
Parties | GRISWOLD ET AL. v. ILLINOIS CENT. R. CO. |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from district court, Buchanan county; J. L. Husted, Judge.
Action to recover damages for the loss of an elevator by fire, alleged to have been caused by negligence on the part of defendant. A demurrer to the answer was overruled. The plaintiffs electing to stand on their demurrer, judgment was rendered against them for costs, and they appeal.
R. W. Barger and E. E. Hasner, for appellants.
W. J. Knight, for appellee.
A rehearing was granted in this case, and it is again submitted with further arguments. The facts disclosed by the pleadings, which are material to be considered, are sufficiently stated in the former opinion, (53 N. W. 295,) and are as follows:
1. It will be seen, from the statement of the case, that the controlling question is whether that clause in the lease whereby plaintiff Griswold agrees to protect and save harmless the defendant from all liability for damages by fire negligently communicated to the property on the leased premises in the operation of the railroad is void, as against public policy. The right to so contract as to fire accidentally communicated is not questioned, but only the right to so contract as to fire negligently communicated. Public policy is variable,--the very reverse of that which is the policy of the public at one time may become public policy at another; hence, no fixed rule can be given by which to determine what is public policy. The authoritiesall agree that a contract is not void, as against public policy, unless it is injurious to the interests of the public, or contravenes some established interest of society. Public policy has been aptly described as “an unruly horse, and, when once you get astride, you never know where it will carry you.” It was said by Wilmot, C. J.: “It is the duty of all courts to keep their eyes steadily upon the interests of the public, even in the determination of community justice, and when they find an action is founded upon a claim injurious to the public, and which has a bad tendency, to give no countenance or assistance in foro civili.” Other courts have said: Again, it is said: Egerton v. Earl Brownlow, 4 H. L. Cas. 1; 3 Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 875, note 3; Boardman v. Thompson, 25 Iowa, 501. Aided by these definitions and cautions, we proceed again to inquire whether the clause of the agreement in question, if carried into effect, would be injurious to any interest of the public, or, in other words, whether the public has any interest in this provision of the contract. The conclusion of the former opinion is “that the provision, if effectual, would cause the defendant to disregard and neglect a duty which it owes to the public, and thereby violate an obligation imposed upon it by law.” This conclusion rests, in part at least, upon holding that sections 1289 and 1308 of the Code are applicable to the question under consideration, and that the defendant owed it as a duty to the public to operate its road with care with respect to plaintiff's property. The discussion on rehearing leads us to inquire whether, under the law and facts, it is correct to say that the defendant owed any duty to the public with respect to the plaintiff's property. The former opinion holds correctly that the liability of railroad corporations, under section 1289, for negligently setting out fires, is absolute, and that the obligation on the part of the railroad companies to exercise care is towards the public; but the question remains whether that section applies to cases like this, or, in other words, whether it established any interest in the public, or imposed any duty upon the defendant towards the public, in respect of the property of the plaintiff. The defendant owed no duty to the public to exercise care with respect to its own buildings situate on its right of way, and incurred no liability for their negligent burning, unless the fire spread beyond its own premises. The operation of a railway increases the danger from fire to the property of the people situated on their own premises, where they have the right to have it, and hence the provision of section 1289 making the corporation operating the railway absolutely liable for all damages by fire that is negligently set out or caused by the operation of the railway. As to such property the railway company owes to the public the duty of care, and the public has an interest in the performance of that duty. Therefore, a contract that exempts from that duty to the public would be injurious to the public interests, and against public policy. The plaintiff Griswold's buildings were not upon his own premises, nor where he had a right to have them,...
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