Griswold v. Texas Co.
| Decision Date | 20 November 1931 |
| Docket Number | 13280. |
| Citation | 161 S.E. 409,163 S.C. 156 |
| Parties | GRISWOLD v. TEXAS CO. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Richland County; M. S Whaley, Judge.
Action by E. O. Griswold against the Texas Company. Judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
The charge of the trial judge requested to be reported follows:
Mr Foreman and Gentlemen: The plaintiff comes into court and alleges that prior to June, 1927, he had been employed by the defendant for about ten years; that for the year commencing January 1, and ending December 31, 1927, the defendant had agreed to employ him for that year at a certain salary plus commissions, averaging a total of $300 per month; that on June 1st, without just cause or excuse, the defendant violated that agreement and discharged the plaintiff although the plaintiff was ready and willing to continue with his contract. The plaintiff claims that as a result of that violation of the contract he has been damaged in the sum of $3,000; that he undertook, after his discharge, to obtain employment, but that for a part of the remainder of that year he was unable to obtain employment. He also claims that he had a certain insurance feature that he lost on account of being discharged.
That goes out of the case for the simple reason that it turns out that he lost no rights because of that, and therefore he could not have been damaged in that particular even if his contention is proved otherwise in the case.
He also claims that he had certain stock by a plan, that in that plan he had allotted to him a certain amount of stock to be paid for in installments to be deducted from his salary, and he claims that for the year 1927, under that plan, he was entitled to an allotment of at least ten shares of the capital stock at the par value which was then $35 per share. That stock was worth approximately on the market $60, which stock he claims he was entitled to as an allotment, and which would have matured under that plan on January 1, 1928, or at the end, rather, of 1927, on December 31st.
He claims that he lost thereby, for being discharged, the difference between the par value of the stock, $35 per share and $60, which he claims was the market value of the stock, or a difference of $25 per share.
He is asking as a total of $3,000 damages at your hands.
In answer to that claim, the defendant denies that there was any contract entered into, as the plaintiff claims for a period of one year, but claims that there was a letter written in that year, of date February 23, 1927, copy of which is attached to the answer, and that that letter was agreed to and accepted by the plaintiff, and that what was in that letter constituted the terms of the contract or agreement between plaintiff and defendant.
The defendant denies that it has breached any contract that it had with the plaintiff, or that it owes him anything by way of damage either for a breach of contract or under this allotment stock payment plan.
The defendant claims for its contention that, under the contract which it had with the plaintiff, it had a legal right to discharge him, and that it lived up to the terms of the contract between the parties.
That answer puts the burden upon the plaintiff of proving his case, as alleged here on the contract, which he claims was in existence, that puts the burden upon the plaintiff of proving all those material matters which the defendant has denied. By that the law does not necessarily mean by the greater number of the witnesses or the greater quantity of the evidence, but by the greater truth of it; in other words, that testimony in which you six men have the greater faith.
Now, the plaintiff in his reply to certain matters set forth in the answer as to the letter of February 23, 1927, which was set forth in the answer as containing the contract, from the defendant's viewpoint, and replying to that allegation, the plaintiff claims that no such letter was signed by the plaintiff, and that he was informed that such letter was sent to him and signed by his wife and returned, and that thereafter he discussed the matter with a representative of the company, and it was agreed between the representative and himself, the plaintiff, that he would not be bound by the provisions of that letter, or the terms stated in it, but that he would be employed for the full period of one year, and he continued in the employment.
So now, there you have all the different angles of the case presented to you as the parties came into court. It is for you gentlemen to say what, if any, of those matters find substantiation in the proof, because, after all, you and I are not governed by what the parties come into court with. It is what they bring into court to us by way of evidence which you have to pass on, and I have to give you the law. You are to find out what the real true evidence is; you apply the law to that.
Where the parties are in dispute as to what happened, was said or done, I can have no opinion about that. You gentlemen have to form an opinion after you find out what the real truth of the situation is.
Now, the plaintiff claims that he had a contract and that that contract was oral. The defendant claims that the contract was in writing and that writing was signed by both parties. In the eyes of the law this was the letter which was signed by him. First signed and sent by Mr. Jones, and it has the name of Jones on it. The defendant claims that that was the binding contract in the eyes of the law.
The plaintiff claims that that was no contract and never became a contract, that there was no written contract, and that the contract became oral. So there are the issues that you gentlemen are going to have to decide.
Now, as to matters about which there is no dispute, I have to pass on them. Here is this letter. Read what is in it. It says certain things. Now, did that bind these parties or did it not. There is the question that you gentlemen are going to have to ferret out and answer, and it depends on how you answer it as to where you go from that point in the case.
There is no doubt about it. The letter was signed in behalf of the Texas Company by Jones and sent over here. Nobody has disputed that, and it was sent back to Atlanta from over here, and the name of E. O. Griswold was written on it. As I understand, and the attorneys can correct me if I am wrong, there is no dispute but what that name of Griswold was written by his wife on that letter when it was returned.
Mr. Tompkins: We don't admit that. We don't know whether he signed it or she signed it, but we think your honor should charge the jury that, under their testimony, it did not make any difference who signed it.
The Court: I was coming to that. If I was wrong in thinking that, I say to you gentlemen that if you believe that Mr. Griswold himself signed that and put that in the mail, that ends his case, because he would not be able to come in and tell this court or any other court that he signed that with his eyes shut and had no intention of delivering it. If he signed it and put it in the mail, or saw that it got in the mail, or authorized it thereafter to be put in the mail, if he put his signature himself, his own name, at the bottom of that piece of paper, then he is bound by what is in there, and that thing says in itself that there can be no modification of this agreement unless signed by the parties thereto. So if he signed it with his own hand and put it in the mail or caused it to be put in the mail, it could never later be changed, no matter how much they talked and agreed between each other, because they had agreed that no modification or change could be made unless signed by the parties thereto.
Now, if he did not sign it himself and his wife signed it and he did not know that his wife had signed it and he did not know about the mailing of it, then we would have a different proposition that you would have to solve, because then it would turn upon whether or not, under all the facts and circumstances then existing, whatever you should find them to be, then, whether or not that piece of paper with Mr. Griswold's name on it, if you believe it was put there by his wife, whether or not that was delivered with the intention that that binds Mr. Griswold, or whether it was put in the mail, because putting it in the mail would be delivery in that case, putting it in the mail at that end of the line would be delivering it as far as the manner would be concerned; if she wrote that name for Mr. Griswold, what was the intention? If she knew she had the authority to do these kinds of things for her husband, and I have to say that as a matter of law from all the testimony, that is, to sign his name. She had been doing it right along. So, if she signed his name to that, you have to go into all the circumstances to see whether or not there was the intention on the part of Griswold himself or through his agent, his wife, that that piece of paper with his name on it, signed by her, if it was put there by her and put in the mail as his acceptance of this proposition that Jones had sent over here. If you believe that she signed his name to that, that she mailed it, understanding that it was her husband's intention that it go back to Atlanta to bind him, it would bind him, because there would be the intention; again, that would be a binding contract. To deposit it in the mail here would be sufficient to make that contract unchangeable except as these parties set out thereafter in writing. As to what the intention there would be, it is for you gentlemen to say.
If you believe it was put in the mail, that she signed this name on it and it was by her put in the mail through a misapprehension on...
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