Grizzle v. Gaddis
| Decision Date | 13 October 1885 |
| Citation | 75 Ga. 350 |
| Parties | GRIZZLE v. GADDIS. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
October Term, 1885.
1. Where one holding a title by deed from a former owner brought ejectment against the tenant in possession of land, the latter could not, by equitable plea, claim from the plaintiff a specific performance of a parol contract alleged to have been made between the defendant and the person from whom the plaintiff bought, and of which it was averred the plaintiff had notice. Especially could not this be done without making the plaintiff's feoffor a party.
2. A parol contract by which it was agreed that, if a man and his family would take possession of certain land and cultivate and improve it, they should have it as their home during the lives of himself and wife, paying therefor a reasonable rent and that if, at any time, after paying such rent from time to time, he should become able to purchase, the owner would convey to him a title for such price or sum as it was then worth, was too vague, uncertain and wanting in mutuality to furnish a foundation for a decree for specific performance requiring a conveyance from the other party to the contract or one who purchased from him with notice.
3. Nor under such circumstances, would the original owner of the land, or one who purchased from him with notice, be compelled to pay for improvements erected thereon by the occupant. It did not appear that he was able to pay for the land, or that he ever demanded a deed prior to its sale. He held as a tenant of the original owner, and became a tenant of the purchaser; and he could neither render the latter liable for improvements not assented to by the landlord, nor could he change the relation of landlord and tenant, except by consent of his landlord.
Contracts. Equity. Specific Performance. Vendor and Purchaser. Landlord and Tenant. Betterments. Before Judge ESTES. Lumpkin Superior Court. April Term, 1885.
Reported in the decision.
WIER BOYD, for plaintiff in error.
R. H BAKER, for defendant.
This was an action in the statutory form to recover lots of land numbers 278 and 279, situate, in the 6th district and first section of Lumpkin county. Both parties held under John H. Abercrombie,-the plaintiff by a deed from him dated March 8th, 1883.
In addition to the general issue, the defendant pleaded, in bar of the plaintiff's recovery, that he went into possession of the premises on the first day of January, 1878, and held possession of them continuously from that time until the commencement of the present suit, under contract (admitted in the argument to be verbal) with the said Abercrombie, that if he and his family would take possession of the same and cultivate and improve it, they should have it as their home during the lives of defendant and his wife, defendant paying therefor reasonable rent; and if at any time, after paying such rent, from time to time, he should become able to purchase, he would convey to him a title to the same at such price or sum as it was then worth. This plea further alleges that he took possession under the contract, and made various improvements upon the land by clearing and fencing some fifteen acres of the same, removing therefrom the rocks and piling the same, and refitting and repairing the house thereon; that these improvements were worth more than the land, being of the value of three hundred dollars, while the land (as we are led to infer from the somewhat loose and confused statements in the plea) was not worth, without the improvements, more than fifty dollars; that in addition to the value of the improvements and repairs made by him, he had, while he remained in possession, paid in rents two hundred dollars, and that plaintiff had due and legal notice of all the foregoing facts before she made the purchase, and took from Abercrombie a conveyance of the land; that Abercrombie had...
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