Grodt v. Darling, 89-1322
| Decision Date | 23 April 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 89-1322,89-1322 |
| Citation | 472 N.W.2d 845 |
| Parties | John G. GRODT and Margery F. Grodt, Appellants, v. Bobby DARLING, Appellee. |
| Court | Iowa Court of Appeals |
Michael J. Galligan, of Galligan & Conlin, P.C., Des Moines, for appellants.
Henry A. Harmon, of Grefe & Sidney, Des Moines, for appellee.
Considered by OXBERGER, C.J., and SCHLEGEL and HABHAB, JJ.
John Grodt and Bobby Darling were involved in an automobile accident. Grodt and his wife sued Darling for damages resulting from the accident. Following trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Darling, finding Grodt sixty percent at fault and Darling forty percent at fault. The jury also returned a verdict in favor of Darling on the loss of consortium claim of Grodt's wife.
The Grodts appeal. First, they contend the district court erred when it instructed the jury in the absence of counsel to return and complete one of the verdict forms. As it relates to this claim, the parties had agreed to a sealed verdict. At the conclusion of their deliberation, the jury informed the court attendant that it had reached a verdict. The jury returned to the courtroom and the judge asked the foreperson if the jury had reached verdicts on the claims of both plaintiffs. The foreperson stated that it had. However, when the verdict forms were given to the judge, he noticed that the jury failed to complete the verdict forms for Margery Grodt's claim. The judge then told the jury to return to the jury room and complete the verdict forms. It is here the Grodts claim the judge should have notified counsel of the incomplete verdict forms and given counsel an opportunity to be heard on what they assert is a further instruction to the jury.
The Grodts next argue the district court erred in refusing to grant a new trial based on the jury's failure to award loss of consortium damages to Margery Grodt. They contend there was substantial evidence to support such an award.
The Grodts further assert the jury instructions were incomplete. They claim the jury should have been instructed on the proper method for making a left turn. Finally, the Grodts contend the district court erred by excluding testimony by their witness concerning left turns.
We first address the plaintiffs' contention the trial court erred by instructing the jury outside the presence of counsel. We note here the attorneys agreed that after the jury had reached a verdict the court was to notify counsel as to the result.
The court followed the procedure agreed to by counsel. The jury returned to the courtroom. The judge questioned the foreman as to whether the jury had reached verdicts as to the claims of both plaintiffs. The foreman responded that it had. After the verdicts were handed to the judge, he noticed that the jury had failed to complete the verdict form with regard to Margery Grodt's consortium claim. The court then sent the jury back to complete the form.
Clearly, the jury had, through mere inadvertence, failed to complete the jury form. It simply made a ministerial error of omission. We do not believe that either party seriously challenges the right and duty of the court to order the jury to resume deliberations to correct this problem. See Iowa Code § 668.3(6).
The Iowa Supreme Court has addressed part of the problem here by saying:
[N]o good reason exists in law why the court should not recall and send back a jury to correct a manifest error in form, or supply an omission of some matter necessary to the verdict as found, and thus complete the verdict, to the end that the party favored by the finding as made may have the full benefit to which thereunder, and in law, he is unquestionably entitled.
Rutledge v. Johnson, 282 N.W.2d 111, 114 (Iowa 1979).
Here, the court had the jury before it. The jury had not been discharged. The court noticed the omission and took immediate action. Although Rutledge does not completely resolve our problem, the supreme court found no error where the trial court recalled the jury to correct omissions from a verdict returned the previous night. Id. at 113. The court found such omission to be correctible since a decision had been previously reached by the jury but inadvertently was not recorded. Id. at 114-15. Here, the jury foreman stated that a decision had been reached as to both plaintiffs' claims. Since the omission was noticed prior to the time the jury was excused, the judge asked it to reconvene in order to complete the form. The supreme court has upheld the recall of a jury under such situations:
The jury was not recalled to pass upon any question of right left undetermined by it, but simply to complete its work by making calculation of the amount due defendant. It is not conceivable that the performance of this duty could have been influenced by the matters relied upon as constituting prejudice.
Oxford Junction Savings Bank v. Cook, 134 Iowa 185, 194, 111 N.W. 805, 808 (1907).
We are unable to find that this communication by the trial judge resulted in prejudice to the plaintiffs requiring reversal. State v. Fiedler, 260 Iowa 1198, 152 N.W.2d 236 (1967). Further, "[w]hen misconduct is asserted as a ground for a new trial, it must appear from the record that the misconduct caused prejudice to the moving party or that a different result would have been probable but for such misconduct." McConnell v. Aluminum Co. of America, 367 N.W.2d 245, 248 (Iowa 1985).
Since we find no prejudice to the plaintiffs, we need not necessarily address the question as to whether the action taken by the trial court constituted an instruction or was merely a statement or direction as to their further duty. We do know that not every communication between a judge and jury is an instruction. As our supreme court has stated:
[G]eneral directions to the jurors as to their duty, not having any bearing upon the evidence which they are to consider and the law applicable thereto, are not instructions such as are required to be in writing under statutory provision is illustrated by many cases. Stated otherwise not every communication between judge and jury subsequent to the jury's retirement to deliberate on a verdict is an instruction.
State v. Fiedler, 152 N.W.2d at 242.
We are unable to find that the plaintiffs were prejudiced by this action. We conclude the plaintiffs are not entitled to a new trial on this issue.
The plaintiffs next contend the trial...
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Gamerdinger v. Schaefer, 98-377.
...v. Wiese Corp., 360 N.W.2d 122, 130-31 (Iowa App.1984); see also Gail v. Clark, 410 N.W.2d 662, 672 (Iowa 1987); Grodt v. Darling, 472 N.W.2d 845, 848 (Iowa App.1991). "[E]vidence of former accidents at a place is admissible to show its dangerous character and knowledge thereof if condition......