Groesbeck v. Golden

• Decision Date: 02 December 1887
• Citation: 7 S.W. 362
• Parties: GROESBECK v. GOLDEN <I>et al.</I>
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

7 S.W. 362

GROESBECK v. GOLDEN et al.

Supreme Court of Texas.

December 2, 1887.

Commissioners' decision. Appeal from district court, Robertson county.

This suit was brought in the district court of Robertson county by A. Groesbeck, in the usual form of trespass to try title, against Ike Golden et al., for 1,496 acres of land patented to said Groesbeck, as the assignee of Martha Brennen, on October 8, 1874. Golden et al. pleaded not guilty. Verdict and judgment for defendants, from which this appeal is properly prosecuted by A. Groesbeck. Appellees claimed by regular chain of transfers, from and under a title to one league of land extended to John Haynie by William H. Steele, special commissioner, on 8th or 10th of February, 1836. John Haynie's application was dated October 6, 1829, and represented that he was a merchant, residing at Bexar, possessed of the necessary capital for agriculture and stockraising and prayed that a league of land be granted to him, in conformity with article 17 of the colonization law of 24th of March, 1825, offering to settle upon and cultivate said land. The commissioner general, Padilla, reported that the applicant was a citizen of the state, by special letter granted to him by the honorable congress, with property of his own, with which he carried on a clothing store; and that he was a widower, with one daughter, who was with her relations in the United States to be educated. Upon this representation, the governor conceded to the petitioner the league which he solicited, in the place where it may best suit him, and directed the commissioner general that the government has appointed, to put him in possession, and expedite the corresponding title. On the 1st of December, 1834, John Haynie addressed a petition to W. H. Steele, saying that, not having received a title to the sitio of land conceded to him on the 20th of April, 1830, and which he selected in the year 1832 on the east margin of the river Brazos, commencing at the upper corner of a sitio of John Teal, and prayed that Steele would order the land to be surveyed, and put him in possession of it personally, and expedite the title; representing that the governor had appointed him special commissioner for that purpose. On the 20th of December, 1834, Steele directed L. B. Chance to survey the sitio which the party intended solicits, on the indicated land, and to make returns, etc. Chance made a survey of a league of land, beginning on the upper corner of the 11 leagues of George Antonio Nixon, and returned the field-notes, in accordance with which the deed was made by Steele, as above stated; the proof showing that it was executed either on the 8th or 10th of February, 1835. There is no evidence in the record that Steele was appointed special commissioner, except the recitals in Haynie's petition and in Steele's deed, or that he had authority to make the deed. The proof showed that Padilla was the commissioner ordered to expedite the title in the first instance. The title to John Haynie was pronounced void by a judgment of the supreme court in the case of Harlan's Heirs v. Haynie, reported in 9 Tex. 460 et seq. Judgment was rendered in the district court in favor of Haynie, in an action of trespass to try title, and the case was appealed by Harlan's heirs. The supreme court, holding the Haynie grant to be void, dismissed the case. The suit only involved that portion of the Haynie grant in conflict with a junior title issued by the republic of Texas to Harlan. In less than a year from the time said suit had been dismissed by the supreme court, John Haynie brought another suit of trespass to try title against the heirs of Harlan for the same land, alleging newly-discovered evidence. The venue of second suit was changed to Burleson county, and was some time in 1886 compromised, the heirs of Harlan paying said Haynie $600 for that portion of his grant in conflict with Harlan's grant; the court, by its decree, vesting title to this part of the Haynie grant in Harlan's heirs, and vesting title of the remaining portion of said grant in the said John Haynie.

H. D. Prendergast and West & McGown, for appellant. Wm. H. Hamman, for appellees.

MALTBIE, J., (after stating the facts as above.)

The grant to John Haynie was issued by W. H. Steele, special commissioner, on 8th or 10th of February, 1835, and the grant to A. Groesbeck, to a part of the same land, was issued by the state of Texas on 8th day of October, 1874. Appellant claims that the supreme court, in the case of Harlan's Heirs v. Haynie, 9 Tex. 461; having determined that the Haynie grant was invalid, the land covered by said grant was vacant, unappropriated public domain, and that he acquired the title to that portion claimed by him by reason of the location of a valid certificate, return of field-notes, and the issuance of the patent introduced in evidence by him in this case. Whether the land was in fact vacant would depend upon whether the decision in the case of Harlan's Heirs v. Haynie supra, is a correct enunciation of the law upon the subject-matters of the adjudication. The decision was made by a divided court, and is, we think, unsupported by either reason or authority. It is mainly rested on a construction of the seventeenth section of the colonization laws of March 24, 1825, which is as follows: "It appertains to the government to augment the quantity indicated in 14th, 15th, and 16th articles in proportion to the family industry and activity of the colonists, agreeable to the information given on the subject by the ayuntamientos and commissioners, always bearing in mind the provision of article 12 of the decree of the general congress on the subject." In construing the seventeenth section the court says "that lexicographers define `augment' to mean `to enlarge by addition; to enlarge in size; to swell,' etc.; and from the definition argue that there can be no augmentation of the land allowed colonists, unless there had been first a grant to such colonists, in which event the commissioner, under certain formalities, may issue another or additional grant to the colonist; but in no event can a larger quantity be granted by virtue of the seventeenth section, in the first instance, than the colonists would be entitled to under the other provisions of the law. This, it seems to us, is too narrow a construction of the seventeenth section of the colonization law. What difference could it make to the government whether there had been a previous concession, and the present was an augmentation, according to the ordinary meaning of the word, or whether there had been a larger quantity than colonists were ordinarily entitled to be granted in the first instance; the object being to grant a larger quantity of land to colonists possessed of certain qualifications than to those not having them. In interpretating an act of parliament, it is said, it is not in general a true line of construction to decide according to the strict letter of the act; but the court will rather consider what is its fair meaning, and will expound it differently from the letter, in order to preserve the intent; for "qui...