Groff v. Department of Labor and Industries

• Decision Date: 01 October 1964
• Docket Number: No. 37064,37064
• Citation: 65 Wn.2d 35,395 P.2d 633
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: Claude M. GROFF, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR & INDUSTRIES of the State of Washington, and Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation, Respondents.

Page 35

65 Wn.2d 35

395 P.2d 633

Claude M. GROFF, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR & INDUSTRIES of the State of Washington and Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation, Respondents.

No. 37064.

Supreme Court of Washington, Department 1.

Oct. 1, 1964.

George W. Young, Spokane, for appellant.

Keith Winston & Repsold, E. Lawrence White, Spokane, John J. O'Connell, Atty. Gen., Olympia, Andrew J. Young, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondents.

HILL, Judge.

This is an appeal by the claimant in a workman's compensation case from a judgment of the superior court affirming an order of the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals (hereafter called the Board), which had affirmed the order of the Supervisor of Industrial Insurance denying the claim for benefits under the workmen's compensation act. The claimant's contention is that he developed a disabling pulmonary condition, as a result of exposure to fumes and smoke in the course of his employment in an aluminum plant.

The factual issues to be determined are two: (1) Is the pulmonary condition of the claimant moderately advanced emphysema, with an advanced peribronchial fibrosis, pulmonary hypertension and flammatory bronchitis resulting in extensive disability together with a more recently acquired conjunctivitis and rhinitis, or is it a slight asthmatic bronchitis? (2) Was the pulmonary condition, if disabling, caused by fumes and smoke in his place of employment?

The right to any benefits under the workmen's compensation act depends upon the answer to the second question, for unless there is a causal connection between his condition and his employment, there can be no benefits. The answer to the first question, however, is important because of the testimony of the claimant's doctor that the pathological condition of the claimant could not have been caused by smoking--the only other cause for the claimant's pulmonary condition which was seriously suggested.

It is unfortunate that, on the issues here presented, in the face of what seems to us an exceptionally strong case presented by the claimant, the Board, contrary to its usual custom, made no extensive analysis of the evidence in the lengthy record. (There are 495 pages in the appeal board record.) The Board contented itself with the following brief five-line summary of the critical issue:

'After a careful review of the record, we are persuaded that the claimant was not exposed to fumes in harmful quantities in the particular area in which he worked as a truck repairman and that, more likely than not, the pulmonary condition of which he complains did not arise naturally and proximately out of his employment.'

The formal finding, on which the Board's decision and that of the superior court must rest, is as follows:

'It is more likely than not that the claimant's pulmonary condition of which he complains, did not arise naturally and proximately out of his employment at the Trentwood, Washington plant of the Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation.'

It is even more unfortunate that the superior court, on the hearing de novo ¹ to which the claimant was entitled made no attempt at an independent appraisal of the evidence.

The first four findings made by the trial court were taken verbatim (with the omission of one 'the') from the first finding made by the Board. The trial court's fifth finding merely recited that there had been hearings held before the Board and that, on August 21, 1962, the Board entered a finding of fact, which it then quoted. This is the same finding which we have said was the basis for the decision of the Board and the superior court and which we have quoted, supra.

The sixth finding is to the effect that the Board made the following three conclusions of law:

(1) This Board has jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter of this appeal;

(2) The pulmonary condition complained of by the claimant is not an occupational disease within the meaning of RCW 51.08.140;

(3) The order of the supervisor of industrial insurance dated May 19, 1959, should be sustained; and that the Board entered an order sustaining the order of the supervisor rejecting the claim for benefits under the workmen's compensation act.

These six findings do no more than recite the procedural steps in connection with the claim and the action of the Board thereon. Whether the Board should have made the decisive finding and made the decision it did may be open to question; but no one can dispute the trial court's finding that they had been made.

The seventh finding was as follows:

'The Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals has acted in this matter within its power and the Board has correctly construed the law and has correctly found the facts herein and has correctly determined that the order of the supervisor of industrial insurance of May 19, 1959, reaffirming a prior order dated March 17, 1959, rejecting the claim of the plaintiff for benefits under the workman's compensation act was correct and should be sustained; that the plaintiff did not produce evidence in the certified appeal Board record sufficient to preponderate against the findings of the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals in its decision and order in this matter dated August 21, 1962.' Finding No. 7.

This is the only finding which could be subject to attack. It should be read with certain provisions of RCW 51.52.115 in mind, i. e.,

'* * * In all court proceedings under or pursuant to this title the findings and decision of the board shall be prima facie correct and the burden of proof shall be upon the party attacking the same. If the court shall determine that the board has acted within its power and has correctly construed the law and found the facts, the decision of the board shall be confirmed; * * *'.

After restating the procedural steps and the action of the Board through six findings the seventh uses the language of the statute and sets forth the ultimate findings of fact and law necessary to affirm the Board, i. e., it 'has acted * * * within its power' and 'has correctly construed the law and has correctly found the facts.'

The only indication that there was any weighing of the evidence by the trial court are the findings that the Board 'has correctly found the facts' and

'* * * that the plaintiff [the claimant] did not produce evidence in the certified appeal Board record sufficient to preponderate against the findings of the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals. * * *'

These findings, while adequate to a final disposition of the case, are completely inadequate if there is to be an effective appellate review on factual issues. Nor are the findings supplemented by an oral opinion or memorandum decision giving some indication of the trial court's appraisal of the evidence. ²

It was pointed out in the first volume of the Washington reports, ³ that general findings such as 'the matters and things set forth in the complaint are true,' are 'entirely insufficient' for an appellate review. ⁴

While the degree of particularity required in findings of fact must necessarily be gauged by the case at hand, it should be sufficient to indicate the factual base for the ultimate conclusion. The Supreme Court of the United States has said,

'The nature and degree of exactness of findings required depends on the circumstances of the particular case.' ⁵

For an adequate appellate review in cases such as the one now before us, this court should have, from the trial court which has tried the case do novo, findings of fact (supplemented, if need be, by a memorandum decision or oral opinion) which show an understanding of the conflicting contentions and evidence, and a resolution of the material issues of fact that penetrates beneath the generality of ultimate conclusions, together with a knowledge of the standards applicable to the determination of those facts.

The findings in the present case fall far short of that requirement. The seventh and only reviewable finding contains only the most general conclusions of ultimate facts, i. e., that the Board 'correctly found the facts,' and 'that the plaintiff [claimant] did not produce evidence * * * sufficient to preponderate against the findings of the Board.' It is impossible to tell upon what underlying facts the court relied and whether proper standards were applied. We could not pass upon the factual issues in this case on such findings without ourselves making a complete de novo review of the entire record.

We shall, presently, discuss the matter of the application of proper standards, but at this point we would make clear the extent of our review and indicate, by way of contrast, what the findings of facts should do in such a case.

The recent cases of Benedict v. Department of Labor & Industries (1963), 63 Wash.Dec.2d 11, 385 P.2d 380, and Pend Oreille Mines & Metals Co. v. Department of Labor & Industries (1963), 63 Wash.Dec.2d 169, 385 P.2d 856, make clear that our review of factual issues on appeals in workmen's compensation cases is, 'as in other civil cases,' ⁶ limited to an examination of the record to see whether there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the trial court made after the de novo trial in the superior court. See Thorndike v. Hesperian Orchards, Inc. (1959), 54 Wash.2d 570, 343 P.2d 183, for a statement of why our appellate review is so limited.

We must--to make such a limited factual review of any value--require that trial courts make findings that give a clear indication that there has been a resolution of the material issues of fact. The Benedict case is an excellent illustration of what we have in mind. Instead of a finding of the ultimate fact, that Mr. Benedict was totally and permanently disabled immediately prior to his death by reason of his occupational vibration disease, we had these findings:

'That for many years prior to 1953 deceased worked in the woods as a faller and bucker using a cross-cut saw without experiencing any particular...