Groff v. Longsdon

• Decision Date: 08 April 1922
• Docket Number: No. 22370.,22370.
• Parties: GROFF v. LONGSDON.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

239 S.W. 1087

GROFF v. LONGSDON.

No. 22370.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.

April 8, 1922.

Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court; Charles B. Davis, Judge.

Suit by John H. Groff against Susy Longsdon. Findings and decree for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded, with directions.

The plaintiff instituted this suit in the circuit court of the city of St. Louis against the defendant to set aside and cancel a certain quitclaim deed executed by him October 2, 1913, conveying to the defendant a certain lot and house situated in the city of St. Louis, particularly described in the petition, upon the ground of fraud. The trial resulted in a finding of the facts for the plaintiff, and a decree accordingly.

From this decree the defendant duly appealed to this court.

Counsel for plaintiff accepts the statement of the case made by counsel for the defendant, and then adds a short statement thereto which the former states the evidence tended to show over and beyond what the statement of defendant shows. The statement of counsel for the defendant is as follows:

The petition which was filed March 4, 1920, alleges that the defendant took advantage of infirmity and disease on the part of plaintiff to cheat and defraud him, by conducting him to a real estate office and having him there execute the deed in question, by representing to him that it was a mortgage to insure the repayment of money loaned to him. The prayer of the petition is that the deed be adjudged null and void and that the defendant be required to deliver up to plaintiff the possession of the premises and for general relief.

On the trial, the plaintiff's evidence consisted of the testimony of himself, his mother, and his brothers; and the defendant's evidence was her own testimony and that of Mr. Hauschulte, the agent who drew the deed in question. The plaintiff and defendant are brother and sister, and the premises in dispute originally belonged to their father. After the latter's death, the children according to the testimony of William Groff, turned the property over to their mother, and she afterwards deeded it to her son John, the plaintiff. At the time the deed in question was executed, October 2, 1913, the plaintiff, his brother and his mother, together with the defendant and her child, were living in the house. The plaintiff testified that he asked his sister to lend him some money and that she told him to sign his name to a paper which he did and she folded it up and afterwards made him go down to Rosenbaum & Hauschulte's real estate office, where they had a paper, and he walked in, and they told him to sign his name, and he signed it and walked out. He further says that they never told him what the paper was, and his sister never told him that it was a mortgage, but that he just took it to be a mortgage and did not read the paper or ask to have it read to him. The defendant testified that there was never anything said by her to the plaintiff in regard to a mortgage or lending him money, but that shortly prior to the execution of the deed the plaintiff wanted some money and told her that, if she would give him $300, he would turn the place over to her, and that thereupon they caused the deed to be prepared by Mr. Hauschulte, and she and her mother went down there on the day that it was to be executed, and her brother came in and signed it and acknowledged it before Mr. Hauschulte as notary public, and then her brother walked out, and she and her mother got up and went away, and that after that time she paid all the taxes, water license, and repairs upon the place. Plaintiff also says that, prior to the execution of the deed, he paid the taxes and the insurance on the property, but that after that time he paid nothing, and that he at no time paid his sister any interest or other money. The deed itself is an ordinary quitclaim deed reciting a consideration of $1. The court entered a decree wherein it found that the deed was fraudulent as to plaintiff and ordered and decreed that the same be set aside and declared void, and that the defendant have a lien against the property for the sum of $300 advanced by defendant to plaintiff, and that defendant pay the costs of the proceeding. The defendant, having unavailingly moved for a new trial, perfected her appeal to this court.

The additional statement made by counsel for plaintiff is as follows:

"The statement of the appellant is adopted by the respondent, except that on the trial of the case the evidence and testimony submitted by the respondent was to the effect that prior to the execution of the deed in question, and at the time of the execution of the deed in question, and subsequent thereto, respondent's mental and physical condition was poor, his eyesight was bad, and that he was in an emaciated condition, due to illness, disease, and intoxication. That at the time of the execution of the deed and prior thereto, his sister did not have any disinterested relatives or friends to advise the respondent or to look after his interest, but permitted him to come to the real estate office alone to transact the business. That he came in, and that she did not see that he read the deed or that it was explained to him, but sat placidly by and permitted him to sign. That the parties had lived in the same house for a long period previous to the execution of the deed in question, and that the appellant was familiar with the respondent's mental and physical condition."

There is no objection made to this additional statement made by counsel for the plaintiff, and under the rules of this court we must take it to be true.

Kinealy & Kinealy, of St. Louis, for appellant.

E. P. Peers, Sarpy Noonan, and John P. Collins,...