Grogan v. Hillman, 2040227.
Decision Date | 18 November 2005 |
Docket Number | No. 2040227.,2040227. |
Citation | 930 So.2d 520 |
Parties | Katrina M. GROGAN and Charlie V. Martin v. Ballard HILLMAN, Jr., and Susanne Hillman. |
Court | Alabama Court of Civil Appeals |
Terry P. Wilson, Montgomery, for appellants.
Matthew T. Ellis of Parnell & Crum, P.A., Montgomery, for appellees.
Katrina M. Grogan and Charlie V. Martin ("the plaintiffs") appeal a judgment finding that they are not the owners of a 3.36-acre tract of unoccupied real property ("the property") and that Ballard Hillman, Jr., and Susanne Hillman ("the defendants") own the property.
Pursuant to § 6-6-560 et seq., Ala.Code 1975 ("the Grove Act"), the plaintiffs sued to quiet title to the property. The plaintiffs originally named as opposing parties Hudson Hillman, the unknown devisees of Hudson Hillman, and the property. The plaintiffs later amended their complaint to add the defendants, who are the grandchildren of Hudson Hillman. In their complaint and amended complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that "[t]he last owner of record of [the] property is Hudson Hillman by way of warranty deed. . . ."
Summarizing § 6-6-560 of the Grove Act, our supreme court has stated:
Shelton v. Wright, 439 So.2d 55, 57 (Ala. 1983) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Fitts v. Alexander, 277 Ala. 372, 375, 170 So.2d 808, 810 (1965)). The plaintiffs sued to quiet title to the property under the fourth condition quoted above.
Section 6-6-566(c) of the Grove Act provides the following conditions for establishing conclusive evidence of title:
"(c) Against all persons who have neither paid any taxes upon said lands nor had any possession thereof, or of any part thereof, during the 10 years next preceding the filing of the complaint . . . proof of exclusive payment of taxes by the plaintiff or by the plaintiff and those through whom he claims title, during said 10-year period, shall be conclusive evidence of title to said lands in the plaintiff."
The plaintiffs moved for a summary judgment and submitted evidence indicating that they were the only persons who had paid taxes on the property for the 10 years preceding the filing of the action and that no one was in actual possession of the property during those 10 years. In opposition to the motion for a summary judgment, the defendants submitted evidence establishing that Hudson Hillman, identified in the complaint as the "last owner of record of [the] property," died intestate in 1946 and was survived by his widow and two sons, Ballard Hillman, Sr., and John L. Hillman. The defendants further submitted evidence establishing that in 1947 Ballard Hillman, Sr., the father of the defendants, acquired all of the interests in all the real property, including the property at issue in this case, that had been owned by Hudson Hillman at the time of his death. The defendants claimed that their father's interest in the property had passed to them by intestacy.
The trial court entered a judgment finding that the plaintiffs had failed to meet the statutory requirements to quiet title to the property and that the defendants owned the property. In pertinent part, the judgment states:
The plaintiffs appealed to the supreme court, and, pursuant to § 12-2-7(6), Ala. Code 1975, the supreme court transferred the appeal to this court.
"We review questions of statutory construction and interpretation de novo, giving no deference to the trial court's conclusions." Pitts v. Gangi, 896 So.2d 433, 434 (Ala.2004).
On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred because, the plaintiffs say, they produced conclusive evidence establishing their title to the property under § 6-6-566(c) of the Grove Act. The plaintiffs argue that they were the only persons who paid taxes on the property for the 10 years preceding the filing of their action. Furthermore, they argue that the defendants neither paid taxes on the property nor exercised "any possession" of the property or any part thereof during the preceding 10 years. The dispositive issue is whether the defendants' title interest in the property constitutes "any possession" under § 6-6-566(c) and therefore defeats the plaintiffs' attempt to establish conclusive evidence of title under § 6-6-566(c). The defendants argue that "any possession" under § 6-6-566(c) should be construed to include "constructive possession," which the defendants claim to have by virtue of their record title to the property. The plaintiffs, on the other hand, argue that "any possession" can only mean "actual possession," which the defendants did not have.
IMED Corp. v. Systems Engineering Assocs. Corp., 602 So.2d 344, 346 (Ala.1992). In ascertaining legislative intent, this court looks to the entire act instead of isolated phrases or clauses. Lambert v. Wilcox County Comm'n, 623 So.2d 727, 729 (Ala. 1993).
Although the legislature did not define what "any possession" means under the Grove Act, there appears to be a distinction between the terms "any possession" and "actual possession" as used in the act. Section 6-6-566(a) states that a plaintiff who presents proof of "actual, peaceable possession" of lands can establish conclusive evidence of title under certain circumstances. (Emphasis added.) Section 6-6-560 uses the terms "actual, peaceable possession" and "actual possession." (Emphasis added.) Having already used the terms "actual possession" and "actual, peaceable possession" in the act, the legislature, had it intended "any possession" to mean "actual possession," could have simply said "actual possession." The modifier "any" in "any possession," used in its natural and plain sense, suggests a definition broader...
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