Grooms Hauling, LLC v. Robinson, CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-5405
| Decision Date | 23 January 2020 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-5405 |
| Parties | GROOMS HAULING, LLC, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CORPORAL LOUIS ROBINSON, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
In this action,1 Plaintiffs Grooms Hauling, LLC ("Grooms Hauling"), Henry Grooms ("Grooms"), and Cynthia Peterkin ("Peterkin") (collectively, "Plaintiffs") have asserted the following claims against Defendants Louis Robinson ("Robinson"), Patrick Fetterman ("Fetterman") and William McCardle ("McCardle") (collectively, "Defendants")2: an equal protection violation based on race, Am. Compl. Count I; race discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, id. Count III; and a conspiracy to discriminate against Plaintiffs in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985, id. Count IV.3 Presently before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 27). For the reasons discussed below, Defendants' Motion will be granted.4
Plaintiffs' claims arise out of three incidents in which one or more of the Defendants issued citations to Plaintiffs on the ground that the window tinting of the Grooms Hauling dump trucks violated federal and Pennsylvania regulations that limit the extent of tinting of windows on commercial vehicles. Pennsylvania has adopted the federal standard for the extent of permissible tinting of vehicle windows. 67 Pa. Code § 229.14(7). Under that standard, window tinting is permitted so long as "the parallel luminous transmittance through the colored or tinted glazing is not less than 70 percent of the light at normal incidence." 49 C.F.R. § 393.60(d). In other words, window tinting is required to allow "70 percent of the light contacting the window [to] pass through the window." Defs.' Br. Ex. 2 (PennDot Fact Sheet Vehicle Window Tint).5
The first incident at issue occurred on June 15, 2017 at the New Garden Weigh Station located near the Pennsylvania-Delaware border. Pls.' Statement of Facts (Doc. No. 34-2) ¶¶ 2-3 ]; Defs.' Br. at 3.6 On that date, Fetterman directed McCardle to inspect the windows of a Grooms Hauling dump truck driven by Grooms, using a tint meter to determine whether it had darker tinting on its windows than is permitted under federal andPennsylvania law. See Pls.' Facts ¶ 12; Defs.' Br. at 3. Fetterman testified that he selected Grooms truck for further inspection Defs.' Br. Ex. 9, at 18-19.
Plaintiffs allege that, during the June 15, 2017 incident, Fetterman accused Grooms of a variety of inspection violations and was rude and disparaging during their interaction. See Pls.' Facts ¶¶ 4-11. Grooms further maintains that Fetterman "told me as a black man there's no way I can own two dump trucks, as a black man you must be selling drugs in my state." Id. ¶ 11. Plaintiffs also contend that a medical waiver issued by the State of Delaware to Peterkin7 permitted Peterkin, and, therefore, Grooms Hauling, to have a heavier degree of tint than the federal and Pennsylvania regulations mandate. Pls.' Br. at 6; Defs.' Br. Ex. 12, at 3 (medical waiver).
McCardle issued a citation to Grooms for violation of the applicable window-tinting regulations. See Pls.' Facts ¶ 12; Defs.' Br. at 3 & Ex. 5. In a document entitled "Traffic Citation Adjudication," in the portion titled "officer's notes," McCardle recorded that Grooms was "very agitated and argumentative throughout stop, since he was singled out for having tinted windows on a brand new truck, also was stopped for a level 2 inspection in Delaware on 06/09/17 and no violations were listed o[n] tint." Defs.' Br. Ex. 5, at 3. That document also reflects that Grooms Hauling pled guilty to that violation. Id. Grooms testified at deposition that he caused Grooms Hauling to do so because an officer had pointed out to him that he did nothave with him a document to support his claim that his window tinting was lawful due to a medical waiver.8 Pls.' Br. Ex. A, at 12-13.
The second incident occurred on June 23, 2017 when Fetterman stopped Grooms driving a Grooms Hauling truck in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania. Pls.' Facts ¶ 15; Defs.' Br. at 3. Fetterman testified at deposition that he stopped the Grooms Hauling truck because he could see that its windows still had the heavy tinting for which it had been cited on June 15, 2017. Defs.' Br. Ex. 9, at 31. Fetterman cited Grooms for the window tinting. Pls.' Facts ¶ 17; Defs.' Br. at 3. Plaintiffs state that Grooms had with him at the time a window-tint waiver issued by the State of Delaware. Pls.' Facts ¶ 16. That representation is contradicted by Grooms' deposition testimony that he did not have a waiver certificate with him at the time he received the second ticket and that the waiver was issued on that same date. Pls.' Br. Ex. A, at 16-17; Defs.' Br. Ex. 12, at 3 (waiver application signed June 23, 2017).
The third incident occurred on October 5, 2017. Robinson pulled over a Grooms Hauling dump truck being driven by Peterkin and conducted an inspection of it. Pls.' Facts ¶¶ 19-20; Defs.' Br. at 4. In addition to again measuring the window tinting and finding it violated federal and Pennsylvania law, Robinson determined that the truck had a defective brake-warning deviceand low air-warning light. Defs.' Br. at 4 & Ex. 7. Robinson issued Peterkin a citation for the window-tinting violation, but did not cite her for the defective warning lights. Id. at 4-5.
At approximately the same time on October 5, 2017, McCardle stopped Grooms, who was again driving his Grooms Hauling truck with the same window tinting for which he had previously been cited. Pls.' Facts ¶¶ 19-20, 22, 24; Defs.' Br. at 4. McCardle issued citations to Grooms for the tinted windows and for an unsecured fire extinguisher. Pls.' Facts ¶ 24; Defs.' Br. Exs. 7, 8. On this occasion, one of the two Grooms Hauling trucks carried a medical waiver certificate issued by the State of Delaware authorizing the dark tinting on the truck's windows. Defs.' Br. at 4. The waiver stated on its face that "I understand that this waiver is only valid for the State of Delaware and must be kept in the vehicle." Id. at 4 & Ex. 12.
An additional incident occurred on July 24, 2018, when two officers who are not parties to this case stopped both Grooms and Peterkin and again issued them citations for window-tinting violations on the Grooms Hauling trucks.9 Pls.' Facts ¶ 29; Pls.' Br. Ex. E.
On November 20, 2017, Plaintiffs challenged the October 5, 2017 tickets in a Lancaster County magisterial district court. Pls.' Br. Ex. D (hearing transcript). The magisterial district court found Plaintiffs not guilty on the citations. Id. Ex. D, at 54-58. At the conclusion of thehearing, Robinson cautioned Grooms that the court's ruling only had force within the magisterial district court's jurisdiction and that he could be ticketed in other jurisdictions. Id. Ex. D, at 56.
Under the well-established summary judgment standard, "[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "Summary judgment is appropriate when 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Williams v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 14-2345, 2015 WL 1573745, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 2015) (quoting Wright v. Corning, 679 F.3d 101, 105 (3d Cir. 2012)).
[T]he plain language of Rule 56[a] mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be "no genuine issue as to any material fact," since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The moving party is "entitled to judgment as a matter of law" because the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of [his or] her case with respect to which [he or] she has the burden of proof.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
"By its very terms, this standard [that there be no genuine issue as to any material fact] provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original). A material fact is one that "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Id. at 248.
When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court shall consider facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Scheidemantle v. Slippery Rock Univ. State Sys. of Higher Educ., 470 F.3d 535, 538 (3d Cir. 2006). To prevail on summary judgment, however, "the non-moving party must present more than a mere scintilla of evidence; 'there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-moving party].'" Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707 F.3d 417, 425 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Jakimas v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 485 F.3d 770, 777 (3d Cir. 2007)); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
In Count I of their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants violated their right to equal protection by discriminating against them based on race. Am. Compl., Count I. "The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment...
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