Scheidemantle v. Slippery Rock Univ. State System
Decision Date | 19 December 2006 |
Docket Number | No. 05-3850.,05-3850. |
Citation | 470 F.3d 535 |
Parties | Judy SCHEIDEMANTLE, Appellant v. SLIPPERY ROCK UNIVERSITY STATE SYSTEM OF HIGHER EDUCATION. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Neal A. Sanders, Esquire (Argued), Butler, PA, for Appellant.
Thomas W. Corbett, Jr., Attorney General, Craig E. Maravich (Argued), Deputy Attorney General, Calvin R. Koons, Senior Attorney General, John Knorr, III, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Appellate Division, Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania, Pittsburgh, PA, for Appellee.
Before McKEE, AMBRO, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.
Judy Scheidemantle alleges that Slippery Rock University discriminated against her by refusing twice to promote her for an advertised locksmith position and hiring unqualified male employees instead. Slippery Rock countered, in a motion for summary judgment, that it did not promote Scheidemantle because she was unqualified for the position. The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania agreed with Slippery Rock in granting its motion, determining that Scheidemantle failed to establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination because she did not meet the "objective qualifications" for the position.
Scheidemantle appeals to us. We must decide whether an employer that hires someone who lacks a job posting's objective qualifications can point to the absence of those same qualifications in another applicant as a basis for declining to hire that second applicant. We hold that it cannot, and in so doing conclude that Scheidemantle established a prima facie case of discrimination. We thus reverse the summary judgment and remand.
In March 2003, Slippery Rock posted a locksmith position vacancy, requiring two years of locksmithing experience. Scheidemantle, who worked for Slippery Rock as a labor foreman, applied along with three male applicants. She had completed a home study course in locksmithing and subsequently received a professional locksmithing license,1 but neither she nor the other applicants possessed the requisite two years of locksmithing experience.
Scheidemantle was not hired. Instead, Calvin Rippey, a younger employee from the University's "carpenter department," who had no prior coursework and less than two years' locksmithing experience, was selected for the position.
Scheidemantle filed a discrimination claim with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),2 alleging age and gender discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e etseq.,3 and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 P.S. §§ 951 et seq. ("PHRA").4 The EEOC dismissed her claim, noting that her home study course was the equivalent of 241 hours of actual locksmithing experience, whereas Rippey's actual experience included at least 941 hours. It concluded that Scheidemantle's App. at 88. Scheidemantle then filed suit in the District Court.
In April 2004, Rippey was promoted out of the locksmith position and the now-vacant position was again posted in June 2004, this time requiring three years of locksmithing experience. Between April and June, Rippey informally had assigned Bradley Winrader, an employee from the carpenter department, to perform locksmithing duties on an ongoing basis. Winrader also had little experience in locksmithing and had completed no locksmithing coursework until November 2004, when he enrolled in a correspondence course after beginning his locksmithing assignment. Based on the record before us, Slippery Rock did not conduct interviews for or fill the 2004 position on a permanent basis.
In October 2004, Scheidemantle filed another complaint with the EEOC, which again rejected her case. She then amended her complaint before the District Court, wherein she alleged age and gender discrimination for both the 2003 and 2004 rejections. She also alleged, in the alternative, that the University's failure to promote her in 2004 was in retaliation for her 2003 EEOC filing.
The District Court determined that Scheidemantle was not qualified for the locksmith position according to the objective criteria listed in the position announcements, and consequently she could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination. She appeals to us, asserting only her gender discrimination claims.
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the initial case pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We exercise plenary review over the District Court's grant of summary judgment and apply the same standard the District Court should apply. See, e.g., Slagle v. County of Clarion, 435 F.3d at 262, 263 (3d Cir.2006); Hugh v. Butler County Family YMCA, 418 F.3d 265, 266 (3d Cir. 2005). Namely, a grant of summary judgment is proper where the moving party has established that there is no genuine dispute of material fact and "the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). To demonstrate that no material facts are in dispute, the moving party must show that the non-moving party has failed to establish one or more essential elements of his or her case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Hugh, 418 F.3d at 267. In addition, a court should view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and make all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Hugh, 418 F.3d at 267.
To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party needs to show specific facts such that a reasonable jury could find in that party's favor, thereby establishing a genuine issue of fact for trial. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). "While the evidence that the non-moving party presents may be either direct or circumstantial, and need not be as great as a preponderance, the evidence must be more than a scintilla." Hugh, 418 F.3d at 267 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251, 106 S.Ct. 2505).
Two principles guide our analysis. First, Title VII is a remedial statute, so it must be interpreted broadly. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.34 (); see also Slagle, 435 F.3d at 267 ( ); Idahoan Fresh v. Advantage Produce, Inc., 157 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir.1998) ( ).
Second, there is a low bar for establishing a prima facie case of employment discrimination. See, e.g., Ezold v. Wolf, 983 F.2d 509, 523 (3d Cir.1993) () (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); Weldon v. Kraft, Inc., 896 F.2d 793, 798 (3d Cir.1990) () (internal citations omitted).
To prevail on a claim for gender discrimination under Title VII and its analogous provision under the PHRA,5 Scheidemantle must satisfy the three-step burden-shifting inquiry laid out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). First, she must establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination. To do that, she must demonstrate that (a) she was a member of a protected class, (b) she was qualified for the locksmith job to which she applied, and (c) another, not in the protected class, was treated more favorably. See id. at 802-03, 93 S.Ct. 1817.
If she succeeds in making out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the University to establish a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its failure to promote her. Id. at 804-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817. If the University is able to provide such a reason, Scheidemantle must then show that the proffered reason is merely a pretext for actual discrimination. Id.; see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000).
The District Court decided this case on the basis of McDonnell Douglas's first step alone: that Scheidemantle could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination because she failed to meet the qualification prong. ...
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