Grooms v. Neff Harness Co.

• Decision Date: 18 June 1906
• Parties: GROOMS v. NEFF HARNESS CO.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

96 S.W. 135

GROOMS v. NEFF HARNESS CO.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

June 18, 1906.

On Rehearing, July 9, 1906.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Pulaski County; Edward W. Winfield, Judge.

Action by the Neff Harness Company against A. S. Grooms. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

J. H. Carmichael, for appellant. W. C. Adamson, for appellee.

McCULLOCH, J.

Appellee, Neff Harness Company, is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of selling harness, buggies, and other vehicles in Little Rock. W. B. Neff, who was secretary of the corporation and manager of the business, was indebted to W. L. Grooms in the sum of $82 on account for groceries and meat, and sold him a surrey in part payment of the debt. Grooms was also to deliver a secondhand buggy in exchange to cover a part of the price of the surrey, and the balance of the price was to be taken out by purchase of more groceries and meat from Grooms by Neff; but it appears that the old buggy was never delivered. The price of the surrey was charged to Grooms on the books of the company. Shortly after the transaction, Neff severed his connection with the company, and the latter repudiated the sale of the vehicle to Grooms in payment of individual indebtedness of Neff. W. L. Grooms disposed of the surrey to his father, A. S. Grooms, and, after making demand for payment of the price, which was refused, Neff Harness Company brought replevin to regain possession of the vehicle and to recover damages for detention. The suit was first brought against W. L. Grooms, but was dismissed before final judgment, and the present suit is against A. S. Grooms. There was evidence tending to show that none of the other officers had any information at the time of the sale of the vehicle to Grooms, that it was made in satisfaction of individual indebtedness of W. B. Neff, and as soon as information of that fact was received the corporation repudiated the transaction, and demanded payment of the price or return of the vehicle. There was also evidence tending to show that Grooms, when he purchased the vehicle from Neff, had no actual knowledge of the fact that the business was owned by a corporation, but thought that it was owned by Neff.

It has been decided by this court that "an agent with power to sell and receive money in payment for his principal has not the apparent authority to accept the cancellation of his own debt due to a vendee who knows, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence could know, that his debtor is acting as agent," and that the principal, upon discovery of such unauthorized sale, may repudiate it and recover possession of the article attempted to be sold. Smith v. James, 53 Ark. 135, 13 S. W. 701. This principle is so well settled by the authorities that further citation is unnecessary. It is contended, however, that the evidence in this case is insufficient to warrant the jury in finding that Grooms was aware, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence could have ascertained, that he was dealing with one who was acting as agent for another; in other words, that Grooms believed Neff to be the owner of the business, and was unaware of the corporate existence of the Neff Harness Company. It is true that Grooms testified that he thought Neff owned the business, but we cannot say that there was entire absence of evidence to justify the finding of the jury. The plaintiff was a corporation duly organized under the laws of this state. Its articles of incorporation were on record in the office of the Secretary of State and in the office of the county clerk of Pulaski county. It was openly doing business under its corporate name, and Grooms was doing business in the same city, and had previously had repeated transactions with the company. He was repeatedly in and about the place of business of the company and came in contact with other employés of the company. The fact that plaintiff was doing business under its corporate name did not necessarily carry information to all who dealt with it that it was a corporation; but we cannot say, under all the circumstances of the transactions with Grooms, that the jury were warranted in concluding that he knew or had information sufficient to put him on inquiry that he was dealing with an agent. It was not necessary that he should have known the precise limitations upon Neff's authority. He was bound to know, when he knew that he was dealing with an agent, that the latter had no authority to sell the goods of his principal in satisfaction of his own debt.

The court, among other instructions given at the instance of each party, gave the following at the request of the plaintiff. "The court instructs the jury that if they find from the evidence that at the time of the transaction between W. L. Grooms and W. B. Neff that the surrey in controversy was the property of the Neff Harness Company, and that...