Gross v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services

• Decision Date: 19 June 2003
• Docket Number: No. 02-AA-658.,02-AA-658.
• Parties: EDWARD C. GROSS, PETITIONER, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SERVICES, RESPONDENT, and KILLIAN CABLE CONTRACTING COMPANY & TRAVELERS INSURANCE, INTERVENORS.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

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EDWARD C. GROSS, PETITIONER, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SERVICES, RESPONDENT, and KILLIAN CABLE CONTRACTING COMPANY & TRAVELERS INSURANCE, INTERVENORS.

No. 02-AA-658.

Court of Appeals of District of Columbia.

Argued May 7, 2003.

Decided June 19, 2003.

Petition for Review of Action by the District of Columbia Department of Employment Services (DKT01-87).

Benjamin T. Boscolo for petitioner.

Amy L. Epstein for intervenors.

Arabella W. Teal, Interim Corporation Counsel, and Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel, filed a statement in lieu of brief, for respondent.

Before RUIZ and WASHINGTON, Associate Judges, and KING, Senior Judge.

WASHINGTON, Associate Judge:

Petitioner, Edward C. Gross, seeks review of the decision of the Director of the Department of Employment Services (DOES), arguing that the Director erred in concluding that he was not an employee of Killian Cable Contracting Company (KCC) and thus not entitled to workers' compensation benefits pursuant to D.C. Code § 32-1501 et seq. (2001). We remand the case for further consideration, fact-finding and analysis.

I.

KCC is a cable installation contractor for District Cablevision. As a contractor, KCC is given a certain number of installation jobs. Once those jobs are received by KCC, the installation supervisors, who are also installers, divide those jobs among all the installers who have been approved by and received a technician number from District Cablevision. There are a number of steps required by District Cablevision to become an approved technician and receive a technician number. An applicant must show: 1) proof of workers' compensation and liability insurance coverage; 2) a driver's license; 3) a vehicle registration; 4) passing a drug screening test; and 5) passing a criminal background check. A technician is then able to get the tools and equipment necessary, from District Cablevision, to complete an installation job. While a technician is required to have a valid technician number, "helpers," individuals who assist the technician, are not. On or about July 13, 1998, Gross met with Ronald Baptiste, the owner of KCC to discuss performing cable installation services for KCC. At that time, Gross was informed of the prerequisites which had to be met before he could begin working.

Although District Cablevision stated that it had no record of providing Gross with a technician number,¹ Gross, using technician number 459, which was a KCC number,² began performing cable installation services. Gross had approximately thirty-five work orders, which he either filled or attempted to fill³ and was paid for the work he performed, albeit some time after the accident. On July 20, 1998, Gross suffered an injury to his leg and arm when he fell from a ladder in the course of performing a cable installation. This injury underlies the claim for workers' compensation benefits. Following his injury, Gross filed for workers' compensation benefits. A formal hearing was held on July 14, 1999 before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Charles D. Devoe. KCC alleged, and ALJ Devoe concluded, that there was no employer/employee relationship between Gross and KCC. Gross appealed the ruling to the Director, and during the pendency of the appeal, filed a motion to reopen the record to introduce additional evidence on the issue of whether an employer/employee relationship existed. The motion was granted and the case was sent back to ALJ Devoe. A second hearing was held on or about October 24, 2000. Following the second hearing, ALJ Devoe again concluded that there was no employer/employee relationship and thus Gross was not entitled to benefits. The ALJ's decision was affirmed by the Director on May 22, 2002. Gross filed a timely notice of appeal.

II.

We review the Director's decision to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence, which is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Morrison v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 736 A.2d 223, 224-25 (D.C. 1999) (quoting George Hyman Const. Co. v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 498 A.2d 563, 566 (D.C. 1985)). However, we review questions of law de novo, "deferring to the Director's interpretation of the statute it enforces unless the interpretation conflicts with the statute, is inconsistent with the [governing] regulation, or otherwise is contrary to established legal doctrine." Id. at 225 (internal quotations and citations omitted and emphasis added).⁴ "The mere existence of evidence . . . contrary [to the ALJ's findings], even if substantial, does not permit this court to substitute its judgment for that of the agency." Children's Defense Fund v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 726 A.2d 1242, 1252 (D.C. 1999). Furthermore, "[c]redibility determinations of a[n ALJ] are accorded special deference by this court." Teal v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 580 A.2d 647, 651 n.7 (D.C. 1990).

D.C. Code § 32-1501 (9) (2001) defines an employee as "every person, including a minor, in the service of another under any contract for hire or apprenticeship, written or implied, in the District of Columbia . . . ." This statute requires us to first determine if there is an express or implied contract for hire, as an essential feature of an employment relationship. As Professor Larson noted, compensation law is a mutual arrangement between the employer and employee under which both give up and gain certain things. Since the rights to be adjusted are reciprocal rights between employer and employee, it is not only logical but mandatory to resort to the agreement between them to discover their relationship. To thrust upon a worker an employee status to which he or she has never consented would not ordinarily harm him or her in a vicarious liability suit by a stranger against his employer, but it might well deprive him or her of valuable rights under the compensation act, notably the right to sue his or her own employer for common-law damages. This reasoning applies not only to the question whether there is any employment relation at all, but also to the question whether one of two or more persons is an employer. In such cases, with all the elements of employment having been established as to some employer, the issue may be solely whether the particular defendant made a contract with the particular employee.

3 ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, 1990 § 64.01 (2002). If such a contract is present, we next determine whether that contract creates an employer/employee relationship or whether an independent contractor relationship exists. In determining whether an employer/employee relationship exists, DOES applies a "relative nature of work" test. Munson v. Hardy & Son Trucking Co., Inc., OWC No. 0029805, H&AS No. 96-176, Dir. Dkt. No. 97-23 (April 19, 1999). This test, which we accept for purpose of deciding this case, focuses on whether the claimant is hired to do work in which the company specializes.⁵

The ALJ concluded, and the Director agreed that there was no contract for hire between KCC and Gross; therefore, Gross was not an employee under the Act and thus not eligible for compensation. Because the Director concluded that there was no contract for hire, he did not conduct an analysis under the relative nature of work test. In his...