Gross v. General Motors Corp.
| Decision Date | 08 March 1995 |
| Docket Number | Docket Nos. 98045,98046,98806,10,Nos. 9,s. 9 |
| Citation | 528 N.W.2d 707,448 Mich. 147 |
| Parties | Wilson GROSS, Plaintiff-Appellee, and Blue Cross/Blue Shield, Intervening-Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant. Sharyn A. McLAIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Fruehauf Trailer Corporation, Fruehauf Trailer Company of Canada Ltd., Fruehauf Trailer Company, Fruehauf Canada, Inc., Fruehauf Corporation, FRH Acquisition Corporation, The Trailmobile Group of Companies, Ltd., 160052 Canada, Inc., The Bradford Group of Companies, Ltd., Gemala Industries, Ltd., Trailmobile of Canada, Trailmobile, Inc., Gemala Trading, Gemala of North America, Noran Transportation, Inc., Noran Leasing, Inc., Waterford Bootleggers, Inc. d/b/a Rockaway Cafe, Paul's Sports Page, Inc. d/b/a Brewbaker's, American Marine Shore Control, Inc., Richard Mini d/b/a American Marine Shorecontrol, Inc., Michael Paul Jones and Leonard Marin, jointly and severally, Defendant-Appellee. Calendar |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Goodman, Lister & Peters, P.C. by Richard M. Goodman and Darrel Peters, and Bendure & Thomas by Mark R. Bendure, of counsel, Detroit, for plaintiff Gross.
Chambers Steiner by Angela J. Nicita, Courtney E. Morgan, Jr., and Jeffrey T. Meyers, Detroit, for plaintiff McLain.
Reynolds, Beeby & Magnuson, P.C. by Frank K. Mandlebaum and Michael C. McKinnon, Troy, and Frank Nizio, Detroit, for defendant General Motors Corp. in Gross.
Garan, Lucow, Miller, Seward, Cooper & Becker, P.C. by Mark Shreve and Mark C. Smiley, Detroit, for defendants-appellees Noran Transp., Inc., Noran Leasing, Inc., and Leonard Martin.
Feeney, Kellett & Wienner, P.C. by James P. Feeney, Peter M. Kellett, and David N. Goltz, Bloomfield Hills, for General Motors Corp. in McLain.
Kohl, Secrest, Wardle, Lynch, Clark & Hampton by Michael L. Updike, Farmington Hills, for defendants-appellees American Marine Shore Control and Mini.
Mark Granzotto, Detroit, and Monica Farris Linkner, Berkley, for amicus curiae Michigan Trial Lawyers Ass'n.
These cases present two issues for discussion. The first issue is whether the county in which executives may have approved product designs provides venue in a design defect case. We hold that it does not. The second issue is whether a plaintiff's experience of damages within a county properly establishes tort venue therein. We hold that it does not.
These consolidated appeals concern two accidents involving General Motors vehicles. The facts concerning the accidents are not in dispute. Wilson Gross was seriously injured when his 1984 Chevrolet CK pickup truck overturned in Washtenaw County. Dawn McLain-Sutherland was killed when her 1987 Chevrolet S-10 Blazer collided with a tractor-trailer on M-59 in Oakland County. As a consequence of these accidents, design defect suits were brought against General Motors. Plaintiffs in each case brought suit in Wayne County, the location of the world headquarters of General Motors Corporation. Defendants subsequently challenged venue in each of these cases as improper, arguing that no design work occurred in Wayne County. No one disputes that venue is proper in Macomb County, the site of the actual design work for both vehicles.
The procedural histories of these cases are more complicated, especially Gross v. General Motors. In summary, plaintiff Gross filed suit in Wayne County. Pursuant to M.C.L. § 600.1651; M.S.A. § 27A.1651 and MCR 2.223, defendant moved for a change of venue for venue improperly laid. The Wayne Circuit Court granted the motion and transferred the case to Washtenaw County, the site of the plaintiff's accident, whereupon Gross, pursuant to M.C.L. § 600.1629(2); M.S.A. § 27A.1629(2), and MCR 2.222, moved in Washtenaw County for a change of venue for the convenience of the parties. The Washtenaw Circuit Court granted the motion and, as required by M.C.L. § 600.1629(2); M.S.A. § 27A.1629(2), transferred the case to the residence of the moving party, Wayne County.
The parties appealed in the Court of Appeals, which reversed the venue transfer of the Washtenaw Circuit Court, and, retaining jurisdiction, returned the case to the Wayne Circuit Court for reconsideration of defendant's original motion for change of venue in light of this Court's decision in Lorencz v. Ford Motor Co., 439 Mich. 370, 483 N.W.2d 844 (1992). On reconsideration, the Wayne Circuit Court determined that venue was proper in Wayne County. The Court of Appeals then peremptorily affirmed the denial of defendant's motion for change of venue. Defendant subsequently appealed to this Court.
Plaintiff McLain also filed suit in Wayne County. Pursuant to M.C.L. § 600.1651; M.S.A. § 27A.1651 and MCR 2.223, defendant moved for a change of venue for venue improperly laid. The Wayne Circuit Court granted the motion, transferring the case to Oakland County, and denied plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. 1 Plaintiff appealed in the Court of Appeals, but was denied leave. Plaintiff then appealed to this Court.
We are asked in these cases to further construe the meaning of M.C.L. § 600.1629(1); M.S.A. § 27A.1629(1). 2 In Lorencz, supra, we were confronted with the question whether this statute limited venue for tort actions to the county in which the tort occurred. We concluded that it does not, that "venue is proper where part or all of the cause of action arose, not merely at the situs of the injury." Id. at 377, 483 N.W.2d 844. We stated:
It is clear that a breach of duty can occur in a different venue than the injury in a tort case. For example, in a products liability action, the product can be designed in one county, manufactured in another, and the injury may occur in yet a third. A plaintiff, alleging proper facts, can file suit in any one of these places because all or a part of the cause of action arose in any one of them. Under the plain language of MCL 600.1629(1)(a); MSA 27A.1629(1)(a), venue would be properly laid in any one of them. [Id. at 375, 483 N.W.2d 844 (citations omitted).]
In accordance with Lorencz, the parties to these design defect actions do not dispute that the county in which a product is designed is a proper place for venue. However, they disagree with regard to the meaning of the term "design" and accordingly with regard to the place or places where the subject vehicles were designed.
Defendants argue that the subject vehicles were designed at General Motors' Warren Technical Center in Macomb County. Plaintiffs counter that the subject vehicles were designed in Macomb and Wayne Counties. They contend that in addition to the actual design work performed at the Tech Center, decisions that affected product design were made at General Motors' world headquarters in Detroit. McLain asserts that General Motors' product policy group, the executive management committee of the corporation, met at General Motors' world headquarters in Detroit "to discuss, adopt and approve funding" for development of a throttle body injection system. McLain alleges that these decisions resulted in the production and marketing of a defective fuel system. Gross similarly argues that General Motors executives made financial and other decisions that shaped or conditioned the design of the roof and restraint systems of the CK pickup. In short, General Motors executives are said to have made "ultimate design decisions" in the corporation's Detroit offices that thereby provide venue in Wayne County.
Venue rules traditionally have served to ensure that proceedings are held in the most convenient forum. Peplinski v. Michigan Employment Security Comm., 359 Mich. 665, 668, 103 N.W.2d 454 (1960). Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 168, 60 S.Ct. 153, 154, 84 L.Ed. 167 (1939); 15 Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 3801, p. 4. Courts evaluate convenience primarily in terms of the interests of the parties and any relevant witnesses. However, the primary goal is to minimize the costs of litigation not only by reducing the burdens on the parties, but also by considering the strains on the system as a whole. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 256-257, 102 S.Ct. 252, 266-267, 70 L.Ed.2d 419 (1981); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507-509, 67 S.Ct. 839, 842-843, 91 L.Ed. 1055 (1947).
In Michigan, plaintiffs carry the burden of establishing the propriety of their venue choice, and the resolution of a venue dispute generally occurs before meaningful discovery has occurred. Marsh v. Walter L. Couse & Co., 179 Mich.App. 204, 208, 445 N.W.2d 204 (1989). This arrangement usually works well. Ordinarily, the underlying facts relevant to the venue issue are not seriously in dispute. In such circumstances, the trial court is in a good position to resolve a dispute without extensive discovery.
The venue issues presented in these appeals, however, are different. The parties have argued contentiously regarding the facts surrounding the design of the subject vehicles. They have sought significant discovery and presented complicated factual issues for the trial court to resolve in determining proper venue. Greater discovery for the purposes of venue determination would help remedy this problem, but this would further burden trial courts with "venue trials."
In resolving these disputes, we approach our task bearing in mind that venue is simply the location of trial, and its determination should only concern the selection of a fair and convenient location where the merits of a dispute can be adjudicated. Rogoski v. Streeter, 364 Mich. 115, 119, 110 N.W.2d 617 (1961); Peplinski, supra 359 Mich. at 668, 103 N.W.2d 454. Battles over venue that endure for years and are a great expense should be discouraged and avoided when there are convenient and fair locations for trial that fulfill the venue requirements of Michigan statutes and court rules.
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