Grosskopf v. Grosskopf

Decision Date10 February 1984
Docket NumberNo. 83-126,83-126
Citation677 P.2d 814
PartiesJeannine Marie GROSSKOPF, Appellant (Defendant), v. Loren M. GROSSKOPF, Appellee (Plaintiff).
CourtWyoming Supreme Court

Stephen L. Simonton of Simonton & Simonton, Cody, for appellant.

Sharon A. Fitzgerald, Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

CARDINE, Justice.

This appeal is from a judgment and decree in a divorce action and appellant's objection to its provisions for child support, division of property, and denial of alimony and attorneys fees. We will affirm.

The issues as framed by appellant are:

"1. Whether the Court erred by finding Appellant at fault in determining which party should be granted the divorce.

"2. Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion to Appellant's prejudice when it considered fault on the issues of property division, alimony and child support.

"3. Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion by refusing to treat Appellee's increased earning capacity as 'property' under Section 20-2-114, W.S.1977 subject to equitable distribution or to otherwise equitably compensate Appellant for her contribution to his education and increased earning capacity.

"4. Whether the Court abused its discretion in refusing to grant Appellant adequate maintenance alimony or adequate child support.

"5. Whether the Court erred in failing to award Appellant's attorney's fees."

Appellant, Jeannine Marie Grosskopf, and appellee, Loren M. Grosskopf, were married August 17, 1968, while attending college in Wisconsin. Appellant was a junior and appellee was a sophomore at the time of the marriage. Both were employed part time. Appellant graduated with a degree in special education one year before appellee and went to work full time supporting the family during appellee's senior year. After graduation, appellee obtained a teaching assistantship at the University of Wyoming. The parties moved to Wyoming appellant worked full time and appellee worked part time while attending the University of Wyoming and obtained his masters degree in accounting.

Following graduation, appellee obtained employment at Cody, Wyoming, and the parties established their home there. Three children were born of the marriage. At the time of the divorce, the children were 11, 5, and 2 years of age. After twelve years, there were marital problems and difficulties which the parties were unable to resolve. Considerable testimony was adduced at the trial by both parties concerning the problems in their marriage, fault and the cause of these difficulties. The evidence established, and the parties generally agreed, that the differences existing between them were such that there was no prospect for reconciliation.

On October 12, 1980, after a particularly bitter dispute, appellee separated from appellant. Two days later this divorce action was initiated by appellee. Appellant took the three children of the marriage, traveled to Wisconsin where she could be with relatives and friends, and stayed approximately five weeks. She returned to Cody, Wyoming at Thanksgiving time, attempted to reconcile and resolve the problems of the marriage, but that was unsuccessful. On December 19, 1980, appellant moved with the children to Appleton, Wisconsin, where they presently reside.

Appellee was successful in his employment and his career. At the time of filing the divorce, his gross annual earnings were approximately $40,500, and, in addition, he received bonuses and earned some money in the stock market. His net take-home pay was approximately $2,150 per month. The parties owned their family home with an equity of approximately $40,577.40, had acquired other assets, including cash and stocks of approximately $31,804, and liabilities as of the date of their separation in the amount of $44,784. An expert, employed by appellant, testified that appellee's masters degree in accounting was marital property, capable of division between the parties; that it had a present value of $105,400; and that a fair award to each party would be $74,741.50 and child support in the approximate amount of $1,359 per month.

The court entered a judgment and decree in which it awarded custody of the children to appellant, subject to the right of appellee to have the children on alternate holidays, four weeks during the summer until the children became six years of age, and six weeks during the summer thereafter. It required appellee to pay $250 per month child support per child, or a total of $750 per month, divided the property between the parties in such a manner that appellant received $36,190.70 and appellee received a like amount but was also required to satisfy the debts of the parties existing at the date of separation which resulted in appellee's being required to pay $8,593.30. The final result was that appellant was awarded $36,190.70 in cash and appellee was left with a net liability of $8,593.30. The court declined to award to appellant either alimony or attorneys fees.

WAS THERE ERROR IN FINDING APPELLANT AT FAULT AND GRANTING DIVORCE TO APPELLEE?

Appellant contends that, upon the evidence presented, the court should not have found appellant at fault and therefore should not have granted the divorce to appellee. Appellee began this action by filing a complaint for divorce. Appellant, in her answer and counterclaim, prayed that divorce be granted to her. With respect to grounds or causes for divorce, § 20-2-104, W.S.1977, provides that:

"A divorce may be decreed by the district court of the county in which either party resides on the complaint of the aggrieved party on the grounds of irreconcilable differences in the marital relationship."

As to the grounds for divorce, the statute requires proof only of "irreconcilable differences" to permit the court to award a decree of divorce. It matters not which party was at fault in bringing about the differences which cannot be reconciled. All that is required is that the irreconcilable differences exist.

Section 20-2-104, supra, provides that the divorce may be decreed upon " * * * the complaint of the aggrieved party * * *." To "aggrieve," is to give pain, sorrow, trouble, or inflict injury. Webster's Third International Dictionary (1961).

Both parties may be "aggrieved." Either may bring an action for divorce and obtain a decree granting a divorce. However, where each party seeks the decree of divorce, the court then must determine to whom the divorce should be granted. In making that determination, the court may consider the fault of the respective parties, the equities involved, the effect of the divorce upon the parties and the children, and all of the other facts and circumstances of the case. There is no fixed rule for determining this question, which in the final analysis involves a large discretion on the part of the trial court.

Here, the trial court found, and stated in its decision letter,

" * * * that the greater degree of fault for the breakup of the marriage rests with the Defendant [appellant] rather than the Plaintiff [appellee]. * * * "

Appellant contends the evidence does not support that finding. In reviewing that evidence,

" * * * we must, on appeal, assume that the evidence in favor of the successful party is true, leaving out of consideration entirely evidence of the unsuccessful party in conflict therewith, and give to the evidence of the successful party every favorable inference which may be reasonably and fairly drawn from it. * * * " Craver v. Craver, Wyo., 601 P.2d 999, 1001 (1979).

Reviewing the facts in this light, we find that appellee was successful and apparently secure in his employment at Cody, Wyoming. Appellant was dissatisfied with their lifestyle, was insistent that the parties move from Cody, Wyoming, to a metropolitan area or to Wisconsin, where her family and relatives resided. She wanted appellee to quit his job. The parties had built a new home on a golf course and she was dissatisfied with the home and wanted to sell it. She decided to practice celibacy during the last two years of the marriage. There were occasions when appellant had packed the car, determined to leave appellee, and heated arguments resulted. Appellee's occupation occasionally required that he travel. The last time that occurred before separation, appellant took the children and traveled to Bozeman, Montana, leaving appellee a note which he found when he returned to an empty house. When appellant returned from Bozeman, Montana, there was a bitter argument between them. Following this argument, appellant took the children out of school, traveled to Wisconsin where she stayed five weeks, then returned to Cody, Wyoming, around Thanksgiving time. There was an effort by the parties to reconcile which was unsuccessful. Appellant then decided that it was more important that the children live in Wisconsin near their relatives than near their father, and she moved with them to Wisconsin and established a permanent residence.

Although appellant offered evidence to support a position that she was not at fault for the divorce, that evidence cannot, on appeal, be considered by us. To hold for appellant under our rules would require that we find that the court was wrong as a matter of law. This we cannot do, for here the evidence supporting the court's decision was substantial. There was no error in awarding the divorce to appellee.

WAS THERE ERROR IN CONSIDERING FAULT OR DID THE COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN THE DIVISION OF PROPERTY, AWARD OF CHILD SUPPORT, REFUSAL TO AWARD ALIMONY AND ATTORNEYS FEES?

The court, in its decision letter, makes it clear that it considered fault in settling the rights and duties of the parties resulting from their marriage and divorce and in dividing their property and considering alimony and attorneys fees. In its decision letter of November 12, 1981, the court stated " * * * it is the Court's opinion that the greater degree of fault for the breakup of the marriage rests...

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