Grossman v. Martin

• Decision Date: 12 October 2021
• Docket Number: C.A. No. 1:20-CV-00048-JJM-LDA
• Parties: Joseph GROSSMAN, Plaintiff, v. Warden Daniel MARTIN; Correctional Officer Carter; Crystal Caniglia; and Central Falls Detention Facility Corp., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island

566 F.Supp.3d 136

Joseph GROSSMAN, Plaintiff,

v.Warden Daniel MARTIN; Correctional Officer Carter; Crystal Caniglia; and Central Falls Detention Facility Corp., Defendants.

C.A. No. 1:20-CV-00048-JJM-LDA

United States District Court, D. Rhode Island.

Signed October 12, 2021

Filed October 13, 2021

Joseph Grossman, Central Falls, RI, Pro Se.

Matthew C. Reeber, William E. O'Gara, Patrick J. McBurney, Pannone Lopes Devereaux & O'Gara LLC, Johnston, RI, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOHN J. MCCONNELL, JR., United States District Court Chief Judge.

Before the Court is Plaintiff Joseph Grossman's Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendants Warden Daniel Martin, Correctional Officer Erika Carter, Unit Manager Crystal Caniglia, and Central Falls Detention Facility Corp.’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.¹ ECF Nos. 163, 172. Mr. Grossman alleges that he was retaliated against because he filed a grievance against Officer Carter and Unit Manager Caniglia. Defendants respond that they did not retaliate against Mr. Grossman, and cross-move on the grounds that Mr. Grossman failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.

I. BACKGROUND²

Joseph Grossman has been a detainee at the Donald W. Wyatt Detention Facility ("Wyatt") since April 2019. ECF No. 164 at ¶ 1. The A-dorm, where Mr. Grossman was housed, has had daily lockdown periods from: 10:50 a.m. until 12:00 p.m.; 2:50 p.m. until 4:00 p.m.; 6:20 p.m. until 8:00 p.m.; and 9:50 p.m. until 7:30 a.m. the following morning. Id. at ¶ 7. The dormitory areas where detainees are kept have no bathroom or water facilities. EOF No. 163-11 at 20:21–24. A-dorm detainees were allowed to leave two at a time to obtain water or use the bathroom during lockdown periods. ECF No. 174 at ¶ 9.

On November 20, 2019, during the 10:50 a.m. lock down period, Officer Erika Carter refused to let Mr. Grossman or any other A-dorm detainee get water or use the restroom. ECF No. 163-10 at ¶¶ 17–18. Upon denial, Mr. Grossman informed Officer Carter of Wyatt's policy that detainees may use the restrooms and obtain drinking water during lockdown hours so long as they leave two at time.³ ECF No. 164 at ¶ 10. Despite Mr. Grossman's pleas, Officer Carter still refused to let any detainee leave their cell during the 10:50 a.m. lockdown. After continued pleas to get water, Officer Carter called her supervisor, Sergeant Cote to confirm that the denial of water was a permissible action. ECF No. 163-11 at 22:5–23:6; ECF No. 163-11 at 29:14. Sgt. Cote confirmed that detainees do not need to be allowed to leave their cells during lockdown periods. ECF No. 163-11 at 23:4–6.

While this event was unfolding, Mr. Grossman informed Officer Carter of his intention to file a grievance. ECF No. 163-10 at ¶ 22. Later that day, Mr. Grossman filed the grievance. ECF No. 164 at ¶ 48.

Because Mr. Grossman was not the only detainee to file a grievance based on this situation,⁴ Warden Daniel Martin held a town hall meeting.⁵ ECF No. 164 at ¶ 88; ECF No. 173 at ¶ 316. At this meeting, Warden Martin addressed, among other things,⁶ access to water and the restrooms during lockdowns. ECF No. 163-11 at 98:8–13. Warden Martin confirmed that detainees can use the restroom and obtain water during lockdown periods. Id. at ¶¶ 94–95. Warden Martin also arranged to have a water station provided in the A-dorm dormitory to ensure that detainees always had access to water. ECF No. 164 at ¶ 96. Finally, Warden Martin approved Mr. Grossman's grievance against Officer Carter and reminded her of A-dorm's restroom policy. ECF No. 172 at 3.

The next day, Unit Manager Crystal Caniglia received confidential reports that Mr. Grossman had acted disrespectfully toward Officer Carter during the incident, ECF No. 173 at ¶ 346. In response, Unit Manager Caniglia informed Mr. Grossman that although there were roughly one dozen detainees ahead of him for a pod worker position, additional instances of disrespect could adversely affect his likelihood of obtaining employment. ECF No. 163-11 at 38:4–40:2. Indeed, "it is well known that a detainee must be respectful in order to maintain their job." ECF No. 174 at ¶ 138. As a response to her actions, Mr. Grossman filed another grievance, this time against Unit Manager Caniglia. ECF No. 163 at 38.

Warden Martin spoke with Mr. Grossman and two other detainees in the Shift Command Office at Wyatt. ECF No. 163-11 at 51:12–19. Warden Martin informed Mr. Grossman and the other two detainees that he had hoped they would follow the chain of command, coming to him with any problems before contacting authorities outside of Wyatt.⁷ Id. at 52:2–10. Additionally, Warden Martin informed the detainees that he would speak with Officer Carter and Unit Manager Caniglia about any potential forthcoming retaliation actions in response to filing a grievance. Id. at 54:7–12. Soon after, Warden Martin denied Mr. Grossman's grievance filed against Unit Manager Caniglia.⁸ ECF No. 163-5. Mr. Grossman appealed the Warden's denial of his grievance three days later.⁹ ECF No. 173 at ¶ 347.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits, show that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. To determine whether summary judgment is suitable, the court analyzes the record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and draws all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. See Cadle Co. v. Hayes , 116 F.3d 957, 959 (1st Cir. 1997). "When reviewing cross-motions for summary judgment, [courts] must decide whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of law on facts that are not disputed. [Courts] review each motion independently, and view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party when doing so." Dahua Tech. USA Inc. v. Feng Zhang , 988 F.3d 531, 539 (1st Cir. 2021) (citation omitted) (internal quotation omitted); see also Wightman v. Springfield Terminal Ry. , 100 F.3d 228, 230 (1st Cir. 1996) ("Cross motions simply require [courts] to determine whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of law on facts that are not disputed.").

"Where ... a district court rules simultaneously on cross-motions for summary judgment, it must view each motion, separately, through this prism." Estate of Hevia v. Portrio Corp. , 602 F.3d 34, 40 (1st Cir. 2010). That is, each motion and the record it provides will be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. See ibid. "It is settled law that each cross-motion for summary judgment must be decided on its own merits," Puerto Rico Am. Ins. Co. v. Rivera-Vazquez , 603 F.3d 125, 133 (1st Cir. 2010). Thus, the summary judgment "standard does not change when the parties cross-move for summary judgment." Krist v. Pearson Educ., Inc. , 419 F. Supp. 3d 904, 907 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (citing Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Stevens & Ricci Inc. , 835 F.3d 388, 402 (3d Cir. 2016) ).

For those issues on which the parties did not cross-move, the burden falls first on the movant to demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact that needs resolution at trial. See Nat'l Amusements, Inc. v. Town of Dedham , 43 F.3d 731, 735 (1st Cir. 1995). The burden then shifts to the nonmovant who must oppose the motion by presenting facts to show a genuine issue of material fact remains. See id. A factual issue is genuine if it "may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A fact is material if it holds the power to "sway the outcome of the litigation under applicable law." Nat'l Amusements , 43 F.3d at 735. The nonmovant must rely on more than "effusive rhetoric and optimistic surmise" to prove a genuine issue of material fact. Cadle , 116 F.3d at 960. Instead, the evidence relied on by the nonmovant "must have substance in the sense that it limns differing versions of the truth which a factfinder must resolve ...." Nat'l Amusements , 43 F.3d at 735 (quoting Mack v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. , 871 F.2d 179, 181 (1st Cir. 1989) ).

Finally, the Court will hold pro se litigants to a more accessible standard when filing pleadings. See Ericson v. Magnusson , No. 2:12-CV-00178-JAW, 2013 WL 2634761, at *2 (D. Me. June 12, 2013) ("Pro se litigants are not held to the same strict standards as attorneys when it comes to technical rules of procedure."); cf. Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (holding that "[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally construed") (citation omitted) (internal quotations omitted). More particularly:

[A]s a general rule, [courts] are solicitous of the obstacles that pro se litigants face, and while such litigants are not exempt from procedural rules, we hold pro se pleadings to less demanding standards than those drafted by lawyers and endeavor, within reasonable limits, to guard against the loss of pro se claims due to technical defects.

Dutil v. Murphy , 550 F.3d 154, 158 (1st Cir. 2008). However, "[t]he right of self-representation is not ‘a license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.’ " Andrews v. Bechtel Power Corp. , 780 F.2d 124, 140 (1st Cir. 1985) (quoting Faretta v. California , 422 U.S. 806, 835 n.46, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) ). Thus, the Court will consider a pro se movant's circumstances when reviewing his motion for summary judgment but will not provide "extra procedural swaddling." See Eagle Eye Fishing Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of Com. , 20 F.3d 503, 506 (1st Cir. 1994).

III. DISCUSSION

There are two legal bases proffered that may provide an independent justification for granting summary judgment. The Court starts by addressing the parties’ predominant contention: that Wyatt employees retaliated against Mr. Grossman for filing a grievance against Officer Carter. Then, the Court will address Defendants’ contention that Mr. Grossman did not exhaust his...