Groton Bridge & Mfg. Co. v. Warren County

• Decision Date: 31 March 1902
• Parties: GROTON BRIDGE & MANUFACTURING COMPANY v. WARREN COUNTY
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

31 So. 711

80 Miss. 214

GROTON BRIDGE & MANUFACTURING COMPANY v. WARREN COUNTY

Supreme Court of Mississippi

March 31, 1902

FROM the circuit court of Warren county. HON. GEORGE ANDERSON Judge.

The Groton Bridge, etc., Co., appellant, was plaintiff, and Warren county, the appellee, defendant in the court below.

In 1899 the board of supervisors of Warren county contracted with the Groton Bridge & Manufacturing Company for the rebuilding or repair of the Baldwin's Ferry Bridge over Big Black River, according to plans and specifications on file in the office of the clerk of the board, the total cost of the work being $ 7,824.00. During the progress of the work it was discovered that one of the piers called for had to be made five feet higher than was specified in the contract, and acting upon the suggestion of the engineer of the board of supervisors, and the consent of one of its members, who agreed that the work should be done on "force account," and that the board would pay for it, the Groton Bridge & Manufacturing Company did the additional work at a cost of $ 679.57. The board of supervisors was never asked to let this additional work, or have it done, nor did it ever approve the same, and disallowed the claim of $ 679.57 on account thereof, while promptly paying the contract price of $ 7,824.00. Thereupon this suit was brought for the $ 679.57 against the county upon a quantum meruit, and a demurrer to the plaintiff's declaration having been sustained, and judgment rendered in favor of the defendant this appeal was prosecuted. The code provision controlling the case is quoted in full in the opinion of the court.

Affirmed.

Green &amp Green, for appellant.

The additional work, which was necessary to the preservation of the county's property, constituted a part of the entire work which was approved and accepted by the board of supervisors, and there necessarily arose an implied obligation to pay for it. It is conceded that express contracts must be evidenced by entry on the minutes of the board, but this requirement has no application to liabilities that arise by implication, and which should be enforced upon a quantum recruit.

The cases of Supervisors v. Patrick, 54 Miss. 240; Dixon v. Greene County, 76 Ib., 794, and Crump v. Colfax County, 52 Ib., 107, while holding that all express contracts must be evidenced by entry on the minutes of the board, recognize the power of the board to contract by adoption or ratification, and in one of them (Crump v. Colfax County) the liability of the county for the rent of rooms under a count of quantum valebat was enforced, although the contract in respect thereto was void because not entered on the minutes of the board. See, also, the following authorities in support of the position above taken: Carroll v. Board of Police, 28 Miss. 49; 7 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d ed.), 945, 946, 953, 954; City v. Litchfield Water Co., 95 Ill.App. 647; Jackson Electric Ry. Co. v. Adams, 79 Miss. 408, s.c., 30 So. 694.

R. V. Booth, for appellee.

Under the statutes and decisions of this state the facts stated in the declaration imposed no liability upon the county. No contract for the additional work was made by the supervisors as a board in open session, nor was any such contract evidenced by entry on their minutes. Code 1892, §§ 340, 344; Supervisors v. Patrick, 54 Miss. 240; Supervisors v. Arrighi, Ib., 670; Beck v. Allen, 58 Ib., 158; Bridges & Hill v. Supervisors, Ib., 819; Howe v. State, 53 Ib., 69; State v. Vice, 71 Ib., 916.

OPINION

WHITFIELD, C. J.

The arrangement made through one member of the board was void. Board v. Patrick, 54 Miss. 240, controls this case. In the note to Gilman v. Contra Costa County, 68 Am. Dec. 292, it is said, speaking of a contract informally made: "It may be ratified at a subsequent meeting of the board in legal session, and the county thus become liable;" citing three authorities. But no such ratification of the board in open session was obtained by the appellant in this case. In 7 Am. & Eng. Enc Law (2d ed.), p. 946, it is said that "such liability on an implied contract will not attach where an express contract only is contemplated by statute ;" citing, in note 2, Wollcot v. Lawrence County, 26 Mo. 272; Lehigh County v. Kleckner, 5 Watts & Serg. 181. In the former case the court say: "The county court is only the agent of the county, and, like any other agent, musk pursue its authority, and act within the scope of its power. In respect to many things that concern the county, it has a large discretion; but in reference to the erection of county buildings its authority is defined by a public law, and is special and limited. It cannot act like general agents, whose acts may bind their principals if performed within the general scope of their agency, though in violation of private instructions unknown to those who deal with them, for it has no power over the subject except such as is given by law; and every person who deals with the county court, acting in behalf of the county, is bound to know the law that confers the authority. There is no difference in this respect between public and private agents, and if the county court exceeds its special and limited authority, conferred...