Grozdanich v. Leisure Hills Health Center

• Decision Date: 30 April 1999
• Docket Number: No. Civ. 97-760(RLE).,Civ. 97-760(RLE).
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota
• Parties: Anne Marie GROZDANICH, Plaintiff, v. LEISURE HILLS HEALTH CENTER, Inc., a Minnesota corporation, a/k/a Leisure Hills of Hibbing; Mesabi Regional Medical Center, Inc., a Minnesota corporation, a/k/a University Medical Center—Mesabi; and John Parson, Defendants.

48 F.Supp.2d 885

Anne Marie GROZDANICH, Plaintiff, v. LEISURE HILLS HEALTH CENTER, Inc., a Minnesota corporation, a/k/a Leisure Hills of Hibbing; Mesabi Regional Medical Center, Inc., a Minnesota corporation, a/k/a University Medical Center—Mesabi; and John Parson, Defendants.

No. Civ. 97-760(RLE).

United States District Court, D. Minnesota.

April 30, 1999.

William James Mavity, Pamela Marie Miller, Mavity & Assoc., Minneapolis, MN, for plaintiff.

Michael M. Fluegel, Fluegel Helseth McLaughlin Anderson & Brutlag, Morris, MN, for Leisure Hills Health Center, Inc., St. Francis Health Service of Morris, Inc., defendants.

Joseph John Roby, Jr., Laura J. Schacht, Johnson Killen Thibodeau & Seiler, Duluth, MN, for Mesabi Regional Medical Center, Inc., defendant.

John Parson, Hibbing, MN, pro se.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

ERICKSON, United States Magistrate Judge.

I. Introduction

This matter came before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to the parties consent, made in accordance with the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), upon the Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider. At the parties' request, this matter was considered on their written submissions, and without oral argument. For these purposes, the Plaintiff appeared by Pamela M. Miller, Esq., and Defendant University Medical Center — Mesabi ("UMC-M") appeared by Joseph J. Roby, Jr. and Laura J. Schacht, Esqs. The other Defendants have made no appearance for purposes of this Motion. For reasons which follow, the Motion to Reconsider is denied.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A full description of the background of this sexual harassment case is set forth in our Memorandum Order, dated September 30, 1998, which resolved a series of Motions for Summary Judgment that were filed by UMC-M, and the Defendant Leisure Hills Health Center, Inc. ("Leisure Hills"). See, Grozdanich v. Leisure Hills Health Center, Inc., 25 F.Supp.2d 953 (D.Minn.1998). The recitation of the facts, which was there recounted, viewed the evidence in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, see, Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970), and will not be reiterated here, for we now narrow the focus of our analysis to the events which bear upon the request for reconsideration.

The Plaintiff, who works as a nurse at Leisure Hills, was sexually assaulted in that workplace on three separate occasions, on May 22, 1996, by her supervising nurse, the Defendant John Parson ("Parson"). Id. at 962-63. In each assaultive episode, Parson groped the Plaintiff's intimate body parts, which was accomplished, on two of those occasions, through the Plaintiff's outer clothing. The Record is uncontested that the Plaintiff did not suffer any demonstrable, physical injury as a result of Parson's acts. Id. at 988.

The Plaintiff filed suit against Leisure Hills for sexual harassment under Title VII, Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., the Minnesota Human Rights Act ("MHRA"), Minnesota Statutes Section 363.01, et seq., as well as claims for battery, assault, negligent hiring/retention/supervision, and for a negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Plaintiff named UMC-M as a Defendant, claiming that it was liable, for acts its agents performed as Parson's former employer. Specifically, agents of UMC-M provided Leisure Hills with a favorable employment recommendation of Parson, even though UMC-M was aware of several instances of alleged sexual assault, and harassment, that Parson purportedly had committed. The Plaintiff claimed that UMC-M was liable to her for negligence per se, because UMC-M had not reported Parson's suspected abuse of a vulnerable adult patient, in violation of the Vulnerable Adults Act, Minnesota Statutes Section 626.557, and because, in the Plaintiff's view, UMC-M's favorable recommendation was an act of negligent misrepresentation, and a negligent failure to warn. In addition, the Plaintiff asserted several claims directly against Parson.

On September 30, 1998, this Court granted Leisure Hills' Motion for Summary Judgment, in part, allowing only the Plaintiff's Title VII, and portions of her negligent retention and supervision claims, to proceed to Trial. We granted UMC-M's Motion for Summary Judgment on the Plaintiff's claims against it, but we denied, in part, UMC-M's Motion for Summary Judgment on certain crossclaims for indemnity, which were asserted by Leisure Hills. Parson did not move for Summary Judgment, and the Plaintiff's claims against him were unaffected by the Court's other rulings.

On March 22, 1999, when this case was at the cusp of Trial, the parties settled all of their disputes — save two. Given the Court's dismissal, with prejudice, of the Plaintiff's claims against UMC-M, no settlement was reached between those parties. Second, the Plaintiff did not resolve her claims against Parson.¹ With the claims against Parson, alone, remaining to be adjudicated, the Plaintiff has requested that the Court reconsider its earlier dismissal of her claim against UMC-M for negligent misrepresentation.

III. Discussion

A. Standard of Review. At the outset, we are obligated to observe that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not recognize, or otherwise provide for, a "Motion to Reconsider." Reynolds v. Condon, 908 F.Supp. 1494, 1524 (N.D.Iowa 1995). When a moving party neglects to specify the Rule, upon which it premises a self-styled Motion to Reconsider, "that party leaves the characterization of the motion to the court's somewhat unenlightened guess ***." Sanders v. Clemco Indus., 862 F.2d 161, 168 (8th Cir.1988). Where, as here, claims against another party in the litigation remain unresolved, a Motion to Reconsider must be addressed under the rubric of Rule 54(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, Interstate Power Co. v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 992 F.2d 804, 807 (8th Cir.1993) (holding that District Court should have treated Motion to Reconsider, heard before all parties' claims were decided, under Rule 54(b)).

Rule 54(b) provides, in pertinent part, that "any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties *** is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities." Rule 54(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. While, as a general proposition, "questions once decided [should] not be subject to continued argument," in extraordinary circumstances, a District Court will always retain the authority to revisit its earlier decisions, under this Rule, before the entry of a final Judgment, in order to correct manifest error. Conrod v. Davis, 120 F.3d 92, 95 (8th Cir.1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 1531, 140 L.Ed.2d 681 (1998). For example, a Motion to Reconsider, pursuant to Rule 54(b), may be justified on the basis of an intervening change in controlling law. See, e.g., Richman v. W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc., 988 F.Supp. 753, 755 (S.D.N.Y.1997); Washington v. Garcia, 977 F.Supp. 1067, 1069 (S.D.Cal.1997); McCoy v. Macon Water Auth., 966 F.Supp. 1209, 1222 (M.D.Ga.1997). However, it must be emphasized that, because reconsideration "interrupts the flow of litigation towards its conclusion," it "should not serve as a vehicle to identify facts or raise legal arguments which could have been, but were not, raised or adduced during the pendency of the motion of which reconsideration was sought." In re Potash Antitrust Litigation, Civ. No. 3-93-197, 1994 WL 2255 *1 (D.Minn., Jan.4, 1994).

B. Legal Analysis. The starting point of our analysis rests in the ruling that the Plaintiff urges us to reconsider. As noted, the Plaintiff had claimed that UMC-M proffered a negligent misrepresentation of fact, to Leisure Hills, when it vouched for Parson's professional qualities without mentioning his alleged prior sexual misconduct which, purportedly, occurred in the discharge of his nursing responsibilities at UMC-C. The tort of "negligent misrepresentation involving the risk of physical harm," has not been recognized under Minnesota common law. Most recently, the Minnesota Supreme Court expressly decided not to decide whether such a claim should be recognized, because the appellant did not satisfy all of the elements of that tort, as the action has been defined in Section 311 of the Second Restatement of Torts. See, Smith v. Brutger Cos., 569 N.W.2d 408, 413 (Minn.1997).

In the Restatement, the elements of this variant of negligent misrepresentation are defined as follows:

(1) One who negligently gives false information to another is subject to liability for physical harm caused by action taken by the other in reasonable reliance upon such information, where such harm results

(a) to the other, or

(b) to such third persons as the actor should reasonably expect to be put in peril by the action taken.

(2) Such negligence may consist of failure to exercise reasonable care

(a) in ascertaining the accuracy of the information, or

(b) the manner in which it is communicated.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 311.

From this definition, the Minnesota Supreme Court abstracted the following operative elements of a negligent misrepresentation claim: "(1) a duty of reasonable care in conveying information; (2) a breach of that duty by negligently giving false information; (3) reasonable reliance on the misrepresentations, which reliance is the proximate cause of physical injury; and (4) damages." Smith v. Brutger Cos., supra at 413. Observing that the appellant, in Smith, had not shown reasonable reliance on the alleged misrepresentations, the Court decided that a claim that was not, itself, actionable was not "the appropriate vehicle" for recognizing the tort of negligent misrepresentation involving the risk of physical harm. Id.

Applying similar logic, we dismissed the Plaintiff's negligent misrepresentation claim against...