Grubbs v. Delo
| Decision Date | 02 April 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 89-1048C(1).,89-1048C(1). |
| Citation | 734 F. Supp. 395 |
| Parties | Ricky Lee GRUBBS, Petitioner, v. Paul DELO, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
Charles Seigel, III, Gallop, Johnson & Nueman, Clayton, Mo., for petitioner.
Jared Cone, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, Mo., for respondent.
Petitioner Ricky Lee Grubbs was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death by a jury in St. Francois County, Missouri, in 1988. On direct appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court summarized the evidence as follows:
State v. Grubbs, 724 S.W.2d 494, 495-96 (Mo. banc 1987).
Petitioner's amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 was filed July 11, 1989. For nearly all of his asserted grounds, petitioner has requested leave to engage in discovery to determine the "motives" of various counsel and the trial judge with respect to their challenged conduct. Discovery in habeas cases brought by state prisoners is governed by Rule 6 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, which leaves the availability of discovery in the judge's discretion. The Court denies petitioner's requests for discovery, in part because petitioner has failed to detail the allegedly necessary discovery with the specificity required by Rule 6(b), and in part because the Court finds that "motives" are of limited relevance to the Court's consideration of the instant petition, and where relevant are adequately documented by the extensive record from petitioner's 27.26 proceedings.
Petitioner also requests an evidentiary hearing on each of his claims. Rule 8 of the habeas rules governs the availability of such a hearing, and like Rule 6 on discovery, leaves the decision to the judge's discretion. As required by Rule 8, the Court has reviewed the record of petitioner's state court proceedings, as expanded by the court file on the instant petition, and has determined that an evidentiary hearing is not required. Petitioner's requests for an evidentiary hearing are, therefore, denied.
Upon consideration of the amended petition, the response of the state, and petitioner's reply, this Court issued its order, dated December 27, 1989, rejecting in their entirety four of petitioner's thirteen enumerated grounds for granting the writ, as barred by procedural default, and rejecting as procedurally barred parts of two others of petitioner's asserted grounds. The Court now sets forth its determination on the merits of petitioner's remaining claims.
Petitioner's ground A asserts that:
petitioner was denied his sixth and fourteenth amendment rights to effective assistance of counsel and a fair and impartial jury when counsel failed to seek exclusion of juror Meiseman for cause and the court failed to sustain petitioner's motion to strike juror Hooper after both Meiseman and Hooper stated a bias in favor of the death penalty in capital murder cases.
In order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of trial counsel, petitioner must show both that (1) the alleged act or omission of counsel, when judged in light of all the circumstances, falls outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced petitioner's defense by depriving the petitioner of a fair trial the result of which is reliable. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). This burden is heavy: "counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment." Id. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066.
Upon review of the relevant portions of the voir dire examination (found at pp. 283-84 of Respondent's Exhibit A), the Court finds that trial counsel's failure to move that Meiseman be stricken for cause is not so egregious an error as to satisfy the first prong of the ineffective assistance test. Defense counsel inquired generally of Meiseman's row of the venire panel if any of those panel members would "automatically" impose the death penalty having found someone guilty of "premeditated, deliberate murder." The silence that greeted defense counsel's question is an initial indication that no member of that row, including Meiseman, felt that he could not consider both the capital punishment and life sentence alternatives.
Counsel's questioning of Meiseman in particular appears to be based not on misgivings specifically directed at Meiseman, but on a general mistrust of the panel's unresponsiveness:
Considered in its entirety, Meiseman's response to that questioning manifests a willingness to consider both the capital and life sentence alternatives. That being so, counsel's decision not to seek to strike Meiseman for cause was entirely within the range of a defense attorney's professional discretion. Because it finds no error of constitutional dimension, the Court need not undertake the prejudice prong of ineffective assistance analysis.
The trial judge's finding that Hooper was unbiased is a finding of fact subject to the presumption of correctness laid down in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1036, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 2891, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 428, 105 S.Ct. 844, 854, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985). Petitioner's challenge to the trial judge's refusal to strike Hooper for cause, then, presents the question "whether there is fair support in the record for the trial court's conclusion that Hooper would be impartial." Patton, 467 U.S. at 1038, 104 S.Ct. at 2892.
Although upon voir dire Hooper stated a predilection for the death penalty in capital cases, he also indicated that he would consider both the death penalty and imprisonment if faced with the sentencing decision, and said that where the court's instructions ran contrary to any feelings he might have he would "have to go the way the court tells him to do it." Respondent's Exhibit E, p. 496. Under the "fair support" standard of review, the Court holds that the trial court's finding of Hooper's impartiality is entitled to the presumption of correctness, and so withstands petitioner's challenge.
What remains of petitioner's ground B is the claim that trial counsel's failure to object to the admission of testimony regarding petitioner's post-arrest silence constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.1 Petitioner's post-arrest silence was relatively short-lived; petitioner eventually made two statements, one oral and one written. A motion to suppress these statements was denied by the trial court, after a lengthy hearing. Respondent's Exhibit A, p. 131. At petitioner's 27.26 hearing, trial counsel testified that she could not specifically recall a reason or strategy for failing to "call attention" to, by objecting to, testimony about petitioner's initial refusal to make any statement to the Scott County sheriff. Respondent's Exhibit I, p. 69.
Nonetheless, given defense counsel's efforts to suppress petitioner's statements and close attention at the suppression hearing to the circumstances surrounding petitioner's initial silence and later statements, see Respondent's Exhibit A, pp. 25-29, 39-41, 60-68, the Court believes that counsel's failure to object to testimony about petitioner's short-lived silence was deliberate. Petitioner is unable to overcome the strong presumption that counsel's decision, in light of the failure of the motion to suppress statements, not to assert the inadmissibility of petitioner's temporary post-arrest silence was a strategic one within the "wide range of professionally competent assistance." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066. Furthermore, given that petitioner's post-arrest statements were ultimately introduced into evidence, the Court is hard-pressed to perceive any prejudice to petitioner from testimony as to petitioner's initial refusal to make a statement.
Petitioner's ground C presents two claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel that must be considered on the merits: (1) counsel's failure to establish a lack of blood on the carpet...
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