State v. Grubbs, 68230
| Decision Date | 17 February 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 68230,68230 |
| Citation | 724 S.W.2d 494 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Ricky Lee GRUBBS, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Janet M. Thompson, Columbia, for defendant-appellant.
William L. Webster, Atty. Gen., John M. Morris, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for plaintiff-respondent.
Ricky Lee Grubbs was convicted by a jury of capital murder, section 565.001, RSMo 1978 (repealed effective 10-1-84), and sentenced to death, section 565.032, RSMo Cum.Supp.1984. Judgment was rendered accordingly.
Appellant charges the trial court erred: in failing to strike for cause venireman Robert Hooper; in failing to declare a mistrial sua sponte for a statement made in the prosecutor's closing argument; in overruling defendant's motion for directed verdict because there was no evidence of premeditation or deliberation; in failing to declare a mistrial sua sponte when the State on cross-examination elicited information from two defense witnesses in violation of the mandatory statutory prohibition against the disclosure of juvenile records; and in overruling defendant's objection to the State's cross-examination of defendant's aunt and sister utilizing information contained in the report of a psychiatric examination taken pursuant to chapter 552, RSMo. He charges further: that the trial court should not have permitted the State's disclosure of a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions by defendant because there was insufficient evidence of such; that the trial court should not have permitted the jury instructions to set forth certain aggravating circumstances to the crime which defendant believed were unsupported by the evidence; that the sheriff should not have been allowed to testify that a statement was taken from defendant's brother, Randy Grubbs, because the testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay; and, that the imposition of the death penalty by the jury was excessive and disproportionate to punishment imposed in similar cases. Affirmed.
The evidence showed that the victim, Jerry Russell Thornton, lived in a trailer in the town of Miner in Scott County, Missouri. On the afternoon of Wednesday, February 15, 1984, Ricky Lee Grubbs and his brother, Randy Grubbs, went to Thornton's trailer. Ricky Grubbs was acquainted with Thornton, having been at his trailer once before; Randy Grubbs had previously worked for Thornton. Both brothers wore gloves while in the trailer. When they left the trailer Thornton was dead. When the body was discovered, its hands and feet were found bound with neckties. The victim had suffered massive injuries to his upper torso, including thirteen broken ribs and a cracked sternum; a laceration of the liver and damage to the small intestine; abrasions and lacerations on the face; a broken nose and a brain hemorrhage. An expert witness testified that the victim was alive when the trauma was inflicted to his abdomen.
Defendant testified that he and his brother had been drinking when they went to the trailer. Although they entered the trailer with Thornton's permission, Thornton, who had been drinking heavily, told defendant he did not like him and wanted him to leave. Defendant stated that when the victim came toward him he became scared and struck the victim repeatedly. After Thornton had fallen to the floor, defendant and Randy Grubbs "hog-tied" Thornton with neckties. Defendant stated that he cut Thornton's throat but did not know where he obtained the knife. The forensic pathologist who conducted the autopsy testified that Thornton died after his lungs filled with fluid from shock.
Approximately thirty dollars and some food stamps were taken from the victim's trailer. The next day defendant and his brother returned to the trailer in order to set it afire and destroy the evidence. Late that evening, the fire department was summoned to put out the fire and Thornton's body was discovered.
Appellant argues that the court should have sustained his motion to strike venireman Robert Hooper and the failure to do so violated his constitutional right to an impartial jury. At voir dire, Hooper was asked by defense counsel, Kevin Curran, whether he believed that the appropriate punishment for capital murder was death; he responded affirmatively. Counsel moved to strike Hooper for cause and the motion was denied. The venireman was later removed by peremptory strike.
The relevant examination of venireman Hooper follows:
Later in the examination Mr. Hooper expressed his intention to follow the directions of the court.
The State contends that the court did not err in denying the motion to strike because Hooper stated that he was able to follow the instructions of the court relating to punishment. The State asserts that defense counsel put the question in a confusing and misleading manner when he asked the panel for personal feelings whether life was an "appropriate" punishment for capital murder or whether they would personally consider one punishment over the other.
In State v. Smith, 649 S.W.2d 417 (Mo. banc 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 908, 104 S.Ct. 262, 78 L.Ed.2d 246 (1983), the venireman was presented with a similar situation. In that case venireman Kraft was asked whether he thought "the death penalty ought to be automatic in a case of capital murder; so that if someone is convicted of the crime of capital murder the only punishment available ought to be capital punishment or death in the gas chamber." Id. at 424. He was further asked "[w]ould it be your statement, then, Mr. Kraft, that if you deliberated on the jury and if you found Jerry Smith guilty of Capital Murder, that you would automatically vote for the death penalty?" Id. The court held that viewed in its context, venireman Kraft was not stating that he could not follow the dictates of the court. The court pointed out that no alternative to capital punishment was mentioned in defense counsel's questions, and it is reasonable to infer that the venireman was responding to the hypothetical presented by counsel. The venireman later stated, upon inquiry, that he would be able to consider both life imprisonment and the death penalty punishment alternatives.
Appellant asserts that this case is similar to State v. Stewart, 692 S.W.2d 295 (Mo. banc 1985). In Stewart, defense counsel asked venirewoman Thompson if she would be "more apt to think (the defendant) was guilty if he didn't testify...." Thompson replied affirmatively. On further questioning Thompson again stated that "[i]f I were in the chair myself, I would like to be able to speak in my defense...." Id. at 297. Counsel for both sides repeatedly advised Mrs. Thompson that the burden of proof was on the State to prove that the defendant was guilty and that the defendant need not testify; however, when asked whether she would hold it against the defendant if he refused to testify she replied, Id. at 298. No questions were asked by the trial court and the court refused to sustain defendant's challenge for cause.
This court reversed and remanded the cause for a new trial. It was noted that Mrs. Thompson never unequivocally stated that she would not draw any inference of guilt from defendant's failure to testify; she once stated that she would tend to find the defendant guilty if he failed to testify. Id. at 299. Consequently, it was held that the trial court should have sustained defendant's challenge for cause and that it was reversible error to fail to do so. Id. at 299.
Venireman Hooper is to be distinguished from venirewoman Thompson. He responded specifically to defense counsel's questions, and he stated his willingness to follow the directions of the law once the law was explained to him when he replied to counsel's questions, "I have to go the way the Court tells me to do it." After Mr. Hooper's unequivocal statement that he could follow the dictates of the court it became unnecessary for the trial court to pursue the matter further. Twenty-three other veniremen were stricken for cause at the request of the defendant on the same rationale when they were asked to speculate as to the law. The trial court did not abuse...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Davis
...value. State v. Pollard, 735 S.W.2d 345 (Mo. banc 1987), cert. denied 484 U.S. 1020, 108 S.Ct. 733, 98 L.Ed.2d 682 (1988); State v. Grubbs, 724 S.W.2d 494 (Mo. banc 1987), cert. denied 482 U.S. 931, 107 S.Ct. 3220, 96 L.Ed.2d 707 (1987); State v. Bannister, 680 S.W.2d 141 (Mo. banc 1984), c......
-
State v. Richardson
...because his theory of defense conceded that he was present at the crime scene and participated in the rapes and robberies. See State v. Grubbs, 724 S.W.2d 494, 501 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 931, 107 S.Ct. 3220, 96 L.Ed.2d 707 (1987); State v. Hunter, 622 S.W.2d 374, 379 (Mo.App.198......
-
State v. Deck
...S.W.2d 159 (Mo. banc 1991); State v. Kilgore, 771 S.W.2d 57 (Mo. banc 1989); State v. Griffin, 756 S.W.2d 475 (Mo. banc 1988); State v. Grubbs, 724 S.W.2d 494 (Mo. banc 1987); State v. Foster, 700 S.W.2d 440 (Mo. banc The death penalty imposed in this case is proportionate to the sentence i......
-
State v. Gray
...penalty was assessed where the murder was committed to avoid arrest or detection. Ramsey, 864 S.W.2d 320; Six, 805 S.W.2d 159; State v. Grubbs, 724 S.W.2d 494 (Mo. banc 1987), aff'd., Grubbs v. Delo, 948 F.2d 1459 (8th Cir.1991); State v. Kilgore, 771 S.W.2d 57 (Mo. banc 1989); State v. Gri......