Grubbs v. Hindes
| Decision Date | 05 March 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. CA 07-239.,CA 07-239. |
| Citation | 278 S.W.3d 575 |
| Parties | John Edward GRUBBS, Appellant, v. Frederick A. HINDES and Pamela M. Cornwell-Hindes, Appellees. |
| Court | Arkansas Court of Appeals |
Pryor, Robertson Beasley, Smith & Karber, PLLC, by: C. Brian Meadors, Fort Smith, AR, for appellant.
Nolan, Caddell & Reynolds, P.A., by: David L. Borland, Fort Smith, AR, for appellees.
Appellant John Edward Grubbs appeals the November 28, 2006 order of the Sebastian County Circuit Court granting appellees Frederick A. Hindes and Pamela M. Cornwell-Hindes a new trial. Appellant contends that appellees failed to properly object to the jury interrogatories and, thus, are not entitled to receive a new trial. Also, he claims that the appellees failed to establish that they did not receive a fair trial. We reverse and remand with instructions to reinstate the judgment consistent with the jury's verdict.
On March 30, 2003, appellant was traveling in a vehicle behind appellees, who traveled by motorcycle and side-car. In front of appellees was another motorcycle, and in front of that motorcycle was a car, which was driven by Elizabeth Rowlett, a non-party to the lawsuit. The testimony at trial was that Rowlett's car left the roadway near a curve. The first motorcycle slowed down, and appellee's motorcycle slowed down or came to a stop. Appellant's vehicle then hit appellees' motorcycle from behind, knocking them off the motorcycle. Both were taken to the hospital by ambulance.
Appellees filed a complaint against appellant on September 7, 2004, for negligence, seeking damages for their injuries, pain and suffering, medical treatment, and medical expenses. At trial, appellant moved for a directed verdict both at the end of appellees' case and at the conclusion of all testimony. The directed-verdict motions were based on appellant's argument that there was not substantial evidence before the trial court to indicate his negligence. The motions were denied. The trial court then discussed jury instructions with counsel for both parties. Counsel for appellees objected to the submission to the jury of those interrogatories which contained a provision for a finding of a percentage of fault attributable to Elizabeth Rowlett, a non-party. The trial court overruled this objection and proceeded to instruct the jury. Contained within the instructions to the jury were four interrogatories, each its own document with blank spaces provided for juror signatures, and which stated as follows:
Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that John Edward Grubbs was negligent in the occurrence?
Using 100% to represent the total responsibility for the occurrence and any injuries or damages resulting from it, apportion the responsibility between the parties whom you have found to be responsible.
State the total damages that Frederick A. Hindes is entitled to recover, if any, that you find were approximately caused by the occurrence.
State the total damages that Pamela M. Cornwell-Hindes is entitled to recover, if any, that you find were approximately caused by the occurrence.
ANSWER: $____
The jury returned having answered "yes" to the first interrogatory, finding that appellant was negligent. Nine jurors signed this form. The jurors then found that appellee Frederick A. Hindes and appellant were both twenty-five percent responsible for the occurrence and that Rowlett was fifty-percent responsible. Again, nine jurors signed the second interrogatory. However, not all the nine jurors who signed Interrogatory No. 2 were the same jurors who answered "yes" to Interrogatory No. 1. This discovery was not made before the jurors were excused, even though the jury was polled as to their verdict before their dismissal. After the jury had been dismissed, appellees moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, arguing that, based upon the evidence as presented, the jury could not have found Rowlett fifty percent at fault. The trial court took the motion under advisement, and offered an opportunity for appellees to file a written motion.
At the post-trial hearing on appellees' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and alternative motion for new trial, appellees made two arguments. First, they argued that there was not sufficient evidence presented at trial for the jury to have found by a preponderance of the evidence that Rowlett was fifty-percent responsible, and that there was substantial evidence presented that appellant was negligent. Second, they argued that the jury failed to properly follow instructions in answering the interrogatories. The second argument was not contained in the written motion before the trial court, but was brought to the trial court's attention for the first time during the oral argument at the post-trial hearing.
The trial court found that there was an irregularity in the proceedings that prevented appellees from having a fair trial, and ordered that the judgment be vacated and the matter set for a new trial. This appeal followed.
The standard of review utilized in cases involving a trial court's grant of a new trial is well settled:
Upon review of a trial court's grant of a new trial, this court must determine whether the trial court abused its discretion. Sunrise Enters., Inc. v. Mid-South Rd. Builders, Inc., 337 Ark. 6, 987 S.W.2d 674 (1999); Razorback Cab of Ft. Smith, Inc. v. Martin, 313 Ark. 445, 856 S.W.2d 2 (1993). Where a new trial has been granted, it is more difficult to prove that the trial court abused its discretion, as the party opposing the motion will have another opportunity to prevail. Id.; Worthington v. Roberts, 304 Ark. 551, 803 S.W.2d 906 (1991). This court has held that a manifest abuse of discretion is one exercised improvidently or thoughtlessly and without due consideration. Martin, 313 Ark. 445, 856 S.W.2d 2; Security Ins. Co. v. Owen, 255 Ark. 526, 501 S.W.2d 229 (1973).
Jones Rigging & Heavy Hauling, Inc. v. Parker, 347 Ark. 628, 632-33, 66 S.W.3d 599, 602 (2002).
Appellant contends that the resolution of this appeal is entirely governed by Jones Rigging. There, injured motorists brought a personal-injury action against a truck driver and trucking corporation as a result of a collision. After a jury verdict for defendants, the trial court granted the injured motorists a new trial. The defendants appealed, and the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the injured motorists were not entitled to a new trial based on their claim of surprise regarding testimony that the trucking corporation had dissolved. The court held that at no point during the surprise testimony did the injured motorists object. They also did not request a continuance or seek any type of curative relief, such as a cautionary instruction from the court. Moreover, the court held that the injured motorists were also responsible for introducing the offending testimony. The court stated, "It is well settled that a party who invites error may not complain of that error for which he or she is responsible." Id., 347 Ark. at 634, 66 S.W.3d at 603 (citing McGhee v. State, 330 Ark. 38, 954 S.W.2d 206 (1997); Peters v. Pierce, 308 Ark. 60, 823 S.W.2d 820 (1992)).
Appellant argues that the facts herein parallel those in Jones Rigging. Here, the jury was given interrogatories, and appellees' only objections were to request a general-verdict form and an objection to including Rowlett in the interrogatories. No alternative interrogatories were offered by appellees. Appellant contends that when the jury returned a verdict that made them unhappy, appellees moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The trial court denied this motion, but granted the motion for a new trial on the basis of the irregularities in signing the interrogatories. Appellant argues that the trial court herein, just as in Jones Rigging, granted a new trial on the basis of an event for which there was not a proper objection. We agree.
Objections to jury interrogatories
Appellees argue that they did make an objection to the interrogatories being submitted to the jury, and referenced the trial court to their motion in limine and brief in support, which sought the trial court's exclusion of testimony or evidence that would support any contention that a non-party, Elizabeth Rowlett, was liable in any way for appellees' damages. Further, appellees maintain that they were not required to proffer an alternate jury instruction, citing Tandy Corporation v. Bone, 283 Ark. 399, 678 S.W.2d 312 (1984) ().
We agree that appellees were not required to proffer an alternative jury instruction in order to preserve the objection for appeal. However, the objection made by appellees was different than and irrelevant to the reasons proffered for a new trial. An objection must be specific enough to tell the trial court exactly why the interrogatory is wrong. See Ark. R. Civ. P. 51 (2006). Appellees' objection was "with regard to a percentage at fault being available to Elizabeth Rowlett, as the empty...
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Gray v. State
...applied to both civil and criminal trials. He cites Tandy Corp. v. Bone , 283 Ark. 399, 678 S.W.2d 312 (1984), and Grubbs v. Hindes , 101 Ark. App. 405, 278 S.W.3d 575 (2008), for the proposition that there is no requirement that a party proffer a jury instruction in a civil case and that a......
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...a new trial to Vo based on purported irregularities to which there were no proper objections raised by Vo. See Grubbs v. Hindes , 101 Ark. App. 405, 414, 278 S.W.3d 575, 581 (2008). The failure to object to the giving of an erroneous jury instruction before the case is submitted to the jury......
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