Sealey v. Giltner
| Decision Date | 16 June 1997 |
| Docket Number | D,No. 393,393 |
| Citation | 116 F.3d 47 |
| Parties | Emmeth SEALEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Lieutenant T.H. GILTNER, Hearing Officer; Thomas A. Coughlin, III, Commissioner of New York State Department of Corrections; Donald Selsky, Director; R. Brimmer, Correctional Officer, Defendants-Appellees. ocket 95-2683. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Jonathan J. Konoff, New York City (Arthur S. Linker, Rosenman & Colin, L.L.P., New York City, on the brief), for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Martin A. Hotvet, Assistant Attorney General, State of New York, New York City (Dennis C. Vacco, Attorney General of the
State of New York, Peter H. Schiff, Deputy Solicitor General, Peter G. Crary, Assistant Attorney General, New York City, of counsel), for Defendants-Appellees.
Before: CARDAMONE and LEVAL, Circuit Judges, and POOLER *, District Judge.
Plaintiff-appellant Emmeth Sealey, a prisoner in the custody of the New York State Department of Correctional Services ("DOCS"), complains of alleged due process violations surrounding his confinement to the Special Housing Unit ("SHU") at the Auburn Correctional Facility ("Auburn") between March 30, 1990, and August 29, 1990. The district court (Hurd, M.J.) dismissed Sealey's complaint in its entirety, and Sealey appealed. We affirm the dismissal as to former DOCS Commissioner Thomas A. Coughlin, III. However, we reverse and remand as to the remaining defendants because Sealey demonstrated genuine issues of material fact concerning the process he received and is entitled to develop a factual record to show that his long-term administrative segregation deprived him of a liberty interest.
The relevant chronology is not disputed. On March 30, 1990, Auburn correctional officers charged Sealey with assault, fighting, and possession of a weapon and placed him in administrative confinement in the SHU pending a disciplinary hearing. After conducting a Tier III disciplinary hearing on April 6, 1990, hearing officer Lieutenant G. Richards found Sealey not guilty because no employee witnessed the alleged assault and a confidential informant's report was unsubstantiated. Richards cautioned Sealey, however, that Richards might recommend placing Sealey in administrative segregation based on the confidential information he had reviewed.
On April 10, 1990, Richards issued his administrative segregation recommendation. The written recommendation was based on "both confidential and other information." Joint Appendix on Appeal at 88. Richards claimed that Sealey's "continued presence in general population could seriously jeopardize the safety and security of this facility" and that "information on file indicates you are involved in extortion and strong arm." ( Id.).
Lieutenant T.H. Giltner conducted a hearing on the administrative segregation recommendation on April 16, 1990. During the hearing, Sealey asked to see the confidential information on file in the prison superintendent's office, and Giltner refused his request. Sealey also requested that Giltner call Richards to testify as to how "he came up with this information I was extorting people and ... what I was extorting ... stuff like that." Joint Appendix on Appeal at 146. Giltner declined Sealey's request due to the confidential nature of the information. Sealey responded that "I'm not asking him to name the accomplice man I'm asking him what was I extorting and who...." (Id.). Giltner also denied Sealey's request to call an additional witness. At the close of the hearing, Giltner directed that Sealey remain in administrative segregation based on Richards' assertion that confidential information suggested Sealey had engaged in extortion.
Sealey appealed the administrative segregation determination, and defendant Donald Selsky, the acting director of special housing/inmate discipline, reversed Giltner's determination on June 18, 1990. Sealey found that Giltner failed to independently verify the reliability of the confidential informant and inappropriately refused witnesses Sealey requested.
On July 8, 1990, Lieutenant Brimmer conducted a rehearing. Brimmer also refused Sealey's request to call witnesses, including Richards. At the end of the hearing, Brimmer decided that Sealey must remain in administrative segregation "until [his] environment On November 1, 1990, Sealey brought a proceeding pursuant to Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules in New York State Supreme Court. He requested a declaration that his rights had been violated as a result of Brimmer's failure to independently appraise the credibility of the confidential informant and refusal to call Sealey's witnesses. Sealey also sought expungement of the result of his administrative segregation hearing from his institutional record. On January 22, 1991, Selsky reversed Brimmer's determination.
is changed and/or [his] attitude towards other person[s'] personal property is handled in a less threatening manner." Joint Appendix on Appeal at 159. Brimmer described the reasons for his determination as the length of time Sealey had served, his history of uncooperative behavior, and "continuous misbehavior charges against other inmates" that disrupted facility programs. (Id.). Brimmer noted that he had relied on both confidential information and previous disciplinary charges. Selsky affirmed Brimmer's determination on September 7, 1990. However, DOCS already had transferred Sealey to the Shawangunk Correctional Facility, where Sealey was released into the general prison population on August 29, 1990
Sealey commenced this action on January 10, 1992, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The parties consented to proceed before a United States magistrate judge, and the court (McAvoy, C.J.) on June 24, 1992, referred the case to Magistrate Judge Hurd. After requesting and receiving answers to interrogatories, in January 1993 Sealey moved for summary judgment. Defendants cross-moved for dismissal or summary judgment. In a memorandum decision and order filed July 15, 1994, Magistrate Judge Hurd (1) dismissed Sealey's complaint against Coughlin because Sealey had failed to demonstrate Coughlin's personal involvement in the alleged due process violations; (2) dismissed Sealey's complaint against Selsky on grounds of absolute immunity; (3) declined to dismiss Sealey's complaint against Giltner because Giltner, the watch commander on duty at the time of the violent incident who made the Unusual Incident Report, arguably violated Sealey's rights by holding him in the SHU without an opportunity to be heard for seven days from March 30 until the disciplinary hearing on April 6, 1990; (4) determined that no due process violations occurred after April 6, 1990, because Sealey received notice and an opportunity to be heard; and (5) dismissed the complaint against Brimmer because Sealey did not allege that Brimmer was personally involved in due process violations occurring prior to the April 6, 1990, hearing.
On February 27, 1995, Giltner sought permission to renew his motion for summary judgment based on proof that Sealey had been notified that he could write to the Deputy Superintendent for Security to complain about his pre-hearing confinement. In a memorandum decision and order entered September 11, 1995, Magistrate Judge Hurd granted Giltner's motion and directed the Clerk to enter judgment dismissing the complaint in its entirety. The magistrate judge did not consider Giltner's notice argument. Instead, Magistrate Judge Hurd held that under the Supreme Court's decision in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995), Sealey had no liberty interest in being free from segregated confinement between March 30 and April 6, 1990.
Sealey contends that factual issues on both the extent of his liberty interest and the process accorded him require that we reverse the judgment below. First, Sealey urges that we find either that (1) he had a liberty interest in avoiding long-term administrative segregation as a matter of law or (2) he should be allowed to create a factual record showing that his long-term administrative segregation constituted an atypical and significant hardship within the meaning of Sandin. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2300. Second, Sealey argues that the district court erred by measuring the process he received against the minimal standard set forth in Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 103 S.Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 Defendants respond that assuming Sealey had a liberty interest in remaining free from administrative segregation in the SHU, he received all process rightfully attendant to deprivation of that interest. Defendants also argue that we should find as a matter of law that New York has not created by regulation or statute a liberty interest in freedom from administrative segregation. We decline defendants' invitation to decide whether New York law creates such a liberty interest because this issue was not raised below. We find that Sealey is entitled to develop a record concerning the nature of his deprivation. Further, we hold that Sealey has demonstrated factual issues on the adequacy of the process he received.
(1983). Sealey contends that he presented competent evidence that his confinement was disciplinary or retaliatory in nature and potentially unlimited in duration, and these facts implicated the more stringent procedural protections mandated in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). Finally, Sealey contends that under either Wolff or Hewitt, he has demonstrated issues of fact as to whether he received the process due him.
We review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment. Duamutef v. O'Keefe, 98 F.3d 22, 24 (2d Cir.1996).
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