Grumet v. Pataki
| Decision Date | 11 May 1999 |
| Citation | 697 N.Y.S.2d 846 |
| Parties | Louis GRUMET et al., Respondents, v. George PATAKI, as Governor of the State of New York, et al., Appellants. |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Eliot Spitzer, Attorney–General, Albany (Peter H. Schiff, Barbara G. Billet and Julie S. Mereson of counsel), for George Pataki and others, appellants.
Miller, Cassidy, Larroca & Lewin, L.L.P. (Nathan Lewin, Richard W. Garnett and Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., of the District of Columbia Bar, admitted pro hac vice, of counsel), and George Shebitz & Associates, P. C., New York City (George Shebitz, Julia R. Cohen and Nahal Motamed of counsel), for Board of Education of the Kiryas Joel Union Free School District, appellant.
Ingerman Smith, L.L.P., Northport (Lawrence W. Reich of counsel), for Board of Education of the Monroe–Woodbury Central School District, appellant.
Jay Worona, Albany, for respondents.
Kevin J. Hasson, Eric W. Treene and Roman Storzer, of the District of Columbia Bar, admitted pro hac vice, for The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, amicus curiae.
Marc D. Stern, New York City, for American Jewish Congress, amicus curiae.
At issue on this appeal is whether chapter 390 of the Laws of 1997, which enables Kiryas Joel to create a separate school district for its disabled children, violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. We conclude that the legislation has the impermissible effect of advancing one religious sect and that it is unconstitutional.
The long history underlying this action is fully chronicled in previous opinions by the Supreme Court of the United States and this Court (see, Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vil. School Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 114 S.Ct. 2481, 129 L.Ed.2d 546; Grumet v. Cuomo, 90 N.Y.2d 57, 659 N.Y.S.2d 173, 681 N.E.2d 340; Grumet v. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vil. School Dist., 81 N.Y.2d 518, 601 N.Y.S.2d 61, 618 N.E.2d 94, affd. 512 U.S. 687, 114 S.Ct. 2481, 129 L.Ed.2d 546; Board of Educ. of Monroe–Woodbury Cent. School Dist. v. Wieder, 72 N.Y.2d 174, 531 N.Y.S.2d 889, 527 N.E.2d 767). Kiryas Joel is a village comprised of Satmar Hasidic Jews residing in Orange County, New York. Residents of Kiryas Joel are devoutly religious and, among other things, follow a strict interpretation of the Torah, segregate the sexes outside the home and dress in a distinctive manner. The children of the Village are educated in parochial schools—boys at the United Talmudic Academy, where they are taught the Torah and girls at Bais Rochel, where they are instructed and prepared for their roles as wives and mothers. Neither school, however, provides special educational services to handicapped children who, under State and Federal law, are entitled to such services even when enrolled in private schools (Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 USC § 1400 et seq. ).
Prior to 1985, the handicapped children of Kiryas Joel, located within the Monroe–Woodbury Central School District, received special educational services provided by Monroe–Woodbury in a building annexed to Bais Rochel. In 1985, following the decision of the Supreme Court in Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 105 S.Ct. 3232, 87 L.Ed.2d 290, and School Dist. of City of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 105 S.Ct. 3248, 87 L.Ed.2d 267 —which ruled that publicly funded classes on religious school premises violated the Establishment Clause—Monroe–Woodbury ceased offering on-site schooling to Kiryas Joel's handicapped children. That decision, now overruled by the Supreme Court, triggered the years of litigation preceding this appeal.
After several months of sending their handicapped children to public schools to receive the special education services, the parents of Kiryas Joel refused to continue the arrangement, alleging that the children experienced fear and trauma in leaving their community and interacting with people whose ways were so different from theirs (Board of Educ. of Monroe–Woodbury Cent. School Dist. v. Wieder, 72 N.Y.2d 174, 181, 531 N.Y.S.2d 889, 527 N.E.2d 767, supra ). Many sought administrative review of Monroe–Woodbury's decision to offer the special education services only in public schools. Monroe–Woodbury commenced a declaratory judgment action, seeking a declaration that Education Law § 3602–c compelled it to furnish special education services only in regular classes and programs of the public schools, and not elsewhere. This Court ruled that the law neither compelled Monroe–Woodbury to provide special education to Kiryas Joel's handicapped children in public schools, nor required it to do so in a segregated setting, as was urged by Kiryas Joel (id., at 188, 531 N.Y.S.2d 889, 527 N.E.2d 767). Instead, this Court ruled that Monroe–Woodbury provide the special services at a site reasonably accessible to Kiryas Joel's handicapped children (id., at 184, 531 N.Y.S.2d 889, 527 N.E.2d 767).
In an effort to resolve the longstanding controversy between Kiryas Joel and Monroe–Woodbury, the Legislature enacted chapter 748 of the Laws of 1989,1 which established a union free school district coterminous with Kiryas Joel within the boundaries of Monroe–Woodbury. In Grumet v. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vil. School Dist., 81 N.Y.2d 518, 601 N.Y.S.2d 61, 618 N.E.2d 94, supra , this Court held that chapter 748 contravened the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution because it violated the second prong of the three-part test delineated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745. The Court reasoned that because the newly formed school district was coterminous with Kiryas Joel, only Hasidic children would attend the public school, and only members of the Hasidic sect would likely serve on the school board. The Court concluded that the statute therefore constituted a "symbolic union of church and State effected by the establishment of the Kiryas Joel Village School District * * * [and was] likely to be perceived by the Satmarer Hasidim as an endorsement of their religious choices, or by nonadherents as a disapproval of their individual religious choices" (Grumet v. Board of Educ., 81 N.Y.2d, supra, at 529, 601 N.Y.S.2d 61, 618 N.E.2d 94).
The Supreme Court affirmed this Court's holding in Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vil. School Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 114 S.Ct. 2481, 129 L.Ed.2d 546, supra [Kiryas Joel I ]. In a 6 to 3 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that chapter 748 violated the prohibition against government establishment of religion because the act was "tantamount to an allocation of political power on a religious criterion and neither presupposes nor requires governmental impartiality toward religion" (512 U.S., at 690, 114 S.Ct. 2481). The Court stated that the statute departed from a constitutional requirement of neutrality toward religion "by delegating the State's discretionary authority over public schools to a group defined by its character as a religious community, in a legal and historical context that gives no assurance that governmental power has been or will be exercised neutrally" (id., at 696, 114 S.Ct. 2481; see also, id., at 703, 114 S.Ct. 2481). The legislative act, in the words of the Supreme Court, left "the Court without any direct way to review such state action for the purpose of safeguarding a principle at the heart of the Establishment Clause, that government should not prefer one religion to another, or religion to irreligion" (id., at 703, 114 S.Ct. 2481).
Four days after the Supreme Court's decision in Kiryas Joel I, the Legislature responded by passing chapter 241 of the Laws of 1994. Under the new statute, a municipality located wholly within a single central or union free school district but whose boundaries were not coterminous with the boundaries of any preexisting school district could establish its own school district whenever the educational interests of the community required it (Grumet v. Cuomo, 90 N.Y.2d 57, 659 N.Y.S.2d 173, 681 N.E.2d 340, supra [ Kiryas Joel II ], citing Education Law § 1504 [former (3) ] [a] ).2 The statute set forth facially neutral criteria that a municipality could satisfy in order to establish a school district and delineated the process by which the new school district could be formed. The statute further defined the term "municipality" as "a city, town or village in existence as of the effective date of this subdivision" ( Education Law § 1504 [former (3) ] [g] ).
This Court held chapter 241 of the Laws of 1994 unconstitutional for two reasons (Grumet v. Cuomo, supra ). First, this Court determined that although the statute was facially neutral, it had a nonneutral effect of allowing Kiryas Joel to create its own school district without providing the same opportunity to other groups. Specifically, the Court reasoned that by limiting its applicability to municipalities "in existence as of the effective date of" the statute, any group, religious or nonreligious, subsequently incorporated as a municipality was effectively cut off from utilizing chapter 241's procedures (id., at 72, 659 N.Y.S.2d 173, 681 N.E.2d 340). The definitional limitation manifested itself in such a way that only one sect reaped the benefits of the statute—Kiryas Joel. The Court noted that the Legislature might have achieved a constitutionally acceptable result if it had enacted a law of "general applicability that the Village of Kiryas Joel, as one in a broad array of eligible municipalities, might have invoked" (id., at 75, 659 N.Y.S.2d 173, 681 N.E.2d 340 [emphasis added] ).
Second, the Court determined that chapter 241, like its predecessor, failed the second prong of the Lemon test (id., at 68, 659 N.Y.S.2d 173, 681 N.E.2d 340). The Court stated that, inasmuch as Kiryas Joel was the only municipality eligible to benefit from the statute, "the enactment of chapter 241 would be perceived as an act of governmental favor for the sole benefit...
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