Grunau v. E. Lansing Athletic Club, Inc.
| Decision Date | 14 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | 356233 |
| Parties | PAMELA GRUNAU, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. EAST LANSING ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., doing business as SPARROW MICHIGAN ATHLETIC CLUB, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
UNPUBLISHED
Ingham Circuit Court LC No. 19-000911-NO
Before: Ronayne Krause, P.J., and Murray and O'Brien, JJ.
In this premises liability action, plaintiff appeals by right the trial court's order granting defendant's motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10). We affirm.
In January 2019, plaintiff went to the Sparrow Michigan Athletic Club (the "MAC") to attend a water exercise class. Plaintiff went to the women's locker room to change into her swimsuit, and as she was leaving the locker room, several women were standing in the path she previously took to go to her locker. Plaintiff took another path out of the locker room, and while she was walking out, she saw a wet spot on the carpeted floor that she believed was water. Plaintiff stepped on the wet spot, slipped, and fell. After she fell plaintiff saw a bucket underneath the benches with a small amount of a brown, greasy liquid in it. An MAC employee informed plaintiff that the liquid on the floor was antifreeze, which had leaked from a rooftop unit, through the ceiling and into the locker room.
Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant, alleging claims of premises liability and negligence. Defendant sought summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10). Through a well-reasoned opinion and order, the trial court granted the motion, and this appeal followed.
"This Court reviews a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary disposition de novo." Pugno v Blue Harvest Farms LLC, 326 Mich.App. 1, 11; 930 N.W.2d 393 (2018). Under MCR 2.116(C)(8), summary disposition is appropriate when "[t]he opposing party has failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted." The trial court must accept all factual allegations in the pleadings as true and consider the pleadings alone. El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich. 152, 160; 934 N.W.2d 665 (2019). A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) "may only be granted when a claim is so clearly unenforceable that no factual development could possibly justify recovery." Id. Under MCR 2.116(C)(10), summary disposition is appropriate when, "[e]xcept as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment or partial judgment as a matter of law." This Court must consider the "pleadings, admissions, and other evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Latham v Barton Malow Co, 480 Mich. 105, 111; 746 N.W.2d 868 (2008). "A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ." Johnson v Vanderkooi, 502 Mich. 751, 761; 918 N.W.2d 785 (2018) (quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted).
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by dismissing her negligence claim under MCR 2.116(C)(8) on the basis that the claim sounds in premises liability.
"Courts are not bound by the labels that parties attach to their claims." Buhalis v Trinity Continuing Care Servs, 296 Mich.App. 685, 691; 822 N.W.2d 254 (2012). "Instead, an action should be determined by reading the entire complaint, looking beyond procedural labels, and determining the exact nature of the claim." Pugno, 326 Mich.App. at 13. "Michigan law distinguishes between claims arising from ordinary negligence and claims premised on a condition of the land." Buhalis, 296 Mich.App. at 692. A plaintiff may bring a claim of ordinary negligence for the overt acts of a premises owner that occur on his or her premises. Kachudas v Invaders Self Auto Wash, Inc, 486 Mich. 913, 914; 781 N.W.2d 806 (2010). However, "[i]f the plaintiff's injury arose from an allegedly dangerous condition on the land, the action sounds in premises liability rather than ordinary negligence . . . ." Id.
Despite their headings, plaintiff's two counts were based in premises liability because each alleged that plaintiff's injury occurred because of a condition on the land, the wet spot on the carpeted floor, rather than defendant's conduct. See Buhalis, 296 Mich.App. at 692. Therefore, the two counts in plaintiff's complaint sound solely in premises liability, and the trial court properly dismissed her ordinary negligence claim pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8).
We also reject plaintiff's argument that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition of her premises liability claim on the basis that the wet spot on the floor was an open and obvious condition.
Plaintiff was an invitee at the MAC because she was there as a gym member to use the exercise equipment at the gym. See Stitt v Holland Abundant Life Fellowship, 462 Mich 592, 597; 614 N.W.2d 88 (2000) (). "In general, a premises possessor owes a duty to an invitee to exercise reasonable care to protect the invitee from an unreasonable risk of harm caused by a dangerous condition on the land." Lugo v Ameritech Inc, 464 Mich. 512, 516; 629 N.W.2d 384 (2001). See also Estate of Livings v Sage's Investment Group LLC, 507 Mich. 328, 337-338; 968 N.W.2d 397 (2021). This duty is breached if a premises possessor "knows or should know of a dangerous condition on the premises of which the invitee is unaware and fails to fix the defect, guard against the defect, or warn the invitee of the defect." Hoffner v Lanctoe, 492 Mich. 450, 460; 821 N.W.2d 88 (2012). "Absent special aspects, this duty does not extend to open and obvious dangers." Estate of Trueblood v P & G Apartments, LLC, 327 Mich.App. 275, 285; 933 N.W.2d 732 (2019). In addition, a plaintiff must establish the elements of ordinary negligence in a premises liability action: that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty, the defendant breached that duty, the defendant's breach proximately caused plaintiff's injury, and the plaintiff suffered damages. Id.
A dangerous condition is open and obvious if "it is reasonable to expect that an average person with ordinary intelligence would have discovered it upon casual inspection." Hoffner, 492 Mich. at 461. This is an objective standard. Lugo, 464 Mich. at 517. As a result, "[t]his Court looks not to whether a particular plaintiff should have known that the condition was hazardous, but to whether a reasonable person in his or her position would have foreseen the danger." Kennedy v Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co, 274 Mich.App. 710, 713; 737 N.W.2d 179 (2007). Although a wet spot on a floor is not always open and obvious, it may be open and obvious if it is visible to a reasonable person upon casual inspection. Watts v Mich. Multi-King, Inc, 291 Mich.App. 98, 104; 804 N.W.2d 569 (2010) ().
The wet spot on the floor upon which plaintiff slipped was open and obvious because a person of ordinary intelligence could have reasonably discovered it upon casual inspection. Hoffner, 492 Mich. at 461. Indeed, plaintiff admitted during her deposition that the wet spot on the floor was readily observable and that she saw it before she stepped on it and proceeded to step on it knowing it was there. There is no evidentiary dispute that the wet spot on the floor had a coloration that made it stand out to a casual observer. That plaintiff thought this wet spot was water, and subjectively believed it would not pose a danger, is irrelevant because the wet spot on the floor was reasonably discoverable upon casual inspection to a person of ordinary intelligence. See id.
Nor was the wet spot on the floor a special aspect taking this case out of the open and obvious doctrine. "[I]f special aspects of a condition make even an open and obvious risk unreasonably dangerous, the premises possessor has a duty to undertake reasonable precautions to protect invitees from that risk." Lugo, 464 Mich. at 517. To prevent the application of the open and obvious danger doctrine, special aspects must make the condition either (1) effectively unavoidable, or (2) unreasonably dangerous such that special aspects impose an unreasonably high risk of severe harm. Estate of Livings, 507 Mich. at 338-339; Kennedy, 274 Mich.App. at 716. An unreasonably dangerous hazard is a hazard that is more than "theoretically or retrospectively dangerous, because even the most unassuming situation can often be dangerous under the wrong set of circumstances." Hoffner, 492 Mich. at 472.
Nothing in the evidence about the wet spot on the carpeted floor raised an issue of material fact as to whether it was unreasonably dangerous. Plaintiff did not present any evidence demonstrating that the antifreeze on the floor presented an unreasonably high risk of severe harm or death. The only evidence plaintiff presented was that the wet spot was "greasy," which is insufficient to demonstrate an unreasonably high risk of severe harm or death. See Lugo, 464 Mich. at 518. Further, that the wet spot was theoretically or retrospectively dangerous is insufficient to demonstrate that the wet spot was unreasonably dangerous. Hoffner, 492 Mich. at 472. The trial court did not err in concluding that, because the wet spot on the floor was open and obvious, defendant did not...
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