GTE NORTH INC. v. COMMUNICATION WORKERS, LOC. 4773

• Decision Date: 15 February 1996
• Docket Number: No. 3:95-CV-354RM.,3:95-CV-354RM.
• Citation: 927 F. Supp. 296
• Parties: GTE NORTH, INC., Plaintiff v. COMMUNICATION WORKERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL 4773, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

927 F. Supp. 296

GTE NORTH, INC., Plaintiff v. COMMUNICATION WORKERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL 4773, Defendant.

No. 3:95-CV-354RM.

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, South Bend Division.

February 15, 1996.

Patrick J. Hinkle, Edward N. Kalamaros & Associates, South Bend, IN; William J. Campbell; David G. Lynch, Holly Hirst, and Steven L. Loren, Rudnick and Wolfe, Chicago, IL, for plaintiff.

Marvin Gittler, Stephen Feinberg, and Patricia A. Collins, Asher Gittler Greenfield Cohen and D'Alba, Chicago, IL, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MILLER, District Judge.

This cause comes before the court on the motions to dismiss and for sanctions filed by defendant Communication Workers of America, Local 4773. The plaintiff, GTE North, Inc., objects to both motions. For the reasons stated in this memorandum and order, the court grants the defendant's motion to dismiss, but denies the defendant's motion for sanctions.

1. Motion To Dismiss

Local 4773 seeks dismissal of GTE North's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.¹ When deciding a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the court must assume the truth of the plaintiff's well-pleaded factual allegations and make all possible inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Johnson v. Northern Indiana Public Serv. Co., 844 F.Supp. 466, 468 (N.D.Ind. 1994) (citing Prince v. Rescorp Realty, 940 F.2d 1104, 1106 (7th Cir.1991)). A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim only if "it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Hondo, Inc. v. Sterling, 21 F.3d 775 (7th Cir.1994).

GTE brings this action pursuant to § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185, for breach of a collective bargaining agreement. The following allegations, which the court must accept as true for the purpose of this motion, appear in GTE North's complaint. GTE North is a Wisconsin corporation, and is an employer within the meaning of § 101 of the LMRA. Local 4773 is a labor organization within the meaning of § 101 of the LMRA, and is affiliated with and is part of the Communication Workers of America ("CWA"). Local 4773's principal business is to represent employees, with respect to the terms and conditions of their employment, who work for employers who maintain collective bargaining relationships with Local 4773. Local 4773 is the exclusive bargaining representative of certain employees employed by GTE North.

On April 18, 1991, GTE North entered into a Memorandum of Agreement ("MOA") with the CWA with respect to GTE North's Indiana operations; this MOA was and is binding upon Local 4773. Under the terms of the MOA, the parties agreed upon a Home Dispatch Program under which specified types of employees could elect to receive a company vehicle to drive to and from their homes and assigned work locations and thereby avoid having to report to an employer facility prior to being dispatched to a customer location. Pursuant to ¶ 3 of the MOA, the time traveling to and from the employees' homes was not compensable.

The MOA was incorporated into a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") entered into between GTE North and CWA on May 19, 1991, and the terms of the Home Dispatch Program are included in the CBA. Around August 12, 1994, GTE North and CWA reached agreement over terms for a new three-year CBA, the terms of which were ratified by and are binding on Local 4773 with regard to its members employed by GTE North. The 1994 CBA parties extended the Home Dispatch Program without modification for the term of the new agreement. Local 4773 is bound to the terms of the 1994 CBA, and its terms control the terms and conditions of employment of the GTE North employees represented by Local 4773.

Approximately 130 GTE North employees represented by Local 4773, all working in Indiana, have elected to participate in the Home Dispatch Program subject to the terms and conditions specified in the CBA.

Local 4773, either directly or through its agents, has precipitated and encouraged its members to initiate a lawsuit against GTE North seeking a determination that the travel time incurred in connection with travel to and from each Home Dispatch participant's home and first and last work assignment is compensable under the terms of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201. et seq. ("FLSA"). The lawsuit, which was filed on November 7, 1994, remains pending in this court under the caption Teddy W. Baker, et al. v. GTE North, Inc., No. 3:94-CV-885RM. There are a total of eight individual plaintiffs in the Baker v. GTE North case.

Prior to the filing of the Baker v. GTE North lawsuit, Local 4773, "without prior notice to or consultation with" GTE North, sought an opinion from its law firm, Asher, Gittler, Greenfield, Cohen & D'Alba, as to whether travel time under the Home Dispatch Program is compensable. On October 18, 1994, the Asher firm rendered a written opinion, addressed to GTE North Home Dispatch Employees, that the firm believed the travel time was compensable under FLSA. The letter also explained the potential for filing a lawsuit, represented that the firm was experienced in such matters, and explained how interested employees could bring an action against GTE North. Consent forms for use by any employees that wished to participate in a lawsuit were attached to the letter.

The letter prepared by the Asher firm was forwarded to Local 4773, which in turn forwarded it to its members employed by GTE North in its Home Dispatch Program, doing so "without any prior notice to or consultation with GTE North."

The complaint concludes that by these actions, "Local 4773 has breached the terms of the collective bargaining agreement between GTE North and the CWA, the terms of which are applicable to and binding on Local 4773." More specifically, the complaint alleges that Local 4773 "has breached the obligations imposed upon it as a matter of law to deal fairly and in good faith with GTE North with regard to the parties' respective and mutual obligations arising out of the parties' collective bargaining agreement now in force and effect." As damages for this alleged breach, GTE North requests its costs and attorneys' fees which it has incurred and will incur in connection with the Baker lawsuit.

GTE North's claim is one for breach of contract under § 301 of the LMRA. The parties agree that "federal substantive law governs suits based on a collective bargaining agreement." Peffley v. Durakool, Inc., 669 F.Supp. 1453, 1459 (N.D.Ind.1987).

"The Supremacy Clause of Art. VI of the United States Constitution grants to Congress the power to preempt state law. Congress exercised this power by enacting § 301(a) of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)...." Loewen Group Int'l, Inc. v. Haberichter, 65 F.3d 1417, 1420 (7th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). Section 301(a) of the LMRA provides:

Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of parties.

29 U.S.C. § 185(a). In addition to providing federal jurisdiction over actions involving collective bargaining agreements, § 301 authorizes federal courts to fashion federal common law for enforcement of these agreements. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972 (1957); see also Loewen Group Int'l, Inc. v. Haberichter, 65 F.3d at 1421 ("This section provides federal court jurisdiction over controversies involving collective bargaining agreements and also authorizes federal courts to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of those agreements."). A court must apply federal law when resolving such disputes to "ensure uniform interpretation of collective-bargaining agreements, and thus to promote the peaceable, consistent resolution of labor-management disputes." Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, 486 U.S. 399, 404, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 1880, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988) (citing Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 82 S.Ct. 571, 7 L.Ed.2d 593 (1962)); see also Loewen Group Int'l. Inc. v. Haberichter, 65 F.3d at 1421.

Atchley v. Heritage Cable Vision Associates, 904 F.Supp. 870, 874 (N.D.Ind.1995).

Thus, § 301 preempts state contract law and also preempts tort claims "so long as the claim is one in which `state tort law purports to define the meaning of the contract relationship.'" Smith v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 943 F.2d 764, 767 (7th Cir.1991) (citing Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 211, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 1911, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985)). Again, the parties agree that this case is governed by the federal common law applicable to § 301 cases. Thus, if a cause of action exists for a breach of an implied duty "to deal fairly and in good faith" between parties to a collective bargaining agreement, that cause of action must exist as a matter of federal common law. For the purposes of this motion, Local 4773 apparently does not argue whether federal law recognizes such a general duty or such a cause of action, but rather is content to argue that even if the duty of good faith and fair dealing existed, its actions in this case could not possibly be construed to constitute a breach of that duty.

GTE North contends that only one conclusion is available from the facts alleged in the complaint: "Local 4773 directly or indirectly, in concert with its agent law firm, having first obtained the law firm's agreement to do so, engineered the filing of the Baker litigation against GTE." Local 4773 does not...