Peffley v. Durakool, Inc.

• Decision Date: 24 September 1987
• Docket Number: No. S86-39.,S86-39.
• Parties: Patty L. PEFFLEY, Plaintiff, v. DURAKOOL, INC., d/b/a Hermaseal Co., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

669 F. Supp. 1453

Patty L. PEFFLEY, Plaintiff, v. DURAKOOL, INC., d/b/a Hermaseal Co., Defendant.

No. S86-39.

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, South Bend Division.

September 24, 1987.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

David T. Stutsman, Elkhart, Ind., Lawrence J. Clifford, South Bend, Ind., for plaintiff.

Gregory L. Kelly and Kathleen K. Brickley, South Bend, Ind., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MILLER, District Judge.

This cause comes before the court on the motion for summary judgment of defendant Durakool, Inc. Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P. For the reasons that follow, the court finds that the defendant's summary judgment motion should be granted, and that the defendant's motion for sanctions under Rule 11, Fed.R.Civ.P., should be denied.

I. Facts

Durakool employed the plaintiff, Patty L. Peffley, from 1972 until her termination on January 27, 1984. At the time of her termination, Mrs. Peffley earned approximately $5.83 an hour and worked an average of forty hours per week. Mrs. Peffley was 49 years of age when her employment was terminated; she alleges that Durakool discharged her on the basis of her age. In support of this allegation, Mrs. Peffley alleges that Durakool hired a younger person to replace her and that Durakool's vice-president made an age-related comment to her after her discharge.

Durakool contends that Mrs. Peffley was discharged, not because of her age, but because her supervisor believed she was trying to take a vacation under the guise of medical leave. On January 23, 1984, Mrs. Peffley saw Dr. Knight for a thumb injury sustained at work in December, 1983. She called Durakool on January 23 to report that she would not be at work that day. Dr. Knight scheduled an appointment for her with Dr. Ellis, an orthopedic specialist, for January 25. Mrs. Peffley did not report to work on January 24 or 25; she does not recall whether she notified Durakool in advance of those absences.

After taking X-rays of Mrs. Peffley's thumb, Dr. Ellis told her not to use her thumb more than was necessary. Mrs. Peffley informed Dr. Ellis that she was scheduled to take a three-week vacation in Florida beginning Monday, January 30. After some discussion, Dr. Ellis wrote a doctor's excuse recommending that Mrs. Peffley take three weeks off from work.

Mrs. Peffley did not report to work on January 26; she cannot recall whether she informed Durakool in advance of her absence. On Friday morning, January 27, Mrs. Peffley went to the Durakool plant to pick up her paycheck. She presented her foreman, Ken Ard, with the note from Dr. Ellis and told Mr. Ard that she was leaving for Florida that day to go fishing. The parties dispute the next events: Durakool contends that Mr. Ard told Mrs. Peffley that she could not use a medical leave of absence to take a vacation; Mrs. Peffley alleges that she did not understand why the two leaves of absence, medical and vacation, could not overlap. Mrs. Peffley further alleges that she told Mr. Ard to put her down for vacation leave beginning January 30.

After speaking to Mrs. Peffley, Mr. Ard prepared a payroll change notice to reflect Mrs. Peffley's termination, effective January 27. Mr. Ard believed that Mrs. Peffley had attempted to abuse the medical leave policy and that, in light of her prior record of absenteeism, her discharge was warranted. On January 31, after discussing the matter with John Howard, Durakool's vice-president, Mr. Ard mailed a termination notice to Mrs. Peffley's home address.

While the Peffleys were in Florida, their daughter was staying in their home. During her stay, the termination notice from Durakool arrived in the mail. During a telephone conversation with Mrs. Peffley in the week of January 30, her daughter informed Mrs. Peffley she had received a termination notice from Durakool, effective January 27, 1984.

Mrs. Peffley was a member of the United Paperworkers, International Union, AFL, CIO-CLC, Local 1056 ("the union"). Following her return from Florida on February 21, Mrs. Peffley filed a grievance regarding her discharge with the union steward at Durakool. Under the collective bargaining agreement between the union and Durakool, grievances were to be resolved under a four-step procedure. If the grievance was not settled through the four-step procedure, the union could refer the dispute to the Federal Mediation Service for arbitration. Mrs. Peffley's grievance was denied after the four-step procedure. Her fellow union members voted not to take the matter to arbitration. The collective bargaining agreement between Durakool and the union contained the following provisions:

Article IV, Section 3.F.

In the event the Union, or any employee fails to originate, handle and/or appeal the grievance from one step to the next in the grievance procedure within the time limits provided for in said grievance procedure, the grievance shall be considered settled on the basis of the last decision of the Company and not subject to further appeal or reconsideration and in such event said grievance shall be subject to no further action of any type or kind whatsoever by the Union....

* * * * * *

Article X, Section 6.

.... full reason for ... suspension or discharge shall be recorded and stated in writing to the Union.

* * * * * *

Causes for suspension or ultimate discharge are:

* * * * * *

K. Dishonesty.

(Collective Bargaining Agreement).

On August 9, 1984, Mrs. Peffley filed an age discrimination charge with the EEOC. Mrs. Peffley alleged that she had called John Howard, Durakool's vice-president, to ask for her job back. According to Mrs. Peffley, Mr. Howard stated that he was sorry she was getting old and could not work but that he did not want her back at Durakool. Mrs. Peffley further alleged that Durakool hired a younger person to replace her. The EEOC stopped processing Mrs. Peffley's charge when she informed them that she intended to file suit against Durakool.

On January 2, 1986, Mrs. Peffley filed suit against Durakool in the Elkhart Superior Court, Elkhart, Indiana. In her complaint, Mrs. Peffley claimed that Durakool discharged her in violation of the ADEA, in violation of the collective bargaining agreement, and in violation of Indiana law on retaliatory discharge. Mrs. Peffley also claimed that Durakool owed her three weeks' vacation pay¹, three weeks' wages for medical leave, and three weeks' worth of disability insurance benefits. Finally, Mrs. Peffley alleged that Durakool defamed her in the termination notice they sent to her. Durakool removed the suit to this court, based on this court's jurisdiction over the ADEA claim, 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b), 626(b), and this court's jurisdiction over suits for breach of collective bargaining agreements. 29 U.S.C. § 185.

II. Standard of Review

In a summary judgment motion, the movant must first demonstrate, by way of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits, if any, that (1) no genuine issues of material fact exist for trial, and (2) the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Munson v. Friske, 754 F.2d 683 (7th Cir.1985). If the motion's opponent would bear the burden of proof at trial on the matter that forms the basis of the summary judgment motion, the burden of proof shifts to the motions's opponent if the movant makes its initial showing, and the motion's opponent must come forth and produce affidavits, depositions, or other admissible documentation to show what facts are actually in dispute. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at ___, 106 S.Ct. at 2548; Klein v. Trustees of Indiana University, 766 F.2d 275, 283 (7th Cir.1985). Summary judgment should be granted only if no reasonable jury could return a verdict for the motion's opponent. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 781 F.2d 1260 (7th Cir.1986).

When the parties dispute the facts, the parties must produce proper documentary evidence to support their contentions. The parties cannot rest on mere allegations in the pleadings, Posey v. Skyline Corp., 702 F.2d 102 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 464 U.S. 960, 104 S.Ct. 392, 78 L.Ed. 2d 336 (1983); or upon conclusory statements in affidavits. First Commodity Traders v. Heinold Commodities, 766 F.2d 1007, 1011 (7th Cir.1985); Hall v. Printing and Graphics Arts Union, 696 F.2d 494, 500 (7th Cir.1982). Any permissible reasonable inferences from the documentary evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Mintz v. Mathers Fund, Inc., 463 F.2d 495, 498 (7th Cir.1972). A party need not try its case by affidavit, but it must set forth some facts from which the court can reasonably infer that the party would be able to produce some evidence at trial to support its theory. Matter of Morris Paint and Varnish Co., 773 F.2d 130 (7th Cir.1985).

The defendant's summary judgment motion must be addressed with these standards in mind.

III. ADEA Claim

In its summary judgment motion, Durakool argues that Mrs. Peffley's claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") is time-barred because she did not file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") within 180 days after the claimed unlawful practice occurred, as required by 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1). Mrs. Peffley argues that Durakool's failure to post conspicuous notice informing its employees of their rights under the ADEA equitably tolled the statute of limitations. The parties have also advanced arguments concerning the merits of Mrs. Peffley's ADEA claim, but the court finds it unnecessary to address those arguments because Durakool is entitled to...