Guanzon v. Kalamau

• Decision Date: 29 April 1965
• Docket Number: No. 4376,4376
• Citation: 402 P.2d 289,48 Haw. 330
• Parties: Rafael S. GUANZON v. Ernest K. KALAMAU.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Page 289

402 P.2d 289

48 Haw. 330

Rafael S. GUANZON v. Ernest K. KALAMAU.

No. 4376.

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

April 29, 1965.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Res ipsa loquitur is a procedural device which operates to shift the burden of going forward with the evidence to the defendant without relieving plaintiff of the burden of proof.

2. In order to be applicable, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur requires defendant to have the management and control of the instrumentality producing the injury at the time the negligence occurred.

3. Whether or not a mere bailee of an automobile violated the provisions of a traffic ordinance pertaining to the care and maintenance of brakes was a question for the jury in determining negligence.

4. Exceptional circumstances are required to warrant the giving of an unavoidable accident instruction to the jury and the better course would appear to be to omit the instruction except in those instances in which quite plainly it is peculiarly appropriate.

Kenneth E. Young, Honolulu, for appellant.

Thomas M. Waddoups (Frank D. Padgett and Robertson, Castle & Anthony), Honolulu, for respondent.

Before TSUKIYAMA, C. J., and CASSIDY, WIRTZ, LEWIS and MIZUHA, JJ.

WIRTZ, Justice.

Plaintiff-appellant filed this action to recover damages for personal injuries and property damage suffered as a result of defendant-appellee driving an automobile into the rear of plaintiff's automobile which was at a complete stop in obedience to a traffic signal. Defendant was driving a 1956 Packard automobile belonging to one Jukuma Tahara on Fort Street in Honolulu on April 14, 1961. As he approached the intersection of Fort and King Streets at five miles an hour he noticed that the traffic light was against him. He applied the brakes which he said had worked perfectly up to that time but the brake pedal went all the way to the floor and the Packard rolled into the rear of an automobile driven by plaintiff who had stopped for the traffic light.

The case was tried before a jury and judgment was entered for defendant pursuant to the jury verdict. The court below denied plaintiff's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or in the alternative a new trial. From this judgment plaintiff brings this appeal.

Plaintiff's theory of the case was based on negligence arising out of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and the violation of an ordinance dealing with proper maintenance of motor vehicles. Defendant claims in defense that the accident was unavoidable.

Plaintiff contends 'that he was entitled to [a] directed verdict and judgment N.O.V. for the reasons that:

'(1) The inferences in his favor under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which the court refused to apply.

'(2) The violation of the ordinance requiring adequate brakes constituted negligence as a matter of law.

'Plaintiff further urges that the court committed reversible error in instructing the jury on the law of unavoidable accident and in refusing to instruct the jury on res ipsa loquitur, the legal effect of the violation of the ordinance, and in [refusing] to instruct the jury that failure to use the emergency brake could constitute negligence even if the failure of the foot brake did not amount to negligence.'

The seven specifications of error can be broken down into three categories and will be considered in that manner: (1) those relating to the application of the doctrine to res ipsa loquitur; (2) those relating to the effect on the question of negligence of the violation of an ordinance prohibiting a person from driving a motor vehicle with such unsafe and inadequate brakes as may endanger any person on the highway, and (3) those relating to the unavoidability of the accident.

Plaintiff's reliance on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is misplaced. ¹ The doctrine, where applicable, is a procedural device which operates to shift the burden of going forward with the evidence to the defendant without relieving plaintiff of the burden of proof. It relieves the plaintiff from showing any particular acts of negligence and places on the defendant the burden of explaining that the accident did not occur from want of care on his part. 61 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 511(3) b, p. 205.

At best, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur resulting in a presumption of negligence raises a rebuttable inference which allows a plaintiff to get his case to the jury. This is well illustrated even in the cases relied on by plaintiff. When defendant meets the burden by presenting evidence of how the accident occurred without fault on his part, the doctrine has accomplished its purpose and no longer remains in effect. As stated in Nielsen v. Pyles, 322 Ill.App. 574, 54 N.E.2d 753, 756:

'* * * As soon as evidence is produced which is contrary to the presumption which arose before the contrary proof was offered, the presumption vanishes entirely. * * *'

Plaintiff, in the presentation of the case for liability testified and called defendant to the stand as an adverse witness. Plaintiff's version of the accident was as follows:

On April 14, 1961, at about 11:45 A.M., plaintiff delivered his wife to the main Fort Street entrance of the Liberty House. After she left the automobile he proceeded on Fort Street toward the ocean and stopped his car at the entrance to King Street in obedience to a red traffic light. He was at a complete stop waiting for the light to change when his Hillman automobile was struck from behind. Plaintiff was alone in the automobile, his foot was on the brake, and the force of the impact moved his vehicle about five feet forward. After the collision, plaintiff got out of his car observed the damage to the rear end, and saw an old model Packard about five feet behind his car. Defendant, the driver of the Packard, spoke to plaintiff and required if he was hurt. When plaintiff asked defendant what had happened, defendant didn't say anything--he just apologized. He did not state that the brakes had not worked. No oil or debris was observed by plaintiff near his car.

Defendant, as an adverse witness, testified, in substance, that while driving in Honolulu on Fort Street, near the Liberty House crosswalk he was looking for a space in which to park his car. He was 'rolling' about 'five miles' hoping that someone would pull out from a parking place. He saw plaintiff's car stopped for the red traffic light for the first time just before defendant had come to the Liberty House crosswalk in the middle of the block on Fort Street between Hotel and King Streets. At the crosswalk he put his foot on the brakes and they worked 'fine.' He kept his foot on the brake, without pressing, and when he was thirteen feet nine inches ² behind plaintiff's car he pressed down on the brake but it 'didn't work.' There was no friction or resistance and the brake 'just went down.' He 'went' for the emergency brake but it was too late and he 'bumped right into him.' He had pulled out the emergency brake two inches but he was so close he 'banged' right into the plaintiff. He couldn't swerve one way or the other because 'cars were parked on the side.' The brake on the defendant's car was an oil hydraulic brake. It was working 'fine' at every other stop he had made that day. He lived at the home of the owner of the car and had driven this 'family' car many times before. He said there was no oil or debris on the road near the point of impact. There were no passengers in defendant's car.

After plaintiff's case was closed, defendant rested without presenting any further testimony or additional evidence. In this posture of the case, there was no evidence as to the condition of the brakes after the collision or if or where the brakes were repaired. Nor was it established when or where the brakes were last serviced, inspected or tested.

In considering the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to the operation of the motor vehicle in question by defendant, we are of necessity confined to the specific procedural situations in which the question was raised in the trial court. Since the presumption of negligence arising under that doctrine when applied is a rebuttable one, the explanation of the accident's occurrence offered by the defendant, albeit as an adverse witness, necessarily raised the issue of negligence versus unavoidability for the jury to resolve. In doing so, it precluded the trial judge from directing a verdict for the plaintiff or granting judgment notwithstanding the contrary result reached by the jury.

The evidence so introduced by the plaintiff disclosed how the event occurred and made it appear that it was through no fault of the defendant. Dabroe v. Rhodes Company, 64 Wash.Dec.2d 444, 392 P.2d 317, 322. Any further evidence as to the condition of the brakes or the physical facts at the scene of the accident would merely serve to either corroborate or impeach defendant's testimony. It was up to the jury to determine whether or not the accident was caused by a sudden unexpected brake failure.

In this factual atmosphere, ³ no instruction was required to assist the jury on this question since the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is merely procedural and not a rule of substantive law and is based on common sense to withstand the challenge of a nonsuit. Chase v. Beard, 55 Wash.2d 58, 346 P.2d 315. Cf., Morgan v. Yamada, 26 Haw. 17. In Ritchie v. Thomas, 190 Or. 95, 224 P.2d 543, 550-551, the court held that since the effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is merely to take the plaintiff's case to the jury (so as to preclude a nonsuit) there was no more reason for requiring the court to comment on this type of circumstantial evidence than upon any other type, and it was not error to refuse plaintiff's requested instruction.

In explaining the function of an evidentiary presumption in law, Professor Wigmore has this to say:

'A presumption * * * is in its characteristic feature a rule of law laid down by the judge, and attaching to one...