Guardian Ins. & Annuity Co. v. White
Decision Date | 26 February 2014 |
Docket Number | Case No. 1:13-cv-360 |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
Parties | THE GUARDIAN INSURANCE & ANNUITY COMPANY, INC., Plaintiff-Interpleader, v. LANCE M. WHITE, et al., Defendants. |
Defendants Lance M. White and Kathryn Ann Bransom have each made conflicting claims to life insurance benefits under an insurance policy issued by Plaintiff The Guardian Insurance & Annuity Company, Inc. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff filed this interpleader action, seeking to deposit the benefits with the Court. (Id.)
A motion for summary judgment should be granted if the evidence submitted to the Court demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The moving party has the burden of showing the absence of genuine disputes over facts which, under the substantive law governing the issue, might affect the outcome of the action. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. All facts and inferences must be construed in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
A party opposing a motion for summary judgment "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 (1986).
In support of his motion, Defendant White argues: (1) that the Policy requires that Decedent personally sign the change of beneficiary form; (2) that Ohio Revised Code ("O.R.C.") § 1337.42 requires specific authorization for someone acting under a written power of attorney to have authority to sign on behalf of the principal; (3) that O.R.C. §1337.42 should be read into the Policy; and (4) that because Rob Bransom, the agent who signed and faxed the change of beneficiary form to Plaintiff, lacked the necessaryauthority under the policy to sign the change of beneficiary form, the attempt to change the beneficiary is a nullity.
Defendant White primarily redlies upon a 2010 case out of this Court (and this judge), Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., v. Schneider-Viers, No. 3:09-cv-497, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77573 (S.D. Ohio July 6, 2010). As with this case, Metropolitan Life was decided under Ohio law. However, Defendant Branson has demonstrated that Metropolitan Life has limited precedential value in this case for two reasons.
First, the sole issue argued to the Court in Metropolitan Life was whether O.R.C. § 1337.20(H) required an attorney-in-fact to have a specific grant of authority to change beneficiaries of a life insurance policy. However, almost two years after entry of the Metropolitan Life decision, in April 2012, O.R.C. § 1337.20 was repealed. The entirety of the Metropolitan Life decision centered on the interpretation of this former statute and the history of the Uniform Power of Attorney Act. The statute no longer exists, and its replacement has its own legislative history.
Second, the only issue raised by the parties and decided by the Court in Metropolitan Life was whether the written power of attorney designation in that particular case granted specific enough authority to change beneficiaries. The issue of waiver of policy requirements in an interpleader action was not before the Court in Metropolitan Life. Truth be told, however, in 1963, the Ohio Supreme Court of Ohio had held that by filing an interpleader action, an insurance company waives all of the insurance policy's requirements. Rindlaub v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 175 Ohio St. 303, 194 N.E.2d 577 (1963).Here, among the requirements waived are that Decedent must personally sign and submit a change of beneficiary form.
In 2012, the Supreme Court of Ohio re-affirmed its Rindlaub decision and articulated that the only factor to be considered in an interpleader beneficiary action is the clear intent of the decedent. LeBlanc v. Wells Fargo Advisors, L.L.C., 2012-Ohio-5458, 134 Ohio St. 3d 250, 981 N.E.2d 839 (2012).2 By contrast, two years earlier, this Court in Metropolitan Life clearly discounted any importance of the intent of the decedent. 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77573 at *14. Alas, Metropolitan Life makes no mention of Rindlaub, because neither of the parties raised it. Instead, one beneficiary claimed the written power of attorney was specific enough to comply with the former O.R.C. § 1337.20, while the other claimed it was not. Thus both parties sought to enforce the insurance policy requirements, despite the fact that those requirements were actually waived by the insurance company under Ohio law.
As a result, the Metropolitan Life decision does not follow the standards articulated by the Supreme Court of Ohio in Rindlaub. Moreover, two years after Rindlaub, the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed it in LeBlanc, indicating that, in an interpleader action, the only relevant issue before the trial court is who the decedent clearly intended as his or her beneficiary. LeBlanc, 981 N.E. 2d at syllabus. TheRindlaub and LeBlanc decisions have undermined any precedential value of Metropolitan Life for the case at hand.
In his motion, Defendant White argues that the attempt by Rob Bransom to change the beneficiary of the Policy acting under the instruction of Decedent is a nullity under the Policy. This argument misses the point. By filing an interpleader action, Plaintiff has waived all of the policy's requirements; and thus policy compliance is a moot issue. Given Rindlaub and LeBlanc, the issue before this Court is determining the intent of Decedent, no matter how noncompliant with the policy requirements the attempt to change the beneficiary was.
Even prior to the LeBlanc decision, various Ohio appellate courts had held that in an interpleader action, the intent of the decedent should be the primary consideration. Moreover, one Ohio appellate court specifically noted that an agent (as opposed to an attorney-in-fact) could, under certain circumstances, change a beneficiary for a decedent. In Colonial Life and Accident v. Leitch, 9th Dist. Summit No. 24263, 2008 WL 5244588 (Dec. 17, 2008), the court analyzed the history of Rindlaub and Ohio change of beneficiary law in circumstances when the attempted change did not comply with the terms of the policy. The court found that if the decedent clearly expressed the intent to change beneficiaries, then the change must be accepted. The court further considered other Ohio and federal decisions on the subject and noted:
[W]here the facts show that the "insured did not communicate to the insurer, or to those who cared for such matters, his clearly expressed intention to name a new beneficiary, the claimant alleging to be the new beneficiary must show: (1) that the insured communicated, to some other person, his clearly expressed intention to name a new beneficiary, and (2) that the insured took, or directed someone to take on his behalf, sufficient steps to notify the insurer or to carry out his intent." Donahue v. Carpenter (Mar. 31, 1992), 6th Dist. No. 91WD057 (citing Rindlaub, 175 Ohio St. at 306; Arnold v. Newcomb (1922), 113 Ohio St. 578, 588; Kabbaz v. Prudential Ins. Co. (1985), 27 Ohio App.3d 254; Benton v. United Ins. Co. of America (1959), 110 Ohio App. 151, 158; Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. MacBrair (1940), 66 Ohio App. 134; Pipe Fitters' Local No. 392 Pension Plan v....
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