Guardiola v. Adams Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 14, Civil Action No. 1:18-cv-03230-RM-NRN
| Decision Date | 22 April 2019 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 1:18-cv-03230-RM-NRN |
| Parties | JOSE GUARDIOLA, Plaintiff, v. ADAMS COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 14, ADAMS COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 14 BOARD OF EDUCATION, and JAVIER ABREGO, individually and in his official capacity, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' motion to dismiss (ECF No. 16). Plaintiff brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Defendants retaliated against him in violation of his First Amendment rights. Defendants contend the complaint fails to state a claim and that Defendant Abrego is entitled to qualified immunity. In his response (ECF No. 17), Plaintiff abandons part of one of his claims. Defendant has filed a reply. (ECF No. 18.) The Court has reviewed the pleadings, case file, and applicable law. For the reasons stated below, the motion is denied.
In evaluating a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint, view those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Brokers' Choice of Am., Inc. v. NBC Universal, Inc., 757 F.3d 1125, 1136 (10th Cir. 2014); Mink v. Knox, 613 F.3d 995, 1000 (10th Cir. 2010). The complaint must allege a "plausible" right to relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569 n.14 (2007); see also id. at 555 (). Conclusory allegations are insufficient, Cory v. Allstate Ins., 583 F.3d 1240, 1244 (10th Cir. 2009), and courts "are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation," Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quotation omitted). To determine whether a claim is plausible, a court considers "the elements of the particular cause of action, keeping in mind that the Rule 12(b)(6) standard doesn't require a plaintiff to set forth a prima facie case for each element." George v. Urban Settlement Servs., 833 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted). However, if the allegations "are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent," the plaintiff has not "nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible." Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted).
Qualified immunity shields individual defendants named in § 1983 actions unless their conduct was unreasonable in light of clearly established law. Estate of Booker v. Gomez, 745 F.3d 405, 411 (10th Cir. 2014). "[W]hen a defendant asserts qualified immunity, the plaintiff carries a two-part burden to show: (1) that the defendant's actions violated a federal constitutional or statutory right, and, if so, (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the defendant's unlawful conduct." Id. (quotation omitted). "Asserting a qualified immunity defense via a Rule 12(b)(6) motion . . . subjects the defendant to a more challenging standard ofreview than would apply on summary judgment." Peterson v. Jensen, 371 F.3d 1199, 1201 (10th Cir. 2004).
The following facts are taken from the complaint and, for present purposes, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Plaintiff was an employee of Adams County School District No. 14 and held the position of Post-Secondary/Work Readiness & Family Engagement Specialist at Lester Arnold High School. (ECF No. 3 at ¶ 55.) Plaintiff was also a board member of INSPIRE, a Colorado nonprofit organization with a mission "to ignite, train, and invest in youth to become Change Agents in their schools, families and communities." (Id. at ¶ 29.) Since 2014, INSPIRE has contracted with the District to work with students at various schools. (Id. at ¶ 30.)
Due to the District's poor performance over a number of years, the state board of education began planning to take over certain aspects of it. (Id. at ¶ 13.) Community members, parents, and students staged multiple protests directed at Defendants' mismanagement of the District, including a student-led walkout at Adams City High School in April 2018 and formation of a group calling for the removal of Defendant Abrego as superintendent. At some protests, students wore INSPIRE t-shirts. (Id. at ¶¶ 18-20.) Although INSPIRE did not encourage students to protest or to wear the t-shirts, it did encourage them to attend school board meetings, tell Defendants their stories, and work with school administrators. (Id. at ¶¶ 32-34, 38.)
In May 2018, the executive director of INSPIRE met with administrators from Adams City to discuss their concerns that INSPIRE students were protesting the administration. (Id. at ¶ 38.) The administrators stated that they would not continue to contract with INSPIRE unlessits board members provided letters of support for the administration. About a week later, INSPIRE's contract with Adams City was cancelled.
The following month, Plaintiff was notified by letter that his position at Lester Arnold had been eliminated. (Id. at 58.) The District's letter states: "We have decided to discontinue [the District's] contract with INSPIRE and as a result, your at[-]will position at Lester Arnold is eliminated effective June 22, 2018." (Id. at ¶ 59.) But according to Lester Arnold's website, Plaintiff's former position was soon held by another person. (Id. at ¶¶ 63-64.) INSPIRE continued its program at Lester Arnold, but the principal there received a written reprimand from the District. (Id. at ¶¶ 47-51.) That letter states: "No entering into a contract with INSPIRE." (Id. at ¶ 51.)
Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated his First Amendment rights by firing him in retaliation for his association with INSPIRE and for not writing a letter in support of the District.
Section 1983 provides a remedy for people, including public officials, if an individual violates their federal rights while acting under color of state law. Cillo v. City of Greenwood Village, 739 F.3d 451, 459 (10th Cir. 2013). Public employee retaliation claims based on protected First Amendment activity are subject to the four-part test derived from Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), and Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). Id. at 460. The Pickering/Connick test requires a plaintiff to show that "(1) his First Amendment activity involved a matter of public concern; (2) his interests in the protected activity outweighed the employer's interest in regulating it; and (3) the protected activity was a substantial motivating factor in the employer's decision to take adverse action against him." Id. at 461. If the plaintiffdoes so, the employer can escape liability by showing that (4) it would have taken the same action in the absence of the protected activity. Id.
Plaintiff's freedom of association claim is based on the legal theory that Defendants fired him in retaliation for being on the board of INSPIRE. The government may not penalize an individual because of his membership in a disfavored group. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984). But to be protected by the First Amendment's expressive associational right, a plaintiff must allege that he associated with a group for expressive purposes. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000). This protection is not reserved for advocacy groups; however, "a group must engage in some form of expression, whether it be public or private" to come within its ambit, id., and the associational conduct must touch a matter of public concern, Merrifield v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 654 F.3d 1073, 1081-82 (10th Cir. 2011).
Defendants raise several arguments pertaining to the first element of the Pickering/Connick test with respect this claim. They assert Plaintiff fails to state a claim because the complaint does not allege (1) that INSPIRE engaged in expressive conduct, (2) that Plaintiff's association with INSPIRE involved a matter of public concern, or (3) that Plaintiff associated with INSPIRE for the purpose of engaging in protected activity.
Defendants' first argument relies heavily on Plaintiff's allegation that INSPIRE did not encourage students to protest the administration. (ECF No. 3 at ¶¶ 32, 33.) But taking that allegation as true does not mean that INSPIRE did not engage in any expressive activity protected by the First Amendment. To the contrary, the complaint alleges that INSPIRE encouraged students to attend school board meetings and share their experiences with the schoolboard—quintessential protected activity. INSPIRE also sought to instill in youth a set of values that would enable them to become change agents in their communities. (Id. at ¶ 29.) INSPIRE's core principles are love, leadership, community, possibilities, and social change. (Id.) In Dale, the Supreme Court concluded that the Boy Scouts of American engaged in expressive activity by seeking to instill its values and principles in young people, stating, "It seems indisputable that an association that seeks to transmit such a system of values engages in expressive activity." 530 U.S. at 650. The Court finds no meaningful basis on which to distinguish INSPIRE's expressive activities from those of the Boy Scouts. Therefore, the Court finds that the allegations in the complaint show that INSPIRE engaged in protected activity.
Defendant's contention that Plaintiff's association with INSPIRE did not involve a matter of public concern also lacks merit. The complaint alleges that the District's poor performance was a concern for students, parents, community members, and the state board of education, and was the subject of several public meetings and protests. To the extent INSPIRE was involved in these activities, it was clearly exercising its right to petition on "a subject of legitimate news interest." Merrifield, 654 F.3d at 1084 (quotation omitted...
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