Guarnier v. Guarnier

Decision Date09 November 1989
PartiesJohn GUARNIER, Respondent, v. Mary GUARNIER, Appellant.
CourtNew York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Wardlaw Associates, P.C. (Donna E. Wardlaw, of counsel), Saratoga Springs, for appellant.

Capasso, Burns & Massaroni (Kevin L. O'Brien, Albany, of counsel), Schenectady, for respondent.

Before MAHONEY, P.J., and CASEY, WEISS, LEVINE and HARVEY, JJ.

CASEY, Justice.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Dier, J.), ordering, inter alia, equitable distribution of the parties' marital property, entered November 30, 1988 in Warren County, upon a decision of the court.

Defendant contends that Supreme Court erred in finding certain assets to be separate property of plaintiff and not marital property. As to the asset described by the parties as the "Pilot Knob" property, we agree with defendant that their interest in this asset was marital property since it was acquired during the marriage and before the commencement of the action for divorce (see, Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][1][c]; Brennan v. Brennan, 103 A.D.2d 48, 51, 479 N.Y.S.2d 877). However, except for contributing one half of the down payment on the property, * defendant made no significant contribution of money, time or labor to the asset. The record establishes that plaintiff paid the parties' entire share of the mortgage payments and maintenance fees during the period that the parties owned an interest in the property. Plaintiff also contributed time and labor in landscaping, renovating and otherwise improving the property. Since the record establishes that the parties' marriage was not a true economic partnership, we are of the view that the proceeds from the sale of this asset should be distributed in accordance with the parties' relative economic contribution (see, Kobylack v. Kobylack, 111 A.D.2d 221, 489 N.Y.S.2d 257). Accordingly, defendant's share in the proceeds is limited to the amount of her contribution toward the down payment, together with interest thereon at a reasonable rate from the date of the purchase to the date of the sale of the parties' interest in the property, plus a pro rata share of the interest earned while the proceeds were held in escrow. In the event that the parties are unable to agree on a reasonable rate of interest, an application should be made to Supreme Court to determine such a rate.

Turning to the marital residence, it was clearly separate property since plaintiff purchased it before the parties were married (Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][1][d][1]. As to the increase in value of this property during the marriage (see, Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][1][d][3], the parties' conflicting testimony on the issue of defendant's direct contribution of money, time and labor toward the improvements made to the marital residence presented a question of credibility which Supreme Court resolved in favor of plaintiff. Our review of the record reveals no basis for disturbing the court's ruling on this issue (see, Lisetza v. Lisetza, 135 A.D.2d 20, 24, 523 N.Y.S.2d 632). Nor do we find any support in the record for defendant's claim that her efforts as a wife, parent, wage earner and homemaker indirectly enhanced the appreciation of the marital residence.

Defendant also contends that Supreme Court erred in its valuation of a checking account maintained by defendant. Although it appears that the court's figure is incorrect, we are of the view that the error does not require any change in the distribution, since the discrepancy amounts to less than 3% of the total marital property distributed by the court, a figure that drops to less than 2% when the proceeds from the Pilot Knob property are included in the marital assets. It is also significant that the court's distribution was not based upon any particular percentage, but instead relied largely upon the parties' practice during their marriage of keeping their financial affairs, including...

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6 cases
  • Alper v. Alper
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • October 12, 2010
    ...assets] presented a question of credibility which [the] Supreme Court resolvedin favor of [the defendant]" ( Guarnier v. Guarnier, 155 A.D.2d 744, 745, 547 N.Y.S.2d 455). Such a credibility determination "is afforded great weight on appeal" ( Schwartz v. Schwartz, 67 A.D.3d at 990, 890 N.Y.......
  • Garges v. Garges
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • July 25, 1991
    ...marriage. Exercising its broad discretion to resolve conflicting evidence with credibility determinations (see, Guarnier v. Guarnier, 155 A.D.2d 744, 745, 547 N.Y.S.2d 455), Supreme Court rejected defendant's testimony concerning the scope of the improvements she made to the property and de......
  • Butler v. Butler
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • September 23, 1991
    ...Monks v. Monks, 134 A.D.2d 334, 520 N.Y.S.2d 810; Coffey v. Coffey, 119 A.D.2d 620, 501 N.Y.S.2d 74; see also, Guarnier v. Guarnier, 155 A.D.2d 744, 745, 547 N.Y.S.2d 455 [holding that "credit" received for contribution of separate property should include interest on original However, if ri......
  • Daisernia v. Daisernia
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • December 31, 1992
    ...conflicting evidence with credibility determinations (see, Garges v. Garges, 175 A.D.2d 511, 572 N.Y.S.2d 780, Guarnier v. Guarnier, 155 A.D.2d 744, 547 N.Y.S.2d 455) and discerning no abuse of discretion in this regard from a review of the record, we see no reason to interfere. The remaind......
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