Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives
| Decision Date | 09 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | 21-5045 |
| Parties | Damien Guedes, et al., Appellants v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, et al., Appellees Firearms Policy Coalition, Inc., Appellee |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Argued March 8, 2022
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (No. 1:18-cv-02988)
Erik S. Jaffe argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Joshua G. Prince, Adam Kraut, and Joshua J Prince.
John Cutonilli, pro se, was on the brief for amicus curiae John Cutonilli in support of appellants.
Mark B. Stern, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Brian M Boynton, Acting Assistant Attorney General, and Michael S Raab, Abby C. Wright, Brad Hinshelwood, and Kyle T. Edwards Attorneys.
Ian Simmons, Jonathan Lowy, and Eric Tirschwell were on the brief for amici curiae Giffords Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence, and Brady and Everytown for Gun Safety in support of appellees.
Before: SRINIVASAN, Chief Judge, WILKINS, Circuit Judge, and EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.
Is a bump stock device a "machine gun" within the meaning of federal law? We are tasked with answering that question definitively. Following the 2017 mass shooting in Las Vegas in which 58 people were killed and approximately 500 were wounded-the deadliest in modern American history-the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives ("ATF" or the "Bureau") promulgated a rule classifying "bump stocks" as machine guns.[1] A bump stock, like those used by the Las Vegas shooter, replaces a rifle's stationary stock with a sliding stock. It thereby enables the weapon to slide back and forth against the shooter's shoulder, "bumping" the shooter's trigger finger repeatedly and rapidly firing the weapon. The Bureau's new rule instructed individuals with bump stocks to either destroy them, abandon them at the nearest ATF facility, or face criminal penalties.
The Bureau interpreted "machine gun," as defined in the National Firearms Act and Gun Control Act, to extend to bump stocks. Plaintiffs initially moved for a preliminary injunction to stop the rule from taking effect, which the District Court denied, and a panel of this Court affirmed. At the merits stage, the District Court again rejected Plaintiffs' challenges to the rule under the Chevron framework. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The central question on appeal is whether the Bureau had the statutory authority to interpret "machine gun" to include bump stocks. Employing the traditional tools of statutory interpretation, we find that the disputed rule is consistent with the best interpretation of "machine gun" under the governing statutes. We therefore affirm.
Congress enacted the National Firearms Act in 1934 to regulate the sale of particular firearms, including machine guns. Initially, the Act defined a "machine gun" as "any weapon which shoots, or is designed to shoot, automatically or semiautomatically, more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger." Pub. L. No. 73474, § 1(b), 48 Stat. 1236, 1236 (1934). In 1968, Congress removed "or semiautomatically" and expanded the definition to include:
the frame or receiver of any such weapon, any combination of parts designed and intended for use in converting a weapon into a machinegun, and any combination of parts from which a machinegun can be assembled.
Pub. L. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213, 1231 (1968). Congress charged the Attorney General with enforcement of the National Firearms Act, who in turn delegated enforcement authority to the Bureau. 26 U.S.C. § 7801(a); 28 C.F.R. § 0.130(a).
With the Gun Control Act of 1968, Congress incorporated the National Firearms Act's definition of "machinegun" and strengthened its prohibitions on firearm sales and licensing. 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(4). As amended by the Firearm Owners' Protection Act of 1986, the Gun Control Act prohibits the transfer of or possession of machine guns, excluding those authorized to possess such weapons by the state or federal government or those who possessed them before the law took effect. 18 U.S.C. § 922(o). The Gun Control Act's enforcement scheme is identical to that of the National Firearms Act. Congress empowered the Attorney General to "prescribe only such rules and regulations as are necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter," who delegated this authority, in turn, to the Bureau. Id. § 926(a); 28 C.F.R. § 0.130(a)(6).
In 2006, the Bureau determined that certain bump stock devices-ones that harnessed energy from an internal spring's recoil, like an Akins Accelerator-qualified as machine guns under both Acts. See ATF Rul. 2006-2. Between 2008 and 2017, however, the Bureau issued ten letter rulings in which it concluded that devices relying on both the recoil energy and the shooter's constant forward pressure were not machine guns. These weapons fired multiple shots with a "single pull of the trigger," but in the Bureau's view did not operate "automatically," though the Bureau did not engage with the meaning of the term. Id. at 66,518.[2]
In the aftermath of the Las Vegas shooting, then-President Trump and Congress urged the Bureau to revisit its position on bump stocks. Department of Justice Announces Bump-Stock-Type Devices Final Rule, DEP'T OF JUST. (Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-announces-bump-stock-typedevices-final-rule, J.A. 21-22. Following a notice of proposed rulemaking, see Bump-Stock-Type Devices, 83 Fed.Reg. 13,442 (Mar. 29, 2018), the Bureau issued a final rule reversing its earlier position that only bump stocks with internal springs qualified as machine guns under the National Firearms Act and Gun Control Act. Bump-Stock-Type Devices, 83 Fed.Reg. 66,514, 66,514-15 (Dec. 26, 2018) ("Bump Stock Rule" or "Rule"). Under the Rule, "bump-stock-type devices are 'machineguns' as defined by the National Firearms Act and Gun Control Act because such devices allow a shooter of a semiautomatic firearm to initiate a continuous firing cycle with a single pull of the trigger." Id. at 66,515. These devices, whether operated by an internal spring or manual pressure, "convert an otherwise semiautomatic firearm into a machinegun." Id.
The Rule defined "single function of the trigger" as a "'single pull of the trigger' and analogous motions" and "automatically" as "the result of a self-acting or self-regulating mechanism that allows the firing of multiple rounds through a single pull of the trigger." Id. Individuals currently in possession of bump stocks were directed to either destroy them or abandon them at an ATF facility prior to the rule taking effect on March 26, 2019. Id. at 66,514, 66,515.
In December 2018, pursuant to the Bureau's notice of final rulemaking, Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the rule from taking effect. The District Court denied that request, finding the Bureau's interpretation of the relevant statutory terms-"single function of the trigger" and "automatically"-reasonable under Chevron. Guedes v. ATF, 356 F.Supp.3d 109 (D.D.C. 2019) ("Guedes I").
We affirmed the District Court's decision on the same basis. Guedes v. ATF, 920 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (per curiam) ("Guedes II"). In our view, the Chevron framework applied, notwithstanding Plaintiffs' objections, because the rule was legislative in character; the government could not waive Chevron deference; and Chevron applies in equal force to provisions with criminal penalties. Id. at 17-28. Because we found "single function of the trigger" and "automatically" ambiguous under the National Firearms Act and Gun Control Act and the agency's interpretations reasonable, we ruled in the Bureau's favor.
The Supreme Court denied Plaintiffs' petition for certiorari. Guedes v. ATF, 140 S.Ct. 789 (2020) (Mem.). In a separate statement, Justice Gorsuch articulated his view that Chevron did not apply because of the government's express waiver of the doctrine and the statute's criminal penalties. Id. at 790. He nevertheless concurred in the petition's denial, finding that the government's position could be substantiated at the merits stage and noting that other courts of appeals were currently considering challenges to the Rule. Id. at 791.
Now before us is the District Court's grant of the government's motion for summary judgment and denial of Plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment. Guedes v. ATF, 520 F.Supp.3d 51, 58 (D.D.C. 2021) ("Guedes III"). For the same reasons discussed in Guedes I and II, the District Court found the Bureau reasonably construed the statute under Chevron and rejected Plaintiffs' challenges on the merits. Id. at 65.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we review a grant or dismissal of a motion for summary judgment de novo. Baylor v. Mitchell Rubenstein & Assocs., P.C., 857 F.3d 939, 944 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
The government urges us to decide this appeal based on the law of the case doctrine, which instructs that "the same issue presented a second time in the same case in the same court should lead to the same result." LaShawn A. v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389, 1393 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The doctrine is a discretionary prudential doctrine, not a jurisdictional bar and we decline to apply it here. Crocker v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 49 F.3d 735, 739-40 (D.C. Cir. 1995). This is not a situation in which we are reaching a different result on the same legal issue in the same case, which could require showing "extraordinary circumstances." Sherley v. Sebelius, 689 F.3d 776, 781 (D.C. Cir. 2012)...
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