Gueits v. State, 90-0326
| Decision Date | 22 August 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 90-0326,90-0326 |
| Citation | 566 So.2d 829 |
| Parties | 15 Fla. L. Weekly D2121 Carlos GUEITS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Michael J. Doddo of Michael Doddo, P.A., Plantation, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Miles Ferris, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.
We reverse the defendant's convictions for trafficking in cocaine and conspiracy to traffic in cocaine.
The only direct evidence connecting the defendant to the crimes charged was his presence in the parked car whose locked trunk contained a sealed package of cocaine. The state acknowledges that the law is well settled that mere presence at the scene of the crime is insufficient to establish a person's participation in the crime. However, the state asserts that the circumstantial evidence in the instant case demonstrates a pattern which is inconsistent with any hypothesis of innocence.
The facts of this case show that in the presence of the undercover police officer the unsuspecting, alleged coconspirator placed a telephone call to an individual to help the police officer arrange for the purchase of cocaine. The alleged coconspirator placed the telephone call and handed the receiver to the police officer telling him that "Carlos" was on the telephone. The police officer attempted to reach an agreement with "Carlos", but was unsuccessful during this first telephone conversation. A number of telephone calls from "Carlos" and the alleged coconspirator to the police officer ensued and ultimately a deal was struck. When the police officer arrived at the designated sale site, the alleged coconspirator gestured to a parked car and said "that's 'Carlos' and his cousin." The alleged coconspirator then opened the trunk of the parked car with a key he had in his possession, retrieved the cocaine, and handed it to the police officer. The defendant did not do or say anything at any time at the sale site. He was merely seated behind the steering wheel of the car.
In addition to the evidence of the defendant's mere presence at the scene of the crime, the state offered, as evidence that the defendant committed the crimes, the hearsay statements made by the alleged coconspirator to the police officer. Asserting that these hearsay statements are admissible, the state maintains that the statements prove that the defendant Carlos was the same "Carlos" that participated in the earlier telephone negotiations with the police officer.
According to the state, the alleged coconspirator's hearsay statement to the police officer, at the time the negotiations began, that the speaker on the telephone was "Carlos" is sufficient proof to link the defendant, Carlos, to the conspiracy. The state also asserts that subsequent telephone calls received by the police officer connected the defendant to the crimes. However, the police officer's testimony reveals only that he recognized the voice, in the subsequent calls, as being the voice of the same individual that had been earlier identified by the alleged coconspirator as "Carlos."
The other hearsay statement offered by the state to connect the defendant to the crimes was the alleged coconspirator's statement at the scene of the crime that "that's 'Carlos' and his cousin." According to the state, the defendant's presence at the scene of the crime and these hearsay statements created sufficient proof that the defendant was the same individual participating in the telephone negotiations, the conspiracy to traffic in cocaine, and the delivery of the cocaine.
As to the charge of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine, for the state to establish that a defendant is a participant in a conspiracy, his actions or statements, or other competent independent evidence shall be used. Absent such evidence, hearsay statements of an alleged coconspirator are not admissible. Romani v. State, 542 So.2d 984 (Fla.1989); Damon v. State, 289 So.2d 720 (Fla.1973); Honchell v. State, 257 So.2d 889 (Fla.1971). In the instant case, the trial court erred in admitting the hearsay statements of an alleged coconspirator because the state failed to establish by any other competent, independent evidence or by the actions or statements of the defendant t...
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Christie v. State, 91-3073
...independent evidence that defendant participated in a conspiracy. Romani v. State, 542 So.2d 984, 985 n. 3 (Fla.1989); Gueits v. State, 566 So.2d 829 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990); State v. Edwards, 536 So.2d 288, 292 n. 3 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). This court must examine whether there was "substantial ev......
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Earle v. State, No. 98-4393
...of the accused's guilty knowledge than exists in this case. See Thomas v. State, 743 So.2d 1190 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Gueits v. State, 566 So.2d 829 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990); McClain; Manning v. State, 355 So.2d 166 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Green v. State, 667 So.2d 208 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); S.B. v. St......
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Chiapponi v. State, 90-3374
...actions or statements, or other competent independent evidence, that a defendant is a participant in a conspiracy. Gueits v. State, 566 So.2d 829 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). In other words, this court must examine whether there was substantial evidence, free from the taint of hearsay, upon which t......
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Alexander v. State
...independent evidence that defendant participated in a conspiracy. Romani v. State, 542 So.2d 984, 985 n. 3 (Fla.1989); Gueits v. State, 566 So.2d 829 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990); State v. Edwards, 536 So.2d 288, 292 n. 3 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). This court must examine whether there was "substantial ev......