Gueldner v. Heyd

• Decision Date: 21 April 1970
• Docket Number: 1519,1520.,Misc. No. 1516
• Citation: 311 F. Supp. 1168
• Parties: August Richard GUELDNER v. Louis A. HEYD, Sheriff, Parish of Orleans. William Roscoe SKINNER v. Louis A. HEYD, Jr., Criminal Sheriff, Parish of Orleans. Alton J. CHARBONNET v. Louis A. HEYD, Jr., Sheriff, Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana

311 F. Supp. 1168

August Richard GUELDNER v. Louis A. HEYD, Sheriff, Parish of Orleans.

William Roscoe SKINNER v. Louis A. HEYD, Jr., Criminal Sheriff, Parish of Orleans.

Alton J. CHARBONNET v. Louis A. HEYD, Jr., Sheriff, Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana.

Misc. Nos. 1516, 1519, 1520.

United States District Court, E. D. Louisiana, New Orleans Division.

April 21, 1970.

Dean A. Andrews, Jr., Michael Barry, New Orleans, La., for August Gueldner.

George M. Leppert, New Orleans, La., for William Skinner.

Robert S. Link, Jr., New Orleans, La., for Alton Charbonnet.

Jim Garrison, Dist. Atty., Louise Korns, John Volz, Asst. Dist. Attys., City of New Orleans, La., for Louis A. Heyd, Sr.

HEEBE, District Judge.

This cause came on for hearing on a previous day on the motion of August Gueldner, William Skinner and Alton Charbonnet for a rehearing on the judgment given by this Court on January 30, 1970, in the above-captioned case. Having heard the arguments of counsel, having studied the legal memoranda submitted and having duly reconsidered all of the evidence previously taken, the Court is now fully advised in the premises and ready to rule.

The main thrust of petitioners' argument is that this Court has adopted the conclusions of law as announced by the Louisiana Supreme Court as binding on its decision, contrary to the mandate of the United States Supreme Court in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963). At 318, 83 S.Ct. at 760, it is stated:

"Although the district judge may, where the state court has reliably found the relevant facts, defer to the state court's findings of fact, he may not defer to its findings of law. It is the district judge's duty to apply the applicable federal law to the state court fact findings independently. The state conclusions of law may not be given binding weight or habeas. That was settled in Brown v. Allen, supra, 344 U.S. 443 at 506, 73 S.Ct. 397 97 L.Ed. 469 (opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter)."

In Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, at 506, 73 S.Ct. 397, at 446, 97 L.Ed. 469

(1952), Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in his concurring opinion, stated:

"State adjudication of questions of law cannot, under the habeas corpus statute, be accepted as binding. It is precisely these questions that the federal judge is commanded to decide."

Petitioners' argument is prompted by our reliance on the Louisiana Supreme Court decision in our own written judgment and the absence of citation to federal cases. Petitioners assume their federally protected rights were not considered. Petitioners' assumption is erroneous.

In the case at bar, the state court has already made a full evidentiary hearing with written findings. In this situation this Court may, and ordinarily should, accept the facts as found in the hearing. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 318, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770; United States ex rel. Fein v. Deegan, 510 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1969). As regards findings of law, the interpretation of state law by the highest court of the state is generally binding on the federal court except where such interpretation is inconsistent with the fundamentals of liberty and justice. Chavez v. Baker, 399 F.2d 943 (10th Cir. 1968). Thus, the federal court may accept the determination of a state court as to constitutional rights, after having reviewed the state proceedings and after ascertaining that all federal standards have been met. Herring v. People of the State of California, 411 F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1969).

In the case at bar, a full evidentiary hearing was had on October 9, 1969. At this hearing petitioners agreed to submit the record and supplement it with any evidence they wished to put on. In due course this Court rendered an opinion with written reasons denying the writ.

Today, after granting a rehearing, we affirm our denial of the writ. Although we feel no compulsion to cite federal cases for authority to support our holding, nevertheless, for benefit of petitioners and their counsel (who cite no authority), we assign further written reasons.

REASONS

Petitioner Charbonnet reurges his claim that his Sixth Amendment right to have the effective assistance of counsel was violated. He claims (1) he had no attorney at his arraignment, a vital stage of the criminal proceedings, and (2) his court-appointed counsel was appointed too close to the trial date to prepare an effective defense. We disagree.

One instance in which the accused criminal in a state proceeding must have an attorney present at his arraignment is when that arraignment is considered to be a critical stage of the criminal proceeding in that state and that certain defenses may be forever waived if not then pleaded. At such an arraignment, the accused must have counsel, even if the accused pleads not guilty. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 82 S.Ct. 157, 7 L.Ed.2d 114 (1961). This is considered such a fundamental right, it is to be applied retroactively. Williams v. State of Alabama, 341 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1965).

Another instance in which an accused must be represented by counsel at arraignment is where the accused is either incapable of making an intelligent waiver of counsel or refuses to do so and enters a plea of guilty. Neither instance is present here.

As regards the rights of a defendant at arraignment in a federal criminal proceeding, the guiding principles are well laid out in McConnell v. United States, 375 F.2d 905 (5th Cir. 1967), at 909:

"* * * there is little doubt that the arraignment in a federal criminal prosecution is a vital part of the criminal process and consequently the accused is entitled to the assistance of counsel at that time. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 supra, (1938); Hamilton v. State of Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 82 S.Ct. 157, 7 L.Ed.2d 114 supra, (1962); Anderson v. United States, 122 U.S.App.D.C. 277, 352 F.2d 945, 947 (1965). However, the accused's lack of counsel at arraignment is not so inherently prejudicial to the rights of the accused as to vitiate, in all cases, an otherwise valid conviction. To require that a conviction be set aside, it is necessary that the accused demonstrate some possible prejudice which resulted from the absence of counsel. Anderson v. United States, supra; McGill v. United States, 121 U.S.App.D.C. 179, 348 F.2d 791 (1965)."

In McConnell, the defendant argued his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated because he was without counsel at arraignment. At the arraignment the defendant's retained counsel was not physically present; indeed, counsel was in another state. But the defendant voluntarily entered, on the advice of his retained counsel, a plea of not guilty with leave to attack the indictment. The court, observing that such a plea did not compromise any of the defendants' rights, and that not the slightest possibility of prejudice resulted therefrom, concluded that he was not denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

A similar expression of the law was made by Judge Murrah in Johnson v. United States, 333 F.2d 371 (10th Cir. 1964), at 373:

"We think, however, the trial court adequately protected the right of appellant to the assistance of counsel when it directed the entry of a plea of not guilty. No statement was made against the accused. He made no incriminating statement whatsoever, and was not called upon to waive assistance of counsel or any other constitutional right. He cannot, therefore, complain of the deprivation of any constitutional right at this stage of the proceedings. Cf. Latham v. Crouse (10CA), 320 F.2d 120, cert. den. 375 U.S. 959, 84 S.Ct. 449, 11 L. Ed. 317; and Marshall v. United States (10CA), 321 F.2d 897."

We hold that Charbonnet was not denied his federal constitutional Sixth Amendment right to counsel when he was arraigned in state court, without an attorney, and a plea of not guilty was entered for him by the trial judge. Charbonnet has not shown, either in the record before us, or on the evidentiary hearing, how he was prejudiced by not having counsel at his arraignment.

Charbonnet next argues he was denied effective counsel because the attorney who represented him at his trial was appointed too close to the date of trial to effectively prepare pre-trial motions vital to a successful defense. Mr. Link, counsel for petitioner Charbonnet, was appointed on January 18, 1966, a date after pre-trial motions had been filed and argued by Charbonnet's two codefendants, and ruled on by the Court.

However the record discloses that on January 31, 1966, the trial court granted Mr. Link's motion to obtain transcripts of preliminary hearing and other proceedings previously held for codefendants. Mr. Link took no further action. Trial began on March 21, 1966. This part of the record was not disputed or contradicted at the evidentiary hearing.

It is axiomatic that effective presentation of a case before a jury is premised on diligent and adequate trial preparation. Thus, the right for an accused to be represented at trial means the accused has a right to an attorney who has adequate time to prepare the case. The Supreme Court expressed such a view in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, at 59, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932), at 57:

"* * * during perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings against these defendants, that is to say, from the time of their arraignment until the beginning of their trial, when consultation, thorough-going investigation and preparation were vitally important, the defendants did not have the aid of counsel in any real sense, although they were as much entitled to such aid during that period as at the trial itself."

This rule was very succinctly stated by Judge Murrah in Willis v. Hunter, 166 F.2d 721 (10th Cir. 1948), at 723:

"We think that the right to the effective assistance of counsel contemplates the guiding hand of an able and responsible lawyer, devoted solely to the interest of his client; who has ample opportunity to acquaint himself with the

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