Guerin v. Colvin

• Decision Date: 13 October 2015
• Docket Number: No. 13 C 6964,13 C 6964
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
• Parties: RITA NICOLE GUERIN, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

RITA NICOLE GUERIN, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

No. 13 C 6964

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

October 13, 2015

Magistrate Judge Mary M. Rowland

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Rita Nicole Guerin filed this action seeking reversal of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying her application for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act (Act). 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 423 et seq., 1381 et seq. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), and filed cross motions for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

I. THE SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS

To recover DIB or SSI, a claimant must establish that he or she is disabled within the meaning of the Act. York v. Massanari, 155 F. Supp. 2d 973, 977 (N.D.Ill. 2001).¹ A person is disabled if he or she is unable to perform "any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505(a), 416.905(a). In determining whether a claimant suffers from a disability, the Commissioner conducts a standard five-step inquiry:

1. Is the claimant presently unemployed?

2. Does the claimant have a severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment that interferes with basic work-related activities and is expected to last at least 12 months?

3. Does the impairment meet or equal one of a list of specific impairments enumerated in the regulations?

4. Is the claimant unable to perform his or her former occupation?

5. Is the claimant unable to perform any other work?

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509, 404.1520, 416.909, 416.920; see Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2000). "An affirmative answer leads either to the next step, or, on Steps 3 and 5, to a finding that the claimant is disabled. A negative answer at any point, other than Step 3, ends the inquiry and leads to a determination that a claimant is not disabled." Zalewski v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 160, 162 n.2 (7th Cir. 1985). "The burden of proof is on the claimant through step four; only at step five does the burden shift to the Commissioner." Clifford, 227 F.3d at 868.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff applied for DIB and SSI on January 16, 2009, alleging that she became disabled on January 1, 2005, because of brain injury, anxiety, depression, PTSD, back problems, and memory problems.² (R. at 81, 102, 107, 114, 118). The application was denied initially and on reconsideration, after which Plaintiff filed a timely request for a hearing. (Id. at 74-77, 81, 98, 103, 111, 115, 119). On March 17, 2011,³ Plaintiff, represented by counsel, testified at a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). (Id. at 17-60, 81). The ALJ also heard testimony from Leslie Freels Lloyd, a vocational expert (VE). (Id. at 17-60, 81, 131-32).

The ALJ denied Plaintiff's request for benefits on July 28, 2011. (R. at 81-91). Applying the five-step sequential evaluation process, the ALJ, at step one, reserved a finding on whether Plaintiff had engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 1, 2005, the alleged onset date. (Id. at 83-84). At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's migraine headaches, bipolar disorder, PTSD, and substance abuse are severe impairments. (Id. at 84). At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meet or medicallyequal the severity of any of the listings enumerated in the regulations. (Id. at 84-85).

The ALJ then assessed Plaintiff's residual functional capacity (RFC)⁴ and determined that she can perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with these nonexertional limitations: "no public contact work, no team coordination, must work alone, only routine, repetitive work that stays the same day-to-day to limit the number of new details that require learning." (R. at 87-90). Based on Plaintiff's RFC and the VE's testimony, the ALJ determined at step four that Plaintiff is capable of performing past relevant work as a hand packer and personal assistant. (Id. at 90). Alternatively, based on Plaintiff's RFC, age, education, and the VE's testimony, the ALJ determined at step five that there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform such as packer. (Id. at 90-91). Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff is not suffering from a disability, as defined by the Act. (Id. at 91).

The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review on September 7, 2012. (R. at 4-7). Plaintiff now seeks judicial review of the ALJ's decision, which stands as the final decision of the Commissioner. Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 561-62 (7th Cir. 2009).

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision is authorized by § 405(g) of the SSA. In reviewing this decision, the Court may not engage in its own analysis of whether the plaintiff is severely impaired as defined by the Social Security Regulations. Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1001 (7th Cir. 2004). Nor may it "reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts in the record, decide questions of credibility, or, in general, substitute [its] own judgment for that of the Commissioner." Id. The Court's task is "limited to determining whether the ALJ's factual findings are supported by substantial evidence." Id. (citing § 405(g)). Evidence is considered substantial "if a reasonable person would accept it as adequate to support a conclusion." Indoranto v. Barnhart, 374 F.3d 470, 473 (7th Cir. 2004); see Moore v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 1118, 1120-21 (7th Cir. 2014) ("We will uphold the ALJ's decision if it is supported by substantial evidence, that is, such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.") (citation omitted). "Substantial evidence must be more than a scintilla but may be less than a preponderance." Skinner v. Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2007). "In addition to relying on substantial evidence, the ALJ must also explain his analysis of the evidence with enough detail and clarity to permit meaningful appellate review." Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 2005).

Although this Court accords great deference to the ALJ's determination, it "must do more than merely rubber stamp the ALJ's decision." Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). "This deferential standard of review isweighted in favor of upholding the ALJ's decision, but it does not mean that we scour the record for supportive evidence or rack our brains for reasons to uphold the ALJ's decision. Rather, the ALJ must identify the relevant evidence and build a 'logical bridge' between that evidence and the ultimate determination." Moon v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 718, 721 (7th Cir. 2014). Where the Commissioner's decision "lacks evidentiary support or is so poorly articulated as to prevent meaningful review, the case must be remanded." Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 2002).

IV. RELEVANT MEDICAL EVIDENCE

Plaintiff began treating with John J. Schoenwald, M.D., her primary care physician, in January 2003. (R. at 546). As a result of an automobile accident in September 2004 when she was 19, Plaintiff suffered a head injury, broken left clavicle, and displacement of the humerus. (R. at 285, 578). She developed symptoms of PTSD with difficulty falling asleep, early morning awakening, crying, and anxiety. (Id. at 68). She also developed severe headaches and a CT scan indicated type 1 Chiari malformation (CM) in the cerebellar area, causing dizziness.⁵ (Id. at 292, 294, 578). Dr. Schoenwald referred her to a psychiatrist for evaluation and treatment of her PTSD symptoms. (Id. at 305).

On October 12, 2004, Rumen Slavkov, M.D., conducted an initial psychiatric evaluation. (R. at 305-09). Plaintiff reported flashbacks, nightmares, chronic fear,increased startle response, emotional numbness, social isolation, and avoidance. (Id. at 305-06). Plaintiff's mother described frequent anger, frustration, withdrawal, sadness, and depression. (Id. at 306). On examination, Dr. Slavkov observed dysthymic mood; tearful, euthymic and slightly labile affect; decreased concentration; and fair insight and judgment. (Id. at 308). He diagnosed PTSD and bipolar II disorder, and assigned a Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) score of 55.⁶ Dr. Slavkov started Plaintiff on psychotherapy and prescribed Klonopin, citalopram, and Lamictal.⁷

On November 16, 2004, Plaintiff reported symptoms consistent with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). (R. at 310). Dr. Slavkov conducted an examination, finding no change from the October examination, diagnosed bipolar II disorder and PTSD, with a need to rule out ADHD. (Id.). He continued Klonopin, Celexa and Lamictal, and started a therapeutic trial of Ritalin.⁸ (Id. at 310-11). Plaintiff saw Dr. Slavkov on a regular basis throughout 2005. (Id. at 312-29). After exhibiting initial improvement, Plaintiff's anxiety returned. (Id. at 318). In October 2005, she reported difficulty focusing and concentrating. (Id. at 328).

In February 2005, Plaintiff underwent suboccipital craniotomy, C1 laminectomy and duraplasty for decompression of the CM. (R. at 68). Plaintiff claims that since the surgery, she has trouble remembering and concentrating and cannot function in school. (Id. at 578).

On August 14, 2006, Plaintiff complained of headaches, back problems, poor memory, and chronic insomnia. (R. at 367). On examination, Plaintiff was alert and oriented but displayed anxiety and depression symptoms. (Id.). Dr....