Guernsey v. American Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 01 January 1872
• Citation: 17 Minn. 83
• Parties: WILLIAM H. GUERNSEY v. AMERICAN INSURANCE CO.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 83

17 Minn. 83

WILLIAM H. GUERNSEY

v. AMERICAN INSURANCE CO.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Appeal from a judgment of the court of common pleas, Ramsey county.

The action was to reform a policy of insurance against fire issued by defendant to plaintiff, and to recover on it as reformed. The description in the policy of the property insured was: "On his dwelling-house;" "on his household furniture therein;" "on his barn and shed adjoining;" "on his grain therein;" "on his hay and fodder therein;" "on his livestock and farming utensils therein."

The reformation sought was to strike out the word "therein" wherever occurring.

At the close of the plaintiff's evidence the court dismissed the action, and judgment was accordingly entered.

Lampreys, for appellant.

E. C. Palmer, for respondent.

RIPLEY, C. J.

The appellant unites an equitable with a legal cause of action, viz., to reform the policy and to recover for a loss under the policy as reformed.

The issue as to the former was triable by the court, subject to the right of the parties to consent, or of the court to order that the whole issue or any specific question of fact involved be tried by a jury. Gen. St. c. 66, §§ 197-199.

The case coming on in its order for trial in the court below, a jury was impaneled and sworn therein; but the case as settled does not show that the parties consented, or that the court ordered, that the jury should pass on the issue as to the reformation of the policy or any specific question of fact involved therein, as was necessary to authorize them to do so. Berkey v. Judd, 14 Minn. 394, (Gil. 300.)

The appellant, however, introduced evidence to maintain the issues on his part as to both causes of action. Under this state of facts there would be nothing for the jury till the court had first decided that the appellant was entitled to have the policy reformed. He sought to reform it by striking out "therein" in the description of the property insured, on the ground that both in the policy and his application, which by reference is made a part of the policy, the same occurs by the mistake and error of the scrivener who wrote the written portion thereof, so that in that respect the said instruments do not truly express the agreement of the parties. That the insertion of the words in question is the insertion of a material stipulation is evident.

Appellant had further to show that such insertion was contrary to the intention of both parties and under a mutual mistake. Such mutual mistake must be clearly made out by satisfactory proof, by evidence clear of all reasonable doubt. Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 152-157.

Taking appellant's statement to be true, that the application and policy do not, in the respect above mentioned, express the agreement as he understood it, he had also to show that the respondent understood the bargain in the same way that he did. If, for instance, it supposed that the agreement was to insure his barn and grain therein, then the word "therein" was not, so far as it was concerned, inserted in the policy through any mistake; but the policy in that particular expresses just what it meant it to.

Though it be there contrary to his intention, that is, contrary to the intention of one of the parties, it is not there contrary to the intention of both, and therefore no mutual mistake is shown.

In insurance, as in all other contracts, it is essential that the minds of the parties meet, — that they propose and mean the same thing in the same sense. In the case above supposed, the appellant would mean one thing and the respondent another. No contract, therefore, would exist between them which the policy through their mutual mistake failed to express, and there would be no ground for reforming it.

This is just where appellant leaves his case. Currier, he says, agreed to insure in the same manner as the Madison Co. Suppose he did, and suppose that Wood made the mistake in the application. In filling it up he was appellant's agent, and it went to respondent as appellant's statement, and there is no evidence that it was informed that it did not express his wishes. In issuing the policy in conformity to it, it intended to insure just what it...