Guerra v. Handlery Hotels, Inc.
| Decision Date | 18 December 1959 |
| Citation | 347 P.2d 674,1 Cal.Rptr. 330,53 Cal.2d 266 |
| Parties | , 347 P.2d 674 Leonor GUERRA, Appellant, v. HANDLERY HOTELS, INC. (a Corporation), Respondent. L. A. 25568 |
| Court | California Supreme Court |
Robert C. Thaxton, San Diego, for appellant.
John W. McInnis and McInnis, Focht & Fitzgerald, San Diego, for respondent.
Plaintiff fell or was thrown to the floor while a passenger in an elevator in defendant's hotel, and she sustained severe injuries when her left arm was caught between the wall of the elevator shaft and the front edge of the floor of the moving car. She brought this action, alleging that her injuries were caused by defendant's negligence. The jury found for defendant, and plaintiff's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was denied. On appeal she contends that she was entitled to judgment under the evidence as a matter of law and that the trial court erred in instructing the jury.
The elevator car was about five and one-half feet wide and four feet deep, and it was equipped with handrails. It did not have a door, but a the lobby floor, as at the other floor levels, there was a door three feet wide and seven feet high in the wall of the shaft. This door closed automatically after an appropriate button was pressed, and the elevator was designed so as not to move until the door was completely shut. Viewed from insisde the car, the door closed from right to left. A handle attached to a bar on the inside of the door protruded one and one-half inches into the shaft, slanting downward and to the left. When the door was completely closed, the tip of the handle was about four feet above the floor level and six inches to the right of the left door jamb. The car floor was about three inches from the door and cleared the handle by about an inch.
A draftsman employed by plaintiff to draw a diagram of the elevator testified that, when the door was closed, the handle on the inside was in such a position that it could catch clothing extending one and an eighth inches beyond the front edge of the car.
The testimony of plaintiff may be summarized as follows: On the day of the accident she dined with four companions, two of whom were celebrating their wedding anniversary. Between 9:30 and 10:00 p. m. the group went to a Navy officers' club where plaintiff had one drink, a whiskey sour. After midnight the party went to defendant's hotel for the purpose of visiting a cocktail lounge on the top floor. They entered an empty elevator at the lobby floor, followed by the operator, who had been standing near the clerk's desk. Plaintiff, who had not been in the hotel previously, was the last of her party to enter, and she did not have a chance to position herself properly and was turning around to the right when the car started upward suddenly. She did not see the operator come in or hear him say anything. As the car started to move, she felt a tug at the left sleeve of her coat, which was caught 'in the door or something.' Things then happened so quickly that she was not sure what occurred. She fell forward, her left arm was wedged between the moving car and the shaft wall, and her left leg was broken, apparently when she struck the floor. She did not know how her arm became caught. None of her companions pushed her, and she was not feeling the effects of the drink she had consumed at the officers' club. Plaintiff was wearing high heels and a coat with large turned-up cuffs. She was in good health and had never suffered from fainting spells.
Plaintiff called as witnesses her four companions who said that each member of the party, including plaintiff, had a single drink at the officers' club. They testified that the elevator moved suddenly before they were settled, and some of them stated that it started with a lurch, that they did not have enough time to turn around completely, and that they did not hear the operator say anything. According to one man the operator was about 20 feet away when plaintiff got in, and eight or ten seconds elapsed before the operator entered, closed the door, and started the elevator. This witness notice plaintiff standing 'in the middle of the car' with he back party to the door as the car started to move, and immediately thereafter he saw her face downward on the floor with her arm wedged between the car and the shaft wall and with her feet diagonally back from the door, toward the rear of the car. None of plaintiff's companions saw what caused her to fall.
The operator testified that when he entered the elevator plaintiff and her companions were inside and toward the rear of the car, that plaintiff was standing away from the door, and that it was not necessary for him to push anyone back when he pressed the button to shut the door. He said that he faced forward to operate the controls, that the car did not start with a jerk but worked as usual, and that after the car had traveled about four feet he saw plaintiff on the floor crying.
An engineer employed by the California Division of Industrial Safety testified that, on the basis of inspections which he made of the elevator before and several months after plaintiff was injured, the facilities complied with safety regulations, that the car started smoothly and accelerated slowly and that the maximum speed of the elevator was set at one-half the permissible rate and could not be increased by the operator.
, 2] In considering plaintiff's contention that she was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we must take the evidence in the light most favorable to defendant, and, when this is done, we cannot say that the court erred in denying plaintiff's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdit.
5] The jury was instructed at defendant's request, 'The mere fact that an accident happened, considered alone, does not support an inference that some party, or any party, to this action was negligent.' It is error to give the quoted instruction where the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies as a matter of law. Alarid v. Vanier, 50 Cal.2d 617, 625, 327 P.2d 897; Jensen v. Minard, 44 Cal.2d 325, 329, 282 P.2d 7. The doctrine is applicable where the accident is of such a nature that it can be said, in the light of past experience, that it probably was the result of negligence by someone and that the defendant is probably the person who is responsible. As aids in determining whether it is more probable than not that a defendant's negligence caused the accident, the courts have considered such...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Tobler v. Chapman
...772, 373 P.2d 860; Faulk v. Sobesanes (1961) 56 Cal.2d 466, 470, 14 Cal.Rptr. 545, 363 P.2d 593; Guerra v. Handlery Hotels, Inc. (1959) 53 Cal.2d 266, 271, 1 Cal.Rptr. 330, 347 P.2d 674; Phillips v. Noble (1958) 50 Cal.2d 163, 167, 323 P.2d 385; Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. (1952) 39 Cal......
-
Albers v. Gehrke
...772, 373 P.2d 860; Borenkraut v. Whitten (1961) 56 Cal.2d 538, 547, 15 Cal.Rptr. 635, 364 P.2d 467; Guerra v. Handlery Hotels, Inc. (1959) 53 Cal.2d 266, 271, 1 Cal.Rptr. 330, 347 P.2d 674; La Porte v. Houston (1948) 33 Cal.2d 167, 169--170, 199 P.2d 665; Casetta v. United States Rubber Co.......
-
Roddiscraft, Inc. v. Skelton Logging Co.
...v. Standard Oil Co., 157 Cal.App.2d 230, 321 P.2d 67; Burger v. Burger, 136 Cal.App.2d 360, 288 P.2d 926; Guerra v. Handlery Hotels, Inc., 53 Cal.2d 266, 1 Cal.Rptr. 330, 347 P.2d 674.) On the other hand, if the existence of any condition is one of fact it is the province of the jury to det......
-
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.
...of negligence or the claim of breach of warranty,' would constitute mere surplusage. As stated in Guerra v. Handlery Hotels, Inc., 53 Cal.2d 266, 272, 1 Cal.Rptr. 330, 333, 347 P.2d 674, 677, such an instruction 'is unnecessary in order to protect the defendant's interests.' Under the circu......