Guerrero v. Cal. Dep't of Corr.
| Decision Date | 07 May 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. C 13-05671 WHA,C 13-05671 WHA |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
| Parties | VICTOR GUERRERO, Plaintiff, v. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS & REHABILITATION; STATE PERSONNEL BOARD; and in their official capacities JEFFREY BEARD, Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation; SUZANNE AMBROSE, Executive Officer of State Personnel Board; K. CARROLL, Lieutenant; D. SHARP, Sergeant; BARBARA LEASHORE, Hearing Officer; C. HESTER, Lieutenant, V. MAYOL, Lieutenant; S. COX, Lieutenant; V. MYERS, Sergeant, Defendants. |
In this employment-discrimination action, defendants move to dismiss. For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motions as to plaintiff's federal claims are GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. On the other hand, plaintiff's state-law claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and are therefore DISMISSED.
In or around 1990, plaintiff Victor Guerrero was brought to the United States from Mexico at age eleven. He began working at fifteen, using a false social security number ("SSN"). Two years later in 1997, plaintiff acquired a legitimate Individual Taxpayer Identification Number ("ITIN") from the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") to pay taxes. Plaintiff acquired a legitimate SSN in 2007 once he obtained permanent resident status. He became a United States citizen in 2010.
In August 2011, plaintiff applied for a position as a correctional officer with defendant California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation ("CDCR"). He passed the written examination and physical agility tests and filled out an extensive background questionnaire. The questionnaire asked whether he "had or used a social security number other than the one . . . used on this questionnaire." He answered, "I found out that my legal status in this country was not very well defined" and therefore did not have an SSN. Accordingly, "I invented a number and used [it] to obtain work" (A.R. 47). A January 2012 letter from CDCR, signed by two individually-named defendants, informed plaintiff that he was not eligible for the position of correctional officer because he had failed to demonstrate "integrity, honesty, [and] good judgment," as required by State Personnel Board Rule 172. The letter went on to assert, inter alia, that plaintiff had "committed identity theft for eight years [by] utilizing a social security number of a United States citizen causing unknown ramifications for that person by having income reported under their number which they were unaware of (A.R. 2).
Plaintiff appealed to defendant State Personnel Board ("SPB"). In his appeal, plaintiff stated that "[a]t the age of 17, . . . my parents first made me aware that I was an undocumented worker and I also learned that the social security number they had provided me was fictitious" (A.R. 85). This statement that his parents "provided" him with the false SSN contradicted his previous statement to the CDCR.
SPB held an "informal hearing" and plaintiff was allowed to clarify any facts in his record to hearing officer defendant Barbara Leashore (Opp. at 9-10, Dkt. No. 43). SPB considered Leashore's recommendation to affirm CDCR and eventually issued an August 2012resolution affirming CDCR. SPB's resolution acknowledged plaintiff's argument that he did not "steal another's social security number," but it concluded that plaintiff had nonetheless shown a "knowing and willful disregard of the law" and therefore demonstrated "a lack of honesty, integrity, and good judgment." The resolution also accused plaintiff of misstating the year in which he had received his legitimate SSN, and asserted that this misstatement was evidence of "lack of thoroughness and accuracy, which are also issues of unsuitability under [S]ection 172" (A.R. 116).
In 2013, plaintiff then re-applied for the correctional officer position with defendant CDCR, but was again notified in October 2013 that he would be removed from the list of eligible candidates. After receiving a right-to-sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission "on the foregoing matters," plaintiff brought this action against SPB (including its individually-named officers in their official capacities) and CDCR (including its individually-named officers in their official capacities) on December 9, 2013 ( ).
The second amended complaint, the operative pleading, alleges three federal claims: (1) disparate impact under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act; (2) violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. 1983; and (3) violations of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. 1983. It also alleges the following California state-law claims: (4) violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act; (5) violation of Government Code Section 11135; (6) violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the California Constitution; and (7) violation of the Due Process Clause of the California Constitution; and additionally requests writs of mandate for (8) violation of the California Due Process Clause; (9) unlawful expansion of legislation; and (10) violation of state and federal anti-discrimination laws. This order follows full briefing and oral argument.
To survive a motion to dismiss, a pleading must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Lack of a cognizable legal theory or mere conclusory allegations, however, will result in dismissal. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009).
CDCR moves to dismiss all federal claims under Rule 12(b)(6). In addition to fully joining CDCR's motion to dismiss, SPB separately argues that it is entitled to absolute immunity, immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, and that it is not liable under Title VII.
Plaintiff seeks monetary damages against CDCR and SPB under Title VII. He does not, however, seek monetary damages from CRCR or SPB under Section 1983. In addition, he does not seek monetary damages under any theory from any individually-named employee of either CDCR or SPB.
SPB claims Eleventh Amendment immunity from plaintiff's Section 1983 claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. The Eleventh Amendment bars "a citizen from bringing a suit against his own State in federal court." Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 237-38 (1985). Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to actions against state agencies, such as CDCR and SPB, Brown v. California Dep't. of Corr., 554 F.3d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 2009), as well as to individuals sued in their official state capacities "because the state is the real party in interest," Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 631 (9th Cir. 1988).
Congress, however, can abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity without the consent of the states if it does so through an unequivocal expression of congressional intent. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 454 (1976). Relevant to this action, the Supreme Court found that Congress intended to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity for Title VII claims; therefore, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar plaintiff from seeking money damages from CDCR or SPB under certain types of Title VII claims. Ibid. On the other hand, the Eleventh Amendment bars plaintiff from seeking money damages from CDCR or SPB under Section 1983. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 343-45 (1979).
The Eleventh Amendment, however, does not bar actions that only seek prospective relief. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
In determining whether the doctrine of Ex parte Young avoids an Eleventh Amendment bar to suit, a court need only conduct a straightforward inquiry into whether the complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.
Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n. of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002) (citations omitted).
SPB argues that plaintiff only seeks to contest SPB's previous adjudication of his appeal and therefore only seeks retrospective relief. This argument is rejected. Plaintiff seeks prospective relief because he still seeks to become a correctional officer. To this end, he re-submitted an application for a correctional officer position with the CDCR, which was denied, and currently has an appeal pending before SPB (Opp. at 12 n.6). SPB's claim for Eleventh Amendment immunity for plaintiff's Section 1983 claims is DENIED.
For its part, CDCR moves to eliminate the Section 1983 equal protection claim. "To state a claim under [Section 1983] for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment[,] a plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class." Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1030 (9th Cir. 2013) (emphasis added). While discriminatory intent may be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence, unintentional conduct that has a disparate impact on minorities does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1976). The complaint alleges that defendants' policy "have caused and will continue to cause the disqualification of Latino and/or all non-native born U.S. citizen applicants as opposed to applicants of other national origins" and their actions were "intentional, willful, malicious, and/or done with reckless disregard . . . ." (Sec. Amd. Compl. ¶¶ 68, 77).
It is true that the complaint alleges that defendants intended to discriminate against plaintiff based on his race. This allegation, however, is highly conclusory and insufficient to meet the Iqbal pleading standard. See Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2013)(Iqbal and Twombly apply to Section 1983 claims). Accordingly, CDCR's motion to dismiss plaintiff's...
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